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Introduction
Each year more than one million children experience the divorce of
their parents.' In 1981, the last year for which complete figures are
available, about five million children lived with a divorced parent-nine
2
percent of all children under age eighteen in the United States.
1. After a prolonged period of rising dramatically, the divorce rate has recently stabilized at
the rate of about 5.0 per 1,000 population. Approximately 55% of all divorces involve children.
National Center for Health Statistics, Advance Report of Final Divorce Statistics 1981, MONTHLY
VITAL STATISTICS REP., Jan. 17, 1984, at 1-2. See generally Spanier & Glick, MaritalInstability in
the UnitedStates: Some Correlatesand Recent Changes, 31 FAM. REL. 329 (1981) (highlighting the
demographic consequences of marital instability for children and families).
2. National Center for Health Statistics, supranote 1, at 1; see also BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, SERIES P-23, No. 84, DIVORCE,
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All of these children contract what may be thought of as a disease of
childhood-a disease usually without physical symptoms, but posing a
serious threat to a child's emotional, financial, and educational well-being. Most of the time its effects are short-term and containable. Sometimes the child who contracts it emerges emotionally stronger as a result.
Sometimes, however, the disease has complex, long-term ramifications
from which the child never recovers. The attending physician for the
child affected by this disease is not a medical doctor but the system of
custody law and procedure. The most important goal of divorce-related
child custody law is to act in the best interests of the child, the most
vulnerable member of the dissolving family. The most important principle of medical treatment is that a doctor should do the patient no harm.
Judged by either legal or medical standards the current legal system fails
to meet its obligations to the child.
A divorce-related custody dispute often causes more damage to the
affected child than if lawyers and judges had never become involved.
Contested custody disputes often drag on for years without resolution,
leaving the child trapped between battling parents, adversarial lawyers,
and overburdened courts applying uncertain substantive standards
through procedures that increase parental conflict and expense.
One reason that the legal system does not deal effectively with divorce-related custody disputes stems from its confused sense of mission
about them. In the past, the legal system essentially designated one sex
as the winner of a custody dispute-first the father, then the mother virtually always won.3 Now, however, no-fault divorce, evidence suggesting
the importance of both parents in the child's life, the increase in the
number of working women with children, and the national movement for
legal equality between the sexes all challenge the assumptions behind this
prevailing pattern of custody awards. Increasing recognition that the
lives of parents and children are interdependent after divorce as well as
before and that legal certification of marital dissolution does not destroy
the family's continuing relationships also challenge the assumptions behind sole custody.
This undermining of the premises of traditional custody law and
procedure has thrown the legal system into a crisis of purpose. Courts
cannot decide if their job is to choose between parents or to seek to recCUSTODY AND CHILD SUPPORT 1-2 (1979) (finding the increase of children living in single parent
homes headed by women results mainly from the increase in the divorce rate, even though the increase in the number of children who live with a mother who never married the father has exploded
in recent years, particularly among blacks); Recommendations, supranote *, at 108 n.7 (charting the
comparative dimensions of the one-parent family phenomena by marital status).
3. For a review of the history of standards for determining custody, see infra subpart I(A).
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oncile them. The legal system cannot make the life of the child in a
custody dispute better if it does not know what making life better means
or what procedures can help accomplish that goal.
This Article tries to resolve this "identity crisis" by describing and
defending a new model for the custody dispute resolution system-one
whose overriding aim is to better serve the needs of the child affected by
divorce by promoting cooperation between divorced parents. The Article has four themes.
First, the child's interests in reducing the emotional trauma of divorce and receiving adequate financial support are best served if society
promotes the long-term involvement of both parents in the child's
postdivorce life. The assumptions behind the traditional sole custody
award do not adequately recognize that, for the child, divorce should not
be the death of the family but the occasion for its reorganization. The
assumptions, philosophy, and especially the symbolism of joint custody
are, on the other hand, in the best interests of the child. The risks ofjoint
custody are risks worth taking in the interests of trying to shift divorcing
parents from combat to cooperation.
Second, change in the procedures for resolving custody disputes is
an indispensible component of a shift in the substantive law to favor joint
over sole custody. The state cannot mandate that parents cooperate after
divorce unless it also provides procedural mechanisms-mediation and
neutral evaluations-that encourage them to do so. To promote cooperative parenting, the state must, through its procedures for dispute resolution, create an atmosphere for negotiation that encourages both parents
to make concessions that will insure the other parent is involved in the
child's postdivorce emotional and financial life. Once that atmosphere is
created, the state should, to the maximum extent possible, honor parental agreements on custody arrangements.
Third, the role of the state must change to encourage a shift from
combative to cooperative postdivorce parenting. The state should not
play the role of referee for parental combat in a one-shot decision allocat4
ing the child. Rather than wishing custody disputes would go away,
courts must function for a family in crisis like a trustee in bankruptcy
4. Several empirical studies confirm that judges dislike handling custody cases and regard
them as undesirable duty because of the intensity of emotion associated with them and the absence of
"legal issues." Lombard, Judicial Interviewing of Children in Custody Cases: An Empirical and
Analytical Study, 17 U.C.D. L. REv. 807, 812 & n.31 (1984). The strain of decision making in
custody cases also seems particularly intense. "A judge agonizes more about reaching the right
result in a contested custody issue than about any other type of decision he renders." B. BOTEIN,
TRIAL JUDGE 273 (1952); see also Pearson & Ring, JudicialDecision-Makingin Contested Custody
Cases, 21 J. FAM. L. 703, 722 (1982-1983) (citing similar statements by other judges).
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seeking to restore a firm in crisis to economic viability. Society must
view a custody dispute as a phase in the judicially supervised reorganization of the family. Intervention by the state should generally be brief and
in all cases be aimed at restoring the family to health by reestablishing its
capacity to deal with its problems autonomously.
Finally, the cooperative custody system must recognize, but not be
dominated by, the special economic needs of women who were the primary caretakers of children before divorce. A mother who has devoted
herself to child care and who does not possess marketable job skills suffers economically when her family structure dissolves. Society has a responsibility to protect her financial stake in the marital partnership.
Society, however, also has a responsibility to the child, and must avoid
allowing the mother to hold the child's need for a paternal relationship
hostage for the payment of support obligations. Linking custody and
money in divorce negotiations and enforcement only creates disengaged
fathers, 5 mothers who do not receive the economic support they deserve,
and children deprived of a relationship with one of their parents. The
cooperative custody system could break that cycle by inducing regular
payment of support through reducing the atmosphere of hostility that
surrounds the divorce, custody, and child support enforcement process
and by creating an emotional climate in the reorganized family that
welcomes the long-term postdivorce involvement of both parents in the
child's life.
The body of this Article documents and explains these basic themes,
which are interwoven throughout. Part I describes the history and current status of substantive custody law. Part II analyzes empirical evidence on the effects of divorce on the child, and on whether sole or joint
custody is in the best interests of the child. It also considers how the
legal system should resolve questions raised by empirical uncertainty
over what custody rule is in the best interests of the child, and over the
fairness of sole and joint custody to the child's parents.
Part III describes how adversary procedures for resolving custody
disputes aggravate the problems of the family after divorce. Part IV
evaluates the principal proposals that have been made to "fix" the
problems of the sole custody/adversary procedure system for resolving
custody disputes: making divorce more difficult for parents to obtain;
appointing a lawyer for the child; and using court-appointed neutral
mental health experts to help formulate a custody plan.
5. This Article uses "father" to identify the noncustodial parent. This assumption does not
always ring true. It is estimated that almost one million fathers in the United States have custody
over their children though not necessarily all because of divorce.
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Part V describes the procedure and basic substantive law of a cooperative custody dispute resolution system, and Part VI defends the principal features of the cooperative custody system described in Part V.
Finally, Part VII describes how a cooperative custody system deals with
serious conflicts between divorced parents by discussing how it copes
with a parent's desire to relocate with the child.
I.

Substantive Custody Standards: Where We Are
and How We Got There

The assumptions behind the general rule of sole custody to the
mother have been challenged by social science evidence, the movement
away from fault in divorce, and the drive for legal equality of the sexes.
Widely agreed-upon alternative assumptions have not emerged to fill the
void. The result is a crisis of purpose in the legal system's struggle to
resolve custody cases in the child's best interests. Some definitions and
background are necessary to describe the confusion of current custody
law.
A.

The Functions of the Substantive Standards

Most states group two different functional concepts under the single
label of "custody" when referring to disputes between divorcing parents--"physical" and "legal" custody. 6 Even though this conceptual division exists in theory, the parent who receives primary physical custody
usually controls all major decisions concerning the child's upbringing.
Nonetheless, this division lies at the heart of most states' approach to
child custody disputes and, therefore, requires explanation.
Physical custody refers to the child's living arrangements and to the
responsibility for the child's day-to-day care. 7 Joint physical custody occurs in an intact family-the parents live in the same house with their
child. When one parent moves out, the problem of deciding how to allocate physical custody rights between them arises.8
Legal custody refers to decisions for the child, such as where the
6. Beck v. Beck, 86 N.J. 480, 486-87, 432 A.2d 63, 65-66 (1981); see, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 4600.5(d) (West Supp. 1986) (defining "legal" and "physical" custody); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 518.003 3(a), (c) (West Supp. 1986) (same). Cf. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 14.02, 14.04 (West
Supp. 1985) (organizing custody under a managing conservator and a possessory conservator).
7. Comment, Joint Custody: An Alternativefor Divorcing Parents,26 UCLA L. REV. 1084,
1087 (1979).
8. The separated parents may live great distances apart; one parent may want to minimize the
amount of time the other parent spends with the child; one parent may want to place conditions on
the actions of the other parent when the child is present. One such condition might be no overnight
stays in the same house when the other parent's lover is there.
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child's primary residence should be, which school the child will attend,
what the child's religious training will be, whether the child can enter
into a contract, and what medical treatments the child will undergo.
"Graphically stated, the legal custodian chooses the nursery school; the
physical custodian determines the child's bedtime." 9
Courts traditionally allocate legal and physical custody between divorcing parents who do not reach an agreement on these issues using the
framework of "sole" custody. In it, the court designates one parent as
the child's primary physical custodian, entitling that parent to most of
the child's physical custody. The court then grants "visitation" rights to
the other parent, which amount to temporary physical custody of the
child, preserving a role for both parents in the physical custody of the
child. A noncustodial parent who meets the minimum standards of the
abuse and neglect laws has a virtually absolute right to some visitation
with the child even over the objections of the other parent and the
child. 10 Courts almost uniformly recognize the desirability of the child's
maintaining contact with both parents through visitation with the noncustodial parent. Courts will, at least in theory, enforce visitation rights
by contempt and other sanctions.1 1 Many courts, for example, have
placed significant restrictions on the right of the primary physical custodian to move the child away from the jurisdiction and defeat the visitation rights of the child and the noncustodial parent. 12 Nevertheless, the
traditional visitation award severely limits the time that the noncustodial
parent may spend with the child, usually to two weekends a month and
13
some period of the child's summer vacation.
In a sole custody framework, courts tend to award both primary
physical and legal custody of the child to the same "sole" or "primary"
custodial parent.14 Unlike standards for physical custody, however, stan9. Comment, supra note 7, at 1087.
10. See, e-g., French v. French, 452 So. 2d 647 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (overturning total ban
on visitation of father with children even though father failed to acknowledge the impropriety of an
extramarital affair and "appeared insensitive to the emotional pain he caused the wife and children"); Katz v. Katz, 97 A.D.2d 398, 467 N.Y.S.2d 223 (1983) (father who abused wife in child's
presence cannot be denied all visitation with child); Cabalquinto v. Cabalquinto, 100 Wash. 2d 325,
669 P.2d 886 (1983) (visitation cannot be restricted because of parent's homosexual lifestyle). See
generally Novinson, Post-Divorce Visitation: Untying the TriangularKnot, 1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 121

(exploring the competing interests involved in the resolution of visitation disputes and the constitutionality of different approaches to visitation arrangements).
11. But see Note, Visitation Rights: ProvidingAdequate Protectionfor the NoncustodialParent,

3 CARDOZO L. REV. 431, 436-40 (1982) (describing lack of enforceability of visitation orders).
12. See infra Part VII.
13. See generally M. ROMAN & W. HADDAD, THE DISPOSABLE PARENT: THE CASE FOR

JOINT CUSTODY 1-21 (1978) (describing with personal stories the limitations courts place on fathers'
visitation rights).
14. Comment, supra note 7, at 1087.
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dards governing legal custody generally do not formally preserve a role
for both parents. Decision-making power over major matters in the
5
child's upbringing is allocated to the primary custodial parent.'
B.

A Brief HistoricalOverview

The rules allocating sole custody to one parent or the other have
varied over time according to changes in child-rearing practices and in
the relative social and economic positions of mothers and fathers. At
early English common law, for example, the father had an absolute right
to physical and legal custody of his child.' 6 In part, this rule was a logical extension of the wife's property-like relationship to her husband. It
also reflected a view of the family that was closely tied to the ownership
and preservation of property through a patriarchal system of heredity.' 7
In the colonies, the courts began to inquire into "fault" in awarding
custody to one parent or the other. This gave the mother a chance to win
custody where none existed before. Most of the early decisions, however,
focused on the parents, and it was not until the early 1900s that the focus
truly shifted to the child's interest. 18
15. E.g. Patrick v. Patrick, 17 Wis. 2d 434, 438, 117 N.W.2d 256, 258 (1962); see also Comment, supra note 7, at 1087 (discussing the relationship between legal and physical custody). Absent
a provision in a parental agreement about custody rights restricting the custodial parent's decisionmaking power over the child, courts usually will not "second-guess" a primary custodial parent's
determination about a child's religious upbringing even if the noncustodial parent is opposed to it.
E.g. Bentley v. Bentley, 86 A.D.2d 926, 448 N.Y.S.2d 559 (1982); Mester v. Mester, 58 Misc. 2d 790,
296 N.Y.S.2d 193 (Sup. Ct. 1969); see also In re Adoption of Vogt, 219 N.W.2d 529, 531 (Iowa
1974) (noncustodial parent with visitation rights but who does not provide financial support cannot
veto adoption of child by a stepparent). But cf Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979) (unconstitutional to permit unmarried mother but not involved unmarried father of child veto power over
child's adoption).
Absent agreement to the contrary, the noncustodial parent generally does not have a right to be
consulted on major decisions about the child, Lerner v. Superior Court, 38 Cal. 2d 676, 242 P.2d 321
(1952), and has no common-law right of access to information about the child from sources such as
public school records, Graham v. Graham, 428 S.W.2d 941 (Mo. Ct. App. 1968). The Family Educational Records and Privacy Act of 1974, 20 U.S.C. § 1232(g) (1982), now requires that in the
absence of a court order to the contrary, noncustodial parents have the same right of access to public
school records as custodial parents. See also TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.04(c) (West Supp. 1985)
(extending noncustodial parent's access to all school, medical, and dental records).
16. See Ex ParteDevine, 398 So. 2d. 686, 688-92 (Ala. 1981) (discussing paternal preference);
R.

HURD, A TREATISE ON THE RIGHT OF PERSONAL LIBERTY AND ON THE WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS AND THE PRACTICES CONNECTED WITH IT 465 (1858); see also Foster & Freed, Life with
Father: 1978, 11 FAM. L. Q. 321, 321-33 (1978) (summarizing the evolution of custody rights from

paternal to maternal preference). But see Zainaldin, The Emergence of a Modern American Family
Law: Child Custody, Adoption and the Courts,1796-1851, 73 Nw. U.L. REV. 1038, 1053 n.48 (1978)
(describing instances when judges exercised discretionary power to deny custody rights of fathers in
favor of best interests of child).
17. Zainaldin, supra note 16, at 1049.
18. Certain courts did inquire into the interests of a child. In the earliest reported American
decision in a child custody dispute, the court rejected the rule that custody should automatically be
awarded to the father and exercised discretion by determining it was in the child's best interests to
leave him with his mother and maternal grandfather in whose care he had been doing well. Nickols
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The presumption that the child's interest usually lay with the
mother resulted from the change in social and economic trends in the
late nineteenth century. Industrialization, and its demand for workers,
removed men from the home and changed the economic nature of the
family.1 9 Wages replaced property as the economic base of most families. 20 Women undertook the full-time responsibility of rearing children
and managing the household, while men earned the wages that provided
the family's economic support. It became "natural" in the sense of the
prevailing social pattern that mothers reared children as a full-time
occupation. 21
Once this prevailing social pattern became established, it received
"scientific" support from early psychoanalytic preoccupation with the
primacy of the mother-child relationship in the child's emotional development.22 Because of Freud's influence, "the prevailing assumption in
American developmental psychology [became] that the more secure and
undiluted the infant's attachment to a single caregiver, the greater the
child's ability to form close emotional relationships and to cope with psychological stress in the future."'2 3 Given prevailing economic and social
patterns, the mother usually filled this role.
Judges responded to this scientific wisdom and social necessity.
Although they declared over and over again that custody decisions
would be made solely on the basis of the child's best interests, with
neither parent having a primary possessory right, courts decided repeatedly that a child of "tender years" should be in the custody of its mother,
who alone had the innate ability to nurture.24 Until the 1970s, this docv. Giles, 2 Root 461 (Conn. 1796), described in Zainaldin, supra note 16, at 1052-53. Since the
1840s, New York statutes and court decisions have instructed judges to make the welfare of the child
the dominant consideration in custody decisions. See Zainaldin, supra note 16, at 1069 & n.131.
19. Zainaldin, supra note 16, at 1051.
20. Stack, To Owns the Child?: Divorce and Custody Decisions in Middle-ClassFamilies, 23
Soc. PROBS. 505, 506 (1976).
21. See Zainaldin, supra note 16, at 1047-52; see also E. SHORTER, THE MAKING OF THE MODERN FAMILY (1976) (exploring the history and development of the modem nuclear family).
22. "Although Freud acknowledged that infants did... identifLy] with both parents.., he
stressed that both boys and girls formed their first and most important relationships with their
mothers." Lamb, Fathers and Child Development An Integrative Overview, in THE ROLE OF THE
FATHER IN CHILD DEVELOPMENT 7 (2d ed. 1981). Recently psychoanalytic thinking has shifted its
emphasis. See Machtingler, The Fatherin Psychoanalytic Theory, in THE ROLE OF THE FATHER IN
CHILD DEVELOPMENT 113-53 (2d ed. 1981) (examining psychoanalytic literature from 1975-1980
about the "meanings and functions of the father"; the literature "stress[es] the importance of the
father in aiding the process of psychic differentiation and individuation in the child").
23. Clingempeel & Reppucci, Joint Custody After Divorce: MajorIssues and Goalsfor Research,
91 PSYCHOLOGICAL BULL. 102, 112 (1982).
24. See Roth, The Tender Years Presumption in Child Custody Disputes, 15 J. FAM. L. 423,
432-38 (1976-1977); Zainaldin, supra note 16, at 1072-74. Conversely, for a time many courts believed adolescent boys belonged in the custody of their fathers who could prepare them for occupations in the world of which mothers had no knowledge. Zainaldin, supra note 16, at 1073-74.
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trine dictated a prevailing pattern for custody awards25 that granted the
mother primary physical and legal custody of the child and limited the
father's legal role in the child's life to visitation rights.
Four dramatic developments have challenged most of the assumptions underlying this predominant pattern: the rise of no-fault divorce;
the entry of women into the labor force; the drive for legal equality of the
sexes; and the empirical evidence establishing the importance of the
child's father in the child's life both before and after divorce.
To some extent, the prevailing pattern of custody awards to the
mother was reinforced by an unarticulated premise that philandering
husbands were "at fault" for most divorces, leaving virtuous wives without cause. In the 1960s, however, the value of using fault as an appropriate basis for the legal system to make decisions about the availability of
27
divorce came under intense scrutiny. 26 Beginning with California,
2
8
every state has enacted no-fault divorce of one kind or another. The
philosophical assumptions of no-fault divorce are the direct antithesis of
those underlying the fault system. The theory of no-fault divorce is that
the interaction of people in intimate relationships is too complex to make
fault assessments based on individual acts. It posits that in most cases
29
the partners share blame in some sense, or neither is to blame.
A number of other problems with fault divorce also fueled the nofault movement. Fault standards encouraged perjury and false creation
of residency in states with lenient divorce grounds for couples who
agreed to divorce by mutual consent. In addition, fault determinations
required judicial fact-finding about the intimate details of family life, a

25. In some states, the "tender years" presumption was codified by statute; in other states it
became law through the pronouncements of the appellate courts, sometimes in spite of a statute that
declared the sexes had equal rights to custody. See Roth, supra note 24, at 432-38.
26. Prior to the 1960s, fault played a central role in the availability of divorce and in the accompanying custody decisions. The state asserted a strong interest in preserving the marriage relationship. The state thus reserved the right to divorce to a spouse who could prove that the other spouse
created the problems in the marital relationship by committing a morally blameworthy act, usually
thought of as drunkenness, loose morals, or adultery. In that context, sole legal and primary physical custody of the children in part rewarded the virtuous spouse and in part punished the guilty
spouse's wrongful conduct. See C. FOOTE, R. LEVY & F. SANDER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
FAMILY LAW 1073-1101 (2d ed. 1976) (containing an imaginary discourse on divorce policy among
a bishop, a law professor, and a doctor, in which the bishop articulates much of the rationale underlying a fault-based divorce system); see also id. at 1101 nn.95-109 (discussing the theoretical basis of
fault and no-fault divorce); M. WHEELER, No-FAULT DIVORCE (1974) (providing an overview of
the history and policy basis of divorce reform in the United States).
27. See CALIFORNIA GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON THE FAMILY, REPORT (1966) (commonly

considered the landmark event in the development of no-fault divorce).
28. Freed & Walker, Family Law in the Fifty States: An Overview, 18 FAM. L.Q. 369, 379-89
(1985).
29. See C. FOOTE, R. LEVY & F. SANDER, supra note 26, at 1073-1101 (law professor advocating a no-fault approach to divorce).
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distasteful, privacy-invading process that seemed to further alienate the
spouses from each other rather than end the marriage with some sense of
30
dignity and mutual responsibility for its failure.
As a result of the no-fault movement, divorce may be obtained by
mutual consent of the spouses and in many states on the request of one
spouse alone. The creation of the new legal regime and accompanying
social milieu seriously questions the value of determining the virtuous
spouse. 3 1 The no-fault movement emphasized that the state's role in divorce i not dispensing retribution but encouraging sensible management
of effects, a role that helps to protect the interests of an innocent and
32
helpless third party to the divorce transaction-the child.
The entry of women into the work force also contributed to the
changing notions of child custody after divorce. During the development
of the prevailing pattern of sole custody, in middle-class families the father worked full-time and the mother stayed home full-time to take care
of the children. It was thus logical, and perhaps inevitable, that sole custody should be awarded to the mother who had the time and energy to
devote to the "private" dimensions of family life after divorce and few
skills with which to earn money in the marketplace.
Out of choice or economic necessity, women have entered the labor
force in staggering numbers, undermining the "mother stays home while
father works" assumption of the sole custody system. 33 The prevailing
work pattern no longer supports the theory that only the mother has the
necessary time to devote to proper child-rearing. 34 Even for those women who do not work during their marriage, six months after their divorce they will probably be working.
30. Id. at 1089; M. WHEELER, supra note 26, at 13.
31. Many courts downplay the role of fault in making divorce related economic determinations.
See Wilson v. Wilson, 101 A.D.2d 536, 544, 476 N.Y.S.2d 120, 125 (1984) (generally excluding
marital fault from consideration in maintenance awards); Blickstein v. Blickstein, 99 A.D.2d 287,

292, 472 N.Y.S.2d 110, 113 (1984) (generally excluding marital fault as a factor in distributing
property under the state's equitable distribution statute, except for "blatant disregard of the marital
relationship-misconduct that 'shocks the conscience' of the court"); Hinton v. Hinton, 11 FAM. L.
REP. (BNA) 1005 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984) (rejecting fault as a discretionary factor in distributing
marital property under state equitable distribution statute after reviewing cases from many states).
32. See infra subpart II(B)(2)(a).
33. In 1970, 39% of all mothers with children under eighteen worked outside the home; in
1982, the proportion was 55%. HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON CHILDREN, YOUTH AND FAMILIES, U.S. CHILDREN AND THEIR FAMILIES: CURRENT CONDITIONS AND RECENT TRENDS, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1983) [hereinafter cited as HOUSE COMMITTEE REPORT]. In 1970, 29% of all
mothers with children under five worked outside the home. The figure in 1982 was 46%. Id. at 13.

Divorced and separated mothers are more likely to be in the labor force than mothers who are
married. Sixty-seven percent of divorced mothers with children under age five work outside the
home; the comparable figure for married mothers is 48.7%. Of divorced mothers with children over
age six, 83.6% work outside the home; for married mothers, the comparable figure is 63.2%. Id.
34. This can also be seen in the shift away from permanent alimony.
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The increasing drive for legal equality of the sexes spurred by the
women's movement also undermines the assumptions behind awarding
sole custody to the mother. Some in the women's movement emphasize
the need for child care and other responsibilities to be shared within the
family so that women can enter the labor force and realize their personal
and economic potential through work.35 Others emphasize the importance of equalizing the status of women who work in the home with their
wage-earning husbands. 36 These notions form the basis for the drive for
legal equality within the family expressed in the partnership theory of
marriage, the dominant modern metaphor for describing the legal organization of the family. 37 Under a partnership model of the family, husbands and wives remain legal equals, although they might contribute in
different ways and in different degrees to the total welfare of the family
unit.
The partnership theory has been generally applied only to the economic aspect of marriage. For example, community property states reflect this theory in recognizing that all income and property received
during marriage belongs to both partners equally, regardless of which
partner actually "earned" the wages. 3 8 The partnership concept, however, cannot logically and emotionally be limited to dollars and cents. Its
reach extends to the other major task of the family, raising children. If
marriage is an economic partnership regardless of the role a partner
plays in creating the family's economic wealth, it is also a parental partnership regardless of the role each parent actually plays in raising the
39
child.
A final development that undermined the traditional pattern of sole
custody to the mother is the increasing amount of empirical evidence
questioning its psychoanalytic underpinnings: the primacy of the
35. Uviller, Fathers'Rights and Feminism: The MaternalPresumptionRevisited, 1 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 107, 109-11 (1978).
36. COMMITTEE ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN 16-18 (1963).
37. See Younger, MaritalRegimes: A Story of Compromise and Demoralization, Together with
Criticismsand Suggestionsfor Reform, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 45, 64-77 (1981) (describing the partnership theory as the basis of both the community and equitable distribution systems of allocating
marital assets after divorce).
38. See, e.g., Connor v. Connor, 97 A.D.2d 88, 97, 468 N.Y.S.2d 482, 490 (1983) (description
of a community property system by a common-law court).
39. Cf Jacobs, Treatment of Divorcing Fathers: Social and PsychotherapeuticConsiderations,
140 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1294, 1296 (1983) ("Within the intact family, many of these [divorced men
the author treated] felt they were doing their best for their children by being the breadwinner and
allowing the mothers to fulfill the nurturing role for both of them. With marital separation, some
fathers no longer viewed their wives as functional extensions of themselves .... "). For a discussion
of the role of the partnership principle and the primary caretaker preference in custody law, see infra
subpart 1113)(2)(b).
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mother-child relationship and the importance of a child's intense attachment to a single caregiver for future emotional well-being. Numerous
studies confirm the importance of both parents in the child's emotional
life in intact families 4° as well as in divorced families.4 1 These findings
have confirmed that the partnership theory of parenting not only symbolizes the legal equality of the sexes but also reflects the reality of life for
most children. Both parents remain important to a child's development
despite the difference in the amount of time each spends with the child. 42
Available evidence indicates that a child generally has emotional attachments to both parents as well as other significant persons in his life like
caretakers and grandparents. 43 Except perhaps for unweaned breastfed
babies, neither one of the child's parents serves as the psychological parent with whom a child's relationship is more necessary than with the
other.
All of these changes have slowly begun to affect custody decision
making. Most states have abrogated the "tender years" presumption by
statute or case law.44 As with the removal of any presumption in law,
the inquiry shifts from a simple issue to a wide-ranging, multifactor inquiry into what custody arrangements are in the best interests of the
child.4 5 Some statutes simply direct courts to make custody decisions in
the child's best interests, 4 6 leaving it to case law to flesh out the meaning
40. See Cochran & Vitz, Child Protective Divorce Laws: A Response to the Effects of Parental
Separation on Children, 17 FAM. L.Q. 327, 340 (1983) ("The great importance of the father in the
development and education of his children-sons and daughters-is one of the best documented
findings within the social sciences within the last twenty years."). For an overview of the research
about the father's role in child development, see Lamb, supra note 22.
41. For a discussion of the extensive evidence concerning the importance of involvement of
both parents in the child's life after divorce, see infra subparts II(A)(1)(a)-(c).
42. See Clingempeel & Reppucci, supra note 23, at 107-10 (discussing how interaction with the
noncustodial parent helps the child's adjustment to divorce). Other than for children under six
months of age, the emotional significance of a parent to the child does not seem related to the child's
age or the parent's sex. See Lamb, supra note 22, at 13-14 (citing numerous studies that "confirm
that most infants are attached to both their parents from the second half year of life"). The emotional significance also does not seem to be proportionate to the amount of time a parent spends with
the child. See id. at 5-6 (citing numerous studies).
43. See infra text accompanying notes 67-68.
44. Some states continue to recognize the tender years presumption. Some require a showing of
"unfitness" to deprive a mother of custody, while others employ a "primary caretaker" custody
presumption, using it as a "tie-breaker" when both parents are deemed equally fit. See infra notes
184-85 and accompanying text. No Supreme Court decision has declared the "tender years" presumption to be unconstitutional on the grounds that it discriminates against men, and state courts
that have considered the issue are divided on it. See Developments in the Law: The Constitution and
the Family, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1156, 1333-38 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Developments].
45. See Salk v. Salk, 89 Misc. 2d 883, 393 N.Y.S.2d 841 (Sup. Ct. 1975) (illustrating wide
breadth of the "best interests" inquiry); see also Atkinson, Criteriafor Deciding Child Custody in the
Trial and Appellate Courts, 18 FAM. L.Q. 1 (1984) (summarizing standards used). See generally
Mnookin, Child Custody Adjudication: JudicialFunctions in the Face ofIndeterminancy, 39 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBs. 226 (1975) (discussing the indeterminacy of current standards).
46. E.g., N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 240 (McKinney 1984).
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of that term. Other statutes describe factors that go into a "best interests" analysis, such as the love and affection between parents and child,
the "moral fitness" of the parents, or the preferences of the child if "reasonable." 47 Yet the factors remain general considerations, without rank
or order and include a catch-all allowing the judge to consider "any
other factor.., relevant to a particular child custody dispute."4 8 In such
jurisdictions, the typical trial court "best interests" decision becomes a
potentially idiosyncratic prediction of which parent is more suitable to be
primary custodian based on comparative evaluation of their fitness for
the task.4 9 A presumptive shield from appellate review confirms that
wide discretion is given to a trial court's "best interests" determination.5 0
Despite these new trends most state trial court decisions in custody
cases in "best interests" jurisdictions still favor the mother. A recent
empirical study of contested custody cases in three Colorado judicial districts found that "[w]hen the father gets custody in contested situations,
it is almost always the result of mother misconduct.... Mothers, on the
other hand, do not seem to have to prove that their husbands are unfit.
The mother will get custody more often when all things appear equal
"51

C. Joint Custody
The changes undermining the traditional award of sole custody to
the mother have spurred the movement for joint custody, which seeks to
expand the role of both parents in the child's postdivorce life. 52 The term
47. E.g., MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.23.3 (West Supp. 1983).
48. Id.
49. Salk v. Salk, 89 Misc. 2d 883, 885, 393 N.Y.S.2d 841, 843 (Sup. Ct. 1975). The factors that
are considered in the comparative fitness evaluation are described and analyzed on the basis of reported opinions in Atkinson, supra note 45, at 4-36. For an empirical study of the factors trial
judges in one state use to measure comparative fitness of parents for custody, see Pearson & Ring,
supra note 4. Constitutionally suspect criteria such as the race of the parents and child cannot,
however, be a basis for the trial court's sole custody decision-making calculus. Palmore v. Sidoti,
466 U.S. 429 (1984).
50. See Mnookin, supra note 45, at 253-54 (noting that a presumptive shield arises from the
inherent value judgments made on the basis of witness demeanor at trial).
51. Pearson & Ring, supra note 4, at 716. Fathers fare better in the appellate custody courtroom. A recent review of all reported appellate custody cases in the West Reporter system between
January 1, 1982, and May 4, 1983, found that each sex won on appeal about 50% of the time.
Atkinson, supra note 45, at 8-11. One can only speculate about why the results on appeal indicate
equality of result between the sexes in custody contests while the picture in the trial courts is different. Fathers may contest custody in trial courts knowing they have no significant chance of winning
to increase bargaining strength on economic issues. Alternatively, fathers who lose at trial may be
discouraged from appealing by the general belief courts favor mothers; thus only the strongest father
custody cases are appealed. National results like those in the appellate survey also lump together
states in which the mother always wins with states in which the results are more equally divided.
52. See Folberg & Graham, Joint Custody of Children Following Divorce, 12 U.C.D. L. REV.
523, 529 (1979); Miller, Joint Custody, 13 FAM. L.Q. 345, 361-66 (1979).
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refers to parents sharing both physical or legal custody or merely aspects
of each. Joint custody does not always contemplate an equal division of
the child's physical presence.5 3 Physical custody plans in joint custody
arrangements take into account the parents' work schedules, the child's
school hours, and the geographic proximity of the parents' postseparation residences. Although in some states joint custody works out to be
no more than a label, generally, the physical custody aspects of joint custody arrangements involve both parents spending significantly more time
54
with the child than a "visiting" parent would.
Joint custody usually means continuing shared parental decisionmaking power over and shared rights to information about the child after
divorce on such major matters as education and medical care.5 5 Shared
decision making, however, does not mean that parents must consult
about every rule in the child's life. The parent who has physical custody
of the child at the particular time sets most of the day-to-day rules.
Joint custody flows logically from the trend of no-fault divorce and
the partnership theory of marriage. It assumes that the child benefits
from continuing relationships with both parents, even though they no
longer live together. Neither parent is presumptively more "fit" or the
superior legal or physical custodian for the child.
Approximately thirty states now provide some mention of joint custody in their state custody statutes, 56 with four degrees of preference
given to joint custody in contested decision making: 1) the court may
approve a parental agreement for joint custody;5 7 2) the court may order
59
joint custody; 58 3) joint custody is a preferred option in contested cases;
and 4) the court presumes joint custody unless shown that one or both
60
parents are unfit.
53. Beck v. Beck, 86 N.J. 480, 486-87, 432 A.2d 63, 65-66 (1981).
54. Miller, supra note 52, at 361.
55. Id. at 360.
56. Scott & Derdeyn, Rethinking Joint Custody, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 455, 456 n.5 (1984).
57. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 125.490 (1983) (rebuttable presumption that joint custody is
in the child's best interests "if parents have agreed to an award of joint custody"); see also Scott &
Derdeyn, supra note 56, at 475 ("when parents agree to joint custody ... ratification will be forthcoming absent unusual circumstances").
58. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-56(a) (West Supp. 1986) ("the court may assign
the custody of any child to the parents jointly"); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 571-46.1 (1984) ("joint
custody may be awarded in the discretion of the court"); MIcH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 722.27(a)
(West Supp. 1985) (court may "[a]ward the custody of the child to I or more of the parties involved")
(emphasis in original).
59. See, eg., CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600.5(a) (West Supp. 1985) (presumption that joint custody is
in the child's best interest, determined by factors including health and safety of the child, and history
of abuse against the child).
60. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 146(c) (West Supp. 1985) (rebuttable presumption that
joint custody is in the child's best interest; presumption rebutted by consideration of various factors,
including the moral, mental, and physical health of the parties involved).
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II.

Substantive Custody Rules: Empirical Evidence, Moral Fairness,
and Decision Making Under Uncertainty

The previous Part's background aids our consideration of how the
legal system should approach the problem of custody after divorce. This
Part analyzes the basic substantive standard that courts should apply
when facing a custody dispute. It proceeds on the premise that although
substantive custody law must try to be fair to the competing claims of the
parents, the most important test is whether a proposed substantive custody rule serves the best interests of the child.
A.

The EmpiricalEvidence on the Best Interests of the Child

Most of the research on the effects of divorce on a child points to
similar conclusions. 6' First, divorce produces significant and threatening
instability in a child's life that can cause the child to suffer in a variety of
ways-emotionally, financially, and in school achievement as compared
to her peers in two parent families. Second, the child's regular and
meaningful relationship with both parents following divorce can alleviate
much of this suffering.
L

The Effects of Divorce on Children.

(a) Emotional crisis and decreased parental competence.-All
researchers report that physical separation of parents creates a stressful,
frightening, and lonely period of a child's life. The protective bubble of
61. Description of and reliance on available research results, however, must begin with cautions, disclaimers, and qualifications. There is much we do not know. Research thus far on the
effects of divorce on children is less than perfect in design. The studies tend to involve small, selfselected members of families undergoing separation who are studied without comparison to a control
group. We thus have little or no data comparing levels of conflict and tension between children who
are and are not experiencing divorce. Further, we do not have many studies that isolate divorce
from other possible variables in the lives of children, such as race and class, that may affect their
emotional, financial, and educational status. See Biller, FatherAbsence, Divorce and Personality
Development, in THE ROLE OF THE FATHER IN CHILD DEVELOPMENT 490-92 (2nd ed. 1981);

Clingempeel & Reppucci, supra note 23, at 103-06; Jacobs, The Effect of Divorce on Fathers: An
Overview of the Literature, 139 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1235-36 (1982); Kurdek, Concluding Comments,
in CHILDREN AND DIVORCE 84 (L. Kurdek ed. 1983); Children of Divorce: Recent Research, 24 J.
AM. ACAD. CHILD PSYCHIATRY 515 (1985). Earlier assessments of the available research contain
similar cautions. See Ellsworth & Levy, Legislative Reform of Child Custody Adjudication: An Effort to Rely on Social Science Data in FormulatingLegal Policies, 4 LAW & Soc. REV. 167, 169-79
(1969). Review of the available evidence on the effects of divorce on children creates a profound
wish for more knowledge to help clarify what custody arrangements serve the child's best interests.
That better data do not exist attests to some extent how seriously our society takes the needs of
children. In the absence of definitive data, our choices are to conclude we know nothing and therefore should do nothing, or to formulate public policy based on inconclusive inferences from the
research that does exist. For an illuminating general discussion of the uses and abuses of social
science data in the formulation of legal policy, see Kalven, The Questfor the Middle Range: Empirical Inquiry and Legal Policy, in LAW IN A CHANGING AMERICA 56-74 (G. Hazard ed. 1968).
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the child's family bursts, causing intense anxiety and provoking fear of
62
the future.
Divorce simultaneously creates a crisis in parental competence and
availability for the child. Parents after divorce must adjust to new financial constraints, the demands of creating a social life for themselves, decreased emotional support, and the sense of failure that accompanies the
dissolution of significant relationships. 63 These parents must cope with
enormous changes, hindering their capacity to help their child at a time
when the child needs more guidance and support from adults.
The capacities of children to manage the emotional stress of parental
divorce and the crisis of parental competence it creates vary significantly.
In a landmark study of fifty families experiencing divorce in Main
County, California, Wallerstein and Kelly found that thiry-four percent
of the children had made appropriate progress in adjustment to the divorce. 64 About a third of the children in their sample, however, reported
significant depression and problems in school and social adjustment. 65
Other studies support Wallerstein and Kelly's findings. A major
study by Heatherington and Cox followed preschool children of fortyeight white middle-class divorced couples over two years and compared
66
them with forty-eight carefully matched children from intact families.
Children from divorced families tended to act aggressively, weep, whine,
and throw temper tantrums more often than their counterparts. This
deterioration in behavior interacted with and reinforced a deterioration
in the quality of parenting the children of divorce received. Divorced
parents set fewer rules for their children, disciplined them inconsistently,
and showed less affection toward them.
Those children whose parents encourage visitation with the noncustodial parent are best able to surmount the divorce crisis. 67 The empirical evidence thus confirms the psychological theory that interaction with
both parental figures shapes the child's emotional life. A child bases his
impressions of an absent parent on fantasy and idealization, resulting in
62. J. WALLERSTEIN & J. KELLY, SURVIVING THE BREAK-UP: How PARENTS AND CHILDREN COPE WITH DIVORCE 35-54 (1980).

63. Id. at 230-3 1.
64. Id. at 209.
65. Id. at 211.
66. The Heatherington and Cox research has been reported in a number of sources. Heatherington, Children and Divorce, in PARENT-CHILD INTERACTION: THEORY, RESEARCH AND PROSPECTS (R. Henderson ed. 1981); Heatherington, Cox & Cox, Family Interaction and the Social,
Emotional and Cognitive Development of Children Following Divorce, in THE FAMILY: SETrING
PRIORITIES (1979); Heatherington, Cox & Cox, The Aftermath of Divorce, in MOTHER-CHILD, FATHER-CHILD RELATIONS 149-76 (1978).
67. J. WALLERSTEIN & J. KELLY, supra note 62, at 215; see also Clingempeel & Reppucci,
supra note 23, at 107-09 (reviewing numerous studies).

704

Cooperative Custody
an unrealistically positive or negative image of that parent. Meaningful
contact with both parents after divorce allows a child to understand the
nature of the new familial relationships.6 8 Such contact also reduces the
child's fear that the divorce means the loss of a parent and relieves the
child's misdirected sense of personal guilt for "causing" the divorce. Evidence of children's expressed desires also shows that, for the most part,
children want more frequent interaction with the non-primary-caretaking parent than the time provided for in a typical alternate weekend visi69
tation schedule.
Regular contact with both parents not only provides emotional comfort for the child whose parents divorce but also increases the quality of
parenting the child receives as a result of it. A study by Hess and Camera, 70 for example, compared sixteen white middle-class divorced families
to a matched group of nondivorced families, 7 1 measuring four variables:
stress, work effectiveness, social relations, and aggression. The quality of
the child's relationship with both parents predicted best the child's rating
on the outcome variables. Children who had positive relationships with
both parents had lower stress and aggression ratings, and higher work
effectiveness and social relations ratings than children who had little con72
tact and poor relationships with one or both parents.
Overall, a recent and extensive review of the empirical research on
the effects of divorce on children concluded:
In the majority of cases, frequent interaction with the noncustodial
parent has been found to have a positive effect on children's adjustment to divorce .... Exceptions occurred in cases of mental disturbance of the noncustodial father and/or a high level of conflict
between the parents ....
A continued relationship with both parents [following
separation] not only provides additional emotional support [for the
child] but also potentially offers a larger array of positive characteristics to 73
model and a greater variety of cognitive and social
stimulation.
68. See Garrison, Why Terminate ParentalRights?, 35 STAN. L. REv. 423, 465-66 (1983) (reviewing and citing numerous studies).
69. This dissatisfaction is particularly acute among younger children. Clingempeel & Reppucci, supra note 23, at 107.
70. Hess & Camera, Post-Divorce Relationships as Mediating Factors in the Consequences of
Divorce for Children, J. Soc. IssuEs, Fall 1979, at 79.
71. The parents of the divorced families had lived in different households for two to three years.
The parents, children, and the children's teachers were interviewed; school records examined; and a
behavior checklist was completed on each family.
72. Hess & Camera, supra note 70, at 92.
73. Clingempeel & Repucci, supra note 23, at 107-09.

705

Texas Law Review

Vol. 64:687, 1985

(b) Financial support of children.-Divorce places a great
strain on the economic resources available in the family for the support
of the children. The typical child living in an intact family enjoys three
times the family income of a child living in a single parent family. 74 After separation, the parents must run two households rather than one.
The economies of scale that existed in maintaining a single family in a
single household no longer exist and the same amount of income must be
75
stretched to fit greater economic needs.
These economic changes magnify the anger and bitterness of divorce. A custodial parent and child might resent a decreased standard of
living, fueling bitterness against the noncustodial parent, particularly if
the child perceives that the noncustodial parent's new family is better off
economically. Such economic disparity strains relationships between the
parents, increases the stress on the custodial parent, and makes children
hostile and less trusting of adults in general. Although wealth may be
transferred from one parent to another in the form of child support payments, noncompliance is commonplace, and the child support enforcement system functions inadequately,7 6 a problem the legal system is just
77
beginning seriously to address.
Evidence suggests, however, that fathers who remain significantly
involved in the life of their children after divorce are more likely to pay
child support, thus increasing the financial well-being of the child and
the mother.78 David Chambers' landmark study of the effectiveness of
child support enforcement concluded that men who regularly visited
their children paid court-ordered child support at an especially high av74. HOUSE COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 33, at 15. This statistic, however, may overstate
the disparity because a large percentage of single parents have never been married.
75. The problem of reduced income is compounded if one or both parents starts a new family
after separation without an increase in available income. Whatever income the family had will now
have to provide for the needs of even more people. See D. CHAMBERS, MAKING FATHERS PAY 4266 (1981) (reviewing the effects of divorce on standard of living).
76. See generally D. CHAMBERS, supra note 75 (acknowledging the realities of nonpayment in
the present system); Weitzman, The Economics of Divorce: Social and Economic Consequences of
Property,Alimony and ChildSupport Awards, 28 UCLA L. Rav. 1181, 1253-56 (1981) (citing several
studies concerning problems with noncompliance).
77. The recently enacted federal Child Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984, 42 U.S.C.
§ 666(a)-(b) (Supp. 1984), "mandate that the states enact a number of specific remedies and procedures to improve their child support enforcement programs as a condition of continued state eligibility to participate in AFDC. [The amendments] also seek to equalize the treatment of AFDC and
non-AFDC families." Dodson & Horowitz, The Child Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984:
New Tools for Enforcement, 10 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 3051, 3051-62 (1984). In general terms, the
federal amendments mandate that all states use the child support enforcement techniques found
most effective in those states that currently use them, including income withholding, liens, bonds,
tax refund intercepts, and provision of information on delinquent child support payments to credit
reporting agencies. See infra note 293 and accompanying text (discussing higher compliance rates in
cases involving parental agreements).
78. D. CHAMBERS, supra note 75, at 127-28.
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erage rate and that men who had no contact with their children had the
lowest rate of payment.7 9 Chambers also found that conflicts over visitation resulted in lower child support payments, 80 to the child's detriment.
Yet these conflicts presented only short-term problems, easily remedied,
because both parents, in essence, cared enough about the child to find the
matter of visitation important, and therefore could be persuaded to care
81
about the welfare of their child.
Evidence from studies of families in joint custody arrangements confirm the link Chambers identified between parental involvement with the
82
child after divorce and the likelihood of payments of child support.
Deborah Leupnitz compared sixteen sole custodial mothers, sixteen sole
custodial fathers, eighteen parents with joint custody, and the ninety-one
children involved in these various custodial arrangements through indepth interviews and comparison of results on standard psychological
tests. She reports:
Fifty-six percent of the single-custody mothershad to return to court
because their ex refused to pay child support. One-third of these
women had not been successful at the time of their interview in
receiving any money from their ex. In contrast, none of the joint
custody parents had returned to court over money. Although
there were serious disagreements over money among the joint parents, they were able to negotiate them out of court. This is clearly
preferable, both in terms of emotional stress and the costs of legal
83
battles.
Other studies generally support the findings of Chambers and
79. Though Chambers cautions against drawing sweeping conclusions from his limited sample,
he observed:
For most men, both payments and visitation probably flow from a common sourceaffection for the child. In some cases, perhaps many, visitation may help induce continued
payments by keeping the child's needs vivid in the father's mind. If the latter is the case,
policies that encourage visitation may help produce higher collections.
Id. at 128.
80. "For many divorced couples, visitation is the one event within the mother's control that she
knows the father cares about, and child support payments are one event within the father's control
that he knows the mother cares about." Id.
81. "[Mien who fight over visitation are those who are, on the whole, involved with their children and that involvement is a good sign for high lifetime [child support] payments." Id. at 129.
82. These studies generally focus on postdivorce families in which the parents have agreed to
joint custody arrangements before trial, indicating a higher level of cooperation than parents who
litigate custody and support arrangements. This issue is discussed extensively infra subpart
II(A)(2)(a), as is the comparative emotional impact ofjoint and sole custody on children. The present point is only that more extensive involvement by parents with their children after divorce, as
symbolized by joint custody arrangements, seems to result in fewer problems in enforcing child
support obligations. Indeed, the available evidence indicates that parental agreement of any kind on
how child support obligations are to be satisfied leads to higher levels of child support payments
than if obligations are imposed by court order. See infra note 293 and accompanying text.
83. D. LEUPNITZ, CHILD CUSTODY: A STUDY OF FAMILIES AFTER DIVORCE 67 (1982) (emphasis in original).
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Leupnitz,8 4 and point to the not-surprising conclusion that a child is
more likely to receive financial support from his or her divorced father if
the father has a meaningful relationship with him or her.
(c) School performance.-The current research in this area indicates that children in one-parent families do not perform as well in
school as children in intact families. A 1980 survey of 18,000 students in
twenty-six elementary and secondary schools in fourteen states conducted by the National Association of Elementary School Principals
(NAESP) gauged the academic achievement and school performance of
children in one- as compared to two-parent families. s5 The NAESP
study confirmed that
children from one-parent families have more trouble in school than
do children whose families fit what we think of as the traditional
family mode. ... [A]s a group, one-parent children show lower
achievement and present more discipline problems than do their
two-parent peers in both elementary and high school. They are
also absent more often, late to8 6school more often and may show
more health problems as well.
In the elementary schools surveyed, thirty-eight percent of children living with only one parent were classified as low achievers compared to
only twenty-three percent of the children from two-parent families. Only
seventeen percent of children living with one parent were ranked as high
achievers in elementary school as compared to thirty percent of the children from two-parent families. The patterns of achievement in the sec87
ondary schools echoed the elementary school results.
The findings from NAESP as well as other studies 88 on the effects of
84. See, eg., Grief, Fathers,Children and Joint Custody, 49 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 311,
319 (1979) (concluding that fathers with joint custody are more likely to involve themselves in all
aspects of their child's growth development); Steinman, The Experience of Children in a Joint Custody Arrangement: The Report of a Study, 51 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 403, 408 (1981) (stating
that in the study of joint custody parents, financial arrangements were generally cooperative and
individually tailored to their capabilities).
85. NAESP Staff Report, One Parent Children and Their Families, 60 PRINCIPAL 31 (1980).
The study did not distinguish between children in one-parent families because of divorce or separation pending divorce from those in that situation for other reasons.
86. Id.
87. In secondary schools, 34% of the one-parent students were low achievers as compared to
22% of the two-parent children; 26% of one-parent children were high achievers as compared to
38% of their two-parent peers. Id. One-parent children are absent from secondary school an average of 11.1 days per semester, while their two-parent counterparts miss school an average of 7.16
days a semester. One-parent children are significantly more likely to be late to school. They are also
more likely to be truants or drop-outs. Because of this, one-parent children seem to be more likely to
be suspended or expelled. Id. at 33-34.
88. Wallerstein and Kelly conducted interviews with the children and parents in the divorced
families they followed and with school personnel, and they reported significant drops in school performance among the children in their sample, especially severe among adolescents. The decrease in
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divorce on children's academic achievement are confirmed by yet another source: the body of research on the effect of father absence on a
child's cognitive development. Many divorces result in reduced involvement by fathers with their children over time.89 The absence of father
involvement is associated generally with lower cognitive achievement. 90
(d) The child's need for speedy stability.-When parents divorce, the child needs stability of environment through continuing access
to the educational, emotional, and financial resources of both parents.
This stability, however, must be created as quickly as possible after the
parents' physical separation. A child has a special sense of time unlike
that of an adult, 9 1 and the younger the child, the more distorted is this
sense of time. To a very young child a week can be perceived as a year, a
month, a decade. Furthermore, a child is far less capable of bearing uncertainty and risk than an adult. The sooner the child's postdivorce family environment achieves equilibrium, the more likely the child will be
92
able to surmount the crisis the parental separation created.
2. Sole Versus Joint Custody.-The child thus has a major interest
in continuing relationships with both parents after divorce. In a perfect
world that allows parents to dissolve imperfect marriages, joint custody
seems to be an ideal form for a child's postdivorce family. Empirical
observations of the problems of sole custody from the perspective of the
child's interests reinforce this intuitive response.
Sole custody's major problem results from the adversarial battle it
often creates. The state designates one parent as the "winner" and the
other the "loser" of a prize-the child. The loser tends to internalize his
or her status as the less important parent and withdraws from the child's
capacity to perform in school accompanied the depression and anger the children felt as a result of
the divorce. J. WALLERSTEIN & J. KELLY, supra note 62, at 264-84. Furthermore, in the immediate
aftermath of the physical separation occuring after divorce, the teachers of two-thirds of the students
involved in the study noticed a significant change in behavior generally described as a new and
unaccustomed "restlessness"; to one degree or another these children had difficulty concentrating on
their work. Id. at 267-68.
A large percentage of the children Wallerstein and Kelly studied raised their school performance level within a year after the divorce, but even five years after the divorce a significant subgroup
was still intensely angry and school performance still suffered. Id. at 282-84.
89. M. ROMAN & W. HADDAD, supra note 13, at 74-75.
90. Biller, supra note 61, at 506-07; Clingempeel & Reppucci, supra note 23, at 109; Lamb,
supra note 22, at 21-23.
91. J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 43
(1973).
92. See Note, Lawyeringfor the Child: Principlesof Representation in Custody and Visitation
Disputes Arisingfrom Divorce, 87 YALE L.J. 1126, 1132-33 (1978) (discussing the importance of
swift adjudication in child custody disputes).
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life, 93 running away from the reminder of an extremely traumatic experience. A kind of "repetitive farewell" syndrome sets in every time visitation ends, with the visiting parent feeling rejected as the loser once again.
Rather than face the pain, these parents tend to decrease their visitation
and contact with the child. 94 Loss of financial, educational, and emotional support follows.
Some parents do overcome the feelings associated with being designated the less important parent, and they visit and support their children
regularly. For them, the problem centers on the nature of their relationship with their children; it is not fully that of parent and child.95 Their
time with the child, usually limited to weekends and holidays, verges on
the fantasy world; the "Disneyland Daddy" syndrome develops and the
child perceives his or her relationship with the visiting parent as pure fun
and games. 96 This syndrome contributes to another defect of sole custody-responsibility for parenting is placed on one parent who must balance its demands with economic and social stress. 97 Several studies
suggest that joint custody arrangements mitigate these problems of sole
custody, at least where the parents agree to such an arrangement without
98
court order.
When the parents agree to a joint custody arrangement, such an
arrangement fosters the child's continuing relationship with both parents
better than a sole custody arrangement. Debate, however, centers on
how much coercion the state should wield in promoting joint custody to
parents who will not initially agree to joint custody for emotional and
financial reasons.
(a) "Voluntary" and "involuntary" joint custody.-A prominent school of psychological theory suggests that if a court imposes joint
custody over the objections of one or both parents, the child's psychological environment will become unstable because of continuing conflict between the parents. The classic statement of this argument appears in
93. See Jacobs, supra note 61, at 1236-37. See generally M. ROMAN & W. HADDAD, supra note
13, at 74-75 (discussing effects of divorce on the parents).
94. Jacobs, supra note 61, at 1237; Scott & Derdeyn, supra note 56, at 459-60 & n.20.
95. See supra text accompanying notes 76-77, 93.
96. Some visiting parents-in an effort to make brief visits as pleasurable as possible-do not
take responsibility for imposing rules and limits on the child's behavior, which often creates an
unrealistic and undesirable contrast between the child's life with the custodial parent and the fantasy
life with the visitor. The child has one parent and a fairy godfather.
97. See supra notes 63-84 and accompanying text.
98. See D. LEUPNITZ, supra note 83; Grief, supra note 84; Steinman, Joint Custody: What We
Know, What We Have Yet to Learn, and the Judicial and Legislative Implications, 16 U.C.D. L.
REv. 739 (1983). See generally Clingempeel & Reppucci, supra note 23 (reviewing several studies
concerning single parent custody).
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Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit's Beyond the Best Interests of the Child.99
The authors argue that if the parents cannot agree on a custody arrangement themselves, the child's welfare requires that a single custodian be
chosen. Their theory asserts that a consistent relationship with one adult
authority figure is a precondition to the child's development of stable
relationships with other adults in later life. A child cannot relate well to
two adults in conflict because of the parents' inability to agree on custody
arrangements. When parents do not agree on custody, the task of the
legal system is simply to provide a rule of decision that protects the stability of the child's ongoing emotional relationships with his "psychological" parent.l°0 Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit contend that, once the court
identifies this parent, the child's interest in emotional stability requires
that the court grant the psychological/custodial parent the right to make
all decisions for the child, including the decision whether the other parent should even be allowed to visit the child. 1° 1
Beyond the Best Interests of the Child does not explicitly state
whether the authors would allow the legal system to ratify parents' negotiated joint custody arrangements. 102 In later writings, however, the authors indicate that parents should be able to negotiate any custody
arrangement they wish. 10 3 Presumably, then, the authors do not believe
that divorcing parents are always in such conflict that joint custody will
inevitably upset the child's psychological equilibrium. Yet their basic assumption divides the universe of divorcing parents into two parts: parents who agree voluntarily on joint custody arrangements and are thus
capable of a continuing relationship, and those who do not and are thus
in such great conflict that the state should not impose joint custody on
99. J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SoLNIT, supra note 91, at 37-39. The book has been exten-

sively cited by courts and criticized by social scientists. Crouch, An Essay on the Criticaland Judicial Reception of Beyond the Best Interests of the Child, 13 FAM. L.Q. 49 (1979).
100. One "who, on a continuing, day-to-day basis, through interaction, companionship, interplay and mutuality, fulfills the child's psychological needs for a parent, as well as the child's physical
needs." J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, supra note 91, at 98.
101. Id. at 38. The Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit premise has been severly criticized: "[T]he
slender volume, Beyond the Best Interests of the Child, is an academic example of over-reacting and
replacing inflexibility with rigidity." Foster & Freed, supra note 16, at 331.
102. In Beyond the Best Interests ofthe Child, the authors indicate that the determination of the
"custodial parent" will be made "either by agreement between the divorcing parents or by the court
in the event each claims custody." J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, supra note 91, at 38 n.*
(emphasis added). The authors do not mention the possibility of joint custody or even agreements
about visitation. The implication of their argument may be that a court should not approve a parental separation agreement with provisions concerning custody unless it provides for a sole custodian
with power to control the noncustodial parent's visitation rights.
103. See J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD

12 (1979) (urging a "policy of minimum coercive intervention by the state"); see also J. GOLDSTEIN
& A. SOLNrr, DIVORCE AND YOUR CHILD: PRACTICAL SUGGESTIONS FOR PARENTS 41-46 (1984)
(describing issues parents should consider in devising joint-custody agreements).
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them. Pretrial agreement becomes the test of whether the parents can
handle joint custody. Absent an agreement, the best interests of the child
require that the state should declare a winner and grant sole custody.
In the dozen years since the publication of Beyond the Best Interests
of the Child, the book has become the target of severe criticism from
social scientists who question its methodology, its conclusions, and the
benefits of adopting its premise. As one critique starkly stated, "[t]he
book's greatest utility may be as an example of the'1wrong way to employ
social science to solve problems of social policy."'
Three "major flaws" 10 5 have been identified in Goldstein, Freud,
and Solnit's research methodology: (1) the authors were casual in their
research methods, (2) they ignored pertinent findings of other studies,
and (3) they never described the group of children from whose experiences the authors drew their conclusions.
Only minimal data were presented in support of their position. In
the few instances in which data were provided, the design limitations of the studies were overlooked. Indeed, [other social scientists] stated that the authors of Beyond the Best Interests of the
Child have shown an overall tendency to "disregard the limitations
be drawn from the social science evion the inferences which10 can
6
dence they introduce."

The subjects of the research on which Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit based
their conclusions were apparently infants 0 7 who were being placed in
foster or adoptive homes because they had been abused or neglected in
the homes of their biological parents, or had been abandoned. As noted
by the Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry, the needs of these
deeply troubled children whose parents have wounded or abandoned
them are not the same as the child involved in a custody dispute between
two fit parents both seeking the greater share of involvement in the
child's postdivorce life:
The proposals advanced in their [Goldstein, Freud, and
Solnit's] work appear valid, as they apply to adoption and foster
care .... The extension and extrapolation, however, to custody
[O]ur disagreements with
disputes in divorce is not validated ...

these authors are basic.

104. Katkin, Bullington & Levine, Above and Beyond the Best Interests of the Child: An Inquiry

into the Relationship Between Social Science andSocialAction, 8 LAw & Soc. REV. 669, 669 (1974).
105. Felner & Farber, Social Policyfor Child Custody: A MultidisciplinaryFramework, 50 AM.
J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 341, 343 (1980).
106. Id. (citations omitted).
107. "The importance of continuity is... one of the 'findings' .... This follows from the fact
that the 'findings' derive from studies of young infants." Kadushin, Beyond the Best Interests of the
Child: An Essay Review, 48 Soc. SERVICE REV. 508, 513 (1974).
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[W]e noted above that the empirical work ... demon-

...

strates that the child from early infancy on can and often does have
more than one psychological parent. ....

What these authors do not recognize is that, in these disputes,
we are usually dealing with two psychological parents, a mother
and a father .... The child needs both parents.1 08

The authors of Beyond the Best Interests have also been castigated
for their disregard for other research. "[The book] does not contain a
single reference to any empirical study in the extensive literature on
adoption and foster placement. In fact, its references to material from
the social sciences include only a single citation to nonpsychiatric or
' 10 9
nonpsychoanalytic literature."
Second, other studies undertaken after the publication of Beyond the
Best Interests have produced empirical evidence that contradicts the assumptions of the earlier book. A major premise of the book was that a
child can have only one psychological parent: "The Wallerstein and
Kelly study provides substantial evidence contradicting the Goldstein,
Freud and Solnit position that a noncustodial parent will have difficulty
in serving as an object for love, trust and identification for the child." 110
Finally, commentators have questioned the benefits of adopting the
Beyond the Best Interests premise that giving one parent all powers over
the child is truly in the child's best interests.
[T]he visitation proposal advocated by Goldstein et al. might actually lead to an increase in parental strife and custody battles in
court. .

.

. [O]ne possible unintended consequence of the recom-

mendation of Goldstein et al., due to the failure to consider the
adversarial nature of the legal system, may be to encourage a situation that increases parental strife, certainly not the "least detrimental alternative" for the child. I
108. COMMITTEE ON THE FAMILY, GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY, DIVORCE, CHILD CUSTODY, AND THE FAMILY 77-78 (1980) (footnote omitted).

109. Katkin, Bullington & Levine, supra note 104, at 672.
Studies... are cited without acknowledging the existence of major criticisms both of
the methodologies used and the conclusions reached in those studies. In consequence, the
authors are in the position of urging the enactment of legislation based not so much on
"social science facts" as on "social science issues in controversy."
Id. at 673 (citations omitted). "Many of the studies cited by Goldstein [etal.] in support of their
contention that separation is harmful for children do not actually deal with the concept of separation, but with parental deprivation." Id. at 675. "The book's greatest importance ... is in its
failures. ... Decisions that might influence the lives of millions need to be based on more satisfactory data and on a more thorough examination of alternatives .... Id. at 683.
As another critic stated, "[Tihe book rests its case on one principal footnote listing a limited
number of studies, all of which are more than a decade old, supplemented by a few scattered, additional, more recent citations." Kadushin, supra note 107, at 512. "In many respects I think the
book creates more problems than it pretends to solve." Id. at 509.
110. Cochran & Vitz, supra note 40, at 353.
111. Felner & Farber, supra note 105, at 345. As another critique put it:"Goldstein [et al.]
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Despite these critical comments, Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit's
analysis underlies the views of some courts, legislators, and commentators about the range of cases in which joint custody is appropriate if the
parents do not agree on it. The leading case on the subject in New York,
Braiman v. Braiman,112 holds that the failure of parents to agree on joint
1 13
custody generally forecloses it as an option for courts to order.
propose major changes in the laws that regulate families without any overt recognition that their
proposals might cause undesirable disruptions in existing social and political arrangements."
Katkin, Bullington & Levine, supra note 104, at 678.
112. 44 N.Y.2d 584, 378 N.E.2d 1019, 407 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1978). For recent comparable views
from other courts, see In re Pool, 118 Ill.
App.3d 1035, 455 N.E.2d 887 (I11.
App. Ct. 1983); Burchell v. Burchell, 10 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 1670, 1671 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984) (concurring and dissenting opinion); Gonzalez v. Gonzalez, 672 S.W.2d 887 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1984, no
writ). But see Taylor v. Taylor, 609 Md. App. 268, 275, 482 A.2d 164, 167 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1984) (rejecting suggestion that joint custody should never be awarded when parents are actively
litigating because such a holding would amount "to a holding that it is an abuse of discretion to
award joint custody in a contested custody action").
113. The facts in Braiman were not conducive to a court's taking a liberal view ofjoint custody.
The appeal resulted from a custody modification proceeding brought by a father after the mother
had sole custody of two children under a separation agreement for two years. The father initiated
the modification proceeding when the mother sought to leave the state with the children. Accusations of unfitness by both the mother and the father abounded at the trial, centering on the father's
alleged gambling and physical abusiveness and the mother's alleged sexual promiscuity in front of
the children. Witnesses supported each parent's claims. The trial court awarded sole custody to the
father. The intermediate court of appeal reversed and awarded joint legal custody, with the children
residing weekdays with the mother and weekends with the father. The New York Court of Appeals
stayed this order, pending consideration of the father's appeal. The father thus retained primary
physical and legal custody. During the period of the stay, approximately two years, the father defied
a court order and denied the mother visitation; the mother apparently disappeared. The Court of
Appeals remanded the case to the trial court for a new hearing and recommended that the trial court
appoint a guardian ad litem to investigate and independently recommend a custody plan.
Against this background of intractable and increasing interparental hostility, the Court of Appeals took the opportunity to provide guidelines to lower courts to decide when joint custody awards
were and were not appropriate. The Court stated that "joint custody is... primarily.., a voluntary
alternative for relatively stable, amicable parents behaving in mature civilized fashion." 44 N.Y.2d
at 589-90, 378 N.E.2d at 1021, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 451. Although it mentions the advantages of joint
custody, the Braiman opinion emphasizes the difficulties and disadvantages in such an arrangement.
"Children," the Braiman court declares, "need a home base ... [p]articularly when alternating
physical custody is directed, [because] such custody could, and would generally, further the insecurity and resultant pain frequently experienced by the young victims of shattered families." Id. at
589, 378 N.E.2d at 1021, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 451 (emphasis added).
The Braiman court went on to emphasize that joint custody is a disfavored and closely scrutinized exception to the sole custody system:
In the rare case, joint custody may approximate the former family relationships more
closely than other custodial arrangements. It may not, however, be indiscriminately substituted for an award of sole custody to one parent. Divorce dissolves the family as well as the
marriage, a reality that may not be ignored.
Id. at 591, 378 N.E.2d at 1021, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 452 (emphasis added). The restrictive language and
skepticism about joint custody that permeates the opinion indicates that the court would favor giving
either parent a veto over joint custody. At the very least, the fact that one parent objects to joint
custody is a presumptive indication that it "will not work" in that particular family and that a sole
custody/visitation arrangement should be ordered. Indeed, Braiman presumably could be read as
holding that the court should modify a joint custody award even if the parents initially agreed to it,
because the very fact that one of the parents no longer wishes to continue in the joint custody
arrangement would be a strong indication of their lack of ability to cooperate.
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The rigid distinction between "voluntary" and "imposed" joint custody arrangements both Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit and the Braiman
court make, however, does not take the "shadow of law" insight into
account.114 Although most divorcing parents make custody arrangements for their children out of court,II 5 the formal legal system provides
an important source of bargaining endowments and social values that
shape the outcomes of out-of-court settlements. As Marc Galanter recently wrote:
Adjudication provides a background of norms and procedures
against which negotiation and regulation.., takes place. This contribution includes, but is not exhausted by, communication to prospective litigants of what might transpire if one of them sought a
judicial resolution. Courts communicate not only the rules that
would govern adjudication of the dispute but possible remedies and
estimates of 6the difficulty, certainty, and cost of securing particular
outcomes."

Substantive law favoring sole custody may give the parent likely to
be designated sole custodian a significant incentive to withhold agreement to joint custody in return for financial concessions. ' 7 It may also
precipitate a negotiating game of strategic "chicken" between the parents, leading to a trial even though both would cooperate in a joint custody arrangement if custody were the only issue for them to resolve in
pretrial negotiations. 18
114. See Mnookin & Kornhauser, Bargainingin the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88
YALE L.J. 950 (1979) (discussing the impact of the legal system on negotiations which occur outside
the courtroom).
115. No accurate method calculates exactly the percentage of custody disputes that are settled
by self-help by one parent or the other; negotiated by the parents themselves with or without the
participation of lawyers; filed in court but settled before trial with or without the intervention of
mediator or outside evaluator; or actually tried. Best estimates are that less than ten percent of
custody cases filed in court are actually tried. See id. at 951 & nn.2-3.
116. Galanter, Reading the Landscapeof Disputes: What We Know and Don'tKnow (and Think
We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4, 32-33
(1983).
117. Assume that a mother is likely to be awarded sole custody by a court after trial because the
jurisdiction has adopted the Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit standard and she is likely to be found to be
the child's "psychological parent." Assume further that under the operative rules of the jurisdiction,
the father will likely not be ordered to pay maintenance to the mother because she is capable of
financial self-support. The father wants joint custody; the mother wants money. The mother believes, however, that the father is a wonderful parent and that it is important for the children to have
a relationship with him after divorce. She is also favorably disposed toward joint custody to relieve
herself of some of the pressures of being a sole custodial parent. The father too is willing to cooperate with the mother in custodial arrangements. Because of the mother's incentive to trade her potential sole custody award for greater financial concessions from the father, however, the mother may
disguise her cooperative attitude toward the father and withhold agreement to joint custody unless
the father offers to pay maintenance. The father may not make such an offer because he feels the
mother's financial demands are too high.
118. For the converse hypothetical to the one set forth supra note 117 demonstrating how a
substantive law preference for joint custody will disadvantage a parent who seeks sole custody in
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If the substantive law, however, favors joint custody unless one of
the parents is "unfit," parents would have far less incentive to oppose
joint custody: if they fail to agree and wind up in court, the final order
will probably be joint custody.1 19 'the distinction between "voluntary"
and "imposed" joint custody on which Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit and
Braiman rely does not do justice to the complex interplay between custody and financial issues in divorce settlement negotiations between divorcing parents and to the influence of substantive standards on the
balance of negotiating power. Some parents will reach agreement on
joint custody before trial regardless of the incentives created by the substantive law; others will never agree, regardless of such incentives. 120
The critical group is those parents who will be influenced by law to reach
joint custody arrangements. A preference for sole custody in the substantive law, however, presumably moves this marginal group in the
other direction.
(b) Parentalconflict andjoint custody. -Although "voluntariness" of parental agreement to a custody framework is not a dispositive
issue in the sole versus joint custody debate, the amount of continuing
parental conflict likely under either legal form does control. A high level
of continuing parental conflict seems to be a key factor in impairing a
child's adjustment to parental divorce. 121 It also significantly influences
how well a child develops even if the parents do not separate. Some level
divorce settlement negotiations, see Scott & Derdeyn, supra note 56, at 477-79. The disadvantaged
parent in the Scott and Derdeyn hypothetical is a long-term homemaker with no job skills. Scott
and Derdeyn argue that a joint custody rule is unfair to her because she spent more personal effort
on raising the children than her husband, who "pursued an ambitious career as a lawyer." Id. at
483. Nowhere in their analysis of the "fairness" of competing custody rules do Scott and Derdeyn
examine whether a sole custody rule is fair to the ambitious lawyer under the partnership principle
of marriage. See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
119. Negotiating power on financial issues would also change in the father's favor, raising questions of public policy. See infra text accompanying notes 181-83.
120. Based on her ten-year study of her sample of divorced families, Judith Wallerstein believes
that
[t]he troika of forces that seems to propel many parents who become trapped in chronic
litigation over children includes the sense of outrage at the betrayal or exploitation at the
hands of the other parent, a regressive dependence on the child, and an inability to tolerate
the absence of the child without suffering acute anxiety.
Wallerstein, The Overburdened Child: Some Long-Term Consequences of Divorce, 19 COLUM. J.L. &
SOC. PROBS. 165, 178 (1985). The parents that Wallerstein describes, like Mr. and Mrs. Braiman,
see supra note 113, may well not be suited for joint custody. The mythology and war stories such
parents create, however, should not obscure the fact that the cooperative custody system described
in this Article does not pretend to be able to influence such people. The aim of the system is to help
parents who can be influenced develop a cooperative postdivorce parental relationship. We do not
know how representative of divorcing parents the Braimans are and should not accord them undue
influence in shaping custody policy.
121. Most of the relevant research is summarized and cited in Scott & Derdeyn, supranote,56, at
490-92 and accompanying notes.
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of conflict is present between parents in many intact families and many
children seem able to cope with it.122 Conflict between some parents
may be reduced, not increased, by divorce, presumably benefitting the
children's emotional adjustment. Conversely, conflict between other parents may be increased by divorce, because the incentive to compromise
may thereby be dissolved. 123
Analysis of conflict in sole and joint custody arrangements must begin with the recognition that some risk of parental conflict after divorce
must be tolerated. The only way to eliminate all risk of conflict between
parents after divorce is to take the Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit approach: choose one parent as the child's custodian, give the custodian
the right to decide arbitrarily whether the noncustodial parent has any
role in the child's life, and hope that the noncustodial parent does not
snatch the child. A parent's right to visit and maintain a relationship
with his or her child-and the child's right to know both parents-makes
such a solution untenable. Indeed, one may view these rights as constitutionally protected.1 24 Visitation benefits both parent and child, and
should be vigorously enforced by the state. The courts do now enforce
visitation rights, thereby agreeing to at least some level of continued conflict between parents. Given such a tolerance, the question then turns on
which substantive standards engender more parental conflict-sole or
joint custody.
Few studies explore how legal forms of custody and presumptions
influence interparental conflict after divorce. The available research indicates that conflict in families that agree to joint custody without court
order is generally lower than in families that end up with a sole custody
arrangement.125
The level of continuing parental conflict in situations in which a
court has imposed sole custody is very high, as measured by relitigation
rates.126 Unpublished data from a study of custody cases in the Minnesota court system suggest that the greatest proportion of cases that return
to court for postjudgment modification are those in which the court de122. M. ROMAN & W. HADDAD, supra note 13, at 52.
123. See Scott & Derdeyn, supra note 56, at 490-92.
124. See infra note 151 and accompanying text.
125. See supra note 98 and accompanying text; see also Steinman, Zemmelman & Knoblauch, A
Study of Parents Who Sought Joint Custody Following Divorce: Who Reaches Agreement and Sustains Joint Custody and Who Returns to Court, 24 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD PSYCHIATRY 554 (1985).
126. One study reviewed court records for 148 consecutive divorce cases, 105 of which involved
children. Although only 5% of the cases not involving children returned to court, 51% of the cases
involving children resulted in relitigation. Moreover, in 31% of the 51%, child related issues were
relitigated two to ten times. Westman, Cline, Swift & Kramer, Role of Child Psychiatry in Divorce,
23 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 416, 417 (1970).
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termined the child's custody plan after a full adversary hearing. 127
Data directly comparing conflict in mandated joint custody and
mandated sole custody awards are extremely scarce. Such comparisons
are complicated by different definitions of joint custody, which range
from equally shared physical and legal custody to shared legal custody
with the physical custody pattern in the family approximating a traditional primary caretaker/visitation award.
Among the limited data available are the results of a recent empirical study of 414 custody cases in a Los Angeles trial court over a two
year period. 128 Based on their analysis of the case records, investigators
concluded that "[i]n those cases which were returns to court, the proportion of relitigation for joint custody families was one-half that of exclusive custody families."' 129 As is true with most studies of the effects of
legal arrangements on postdivorce conflict between parents, the authors
found it impossible to control for all variables that might have affected
their sample. They acknowledge, for example, lower relitigation rates for
joint custody arrangements may have resulted from the court awards of
joint custody to parents who seemed more likely to cooperate without
future judicial supervision. Other aspects of their data, however, suggest
that more sole custody awards in their sample were based on parental
30
agreement than were joint custody awards.'
These limited data suggest that the imposition of joint custody
awards would not result in more conflict than the already high levels of
continuing parental conflict in mandated sole custody arrangements.
More research is necessary to determine if parents on whom joint custody is imposed can adjust to it over time as they go through the stages of
adjustment to the divorce and come to recognize the benefits of joint
custody for the child. 13 1 When the alternative of a parent's using the
127. The Minnesota data is reported in ADVISORY COMMISSION ON FAMILY LAW TO THE CALIFORNIA STATE SENATE SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, REVISED DRAFT
REPORT ON CONCILIATION COURTS AND COUNSELING 15 (Jan. 17, 1979) (on file with the author).

128. Ilfeld, Ilfeld & Alexander, Does Joint Custody Work? A FirstLook at Outcome Data of
Relitigation, 139 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 62 (1982).
129. Id. at 65.
130. Id. at 64.
131. Scott and Derdeyn overstate by asserting that "[n]o existing empirical evidence supports
this hope that joint custody will reduce conflict between parents or that most parents will be able to
separate hostility toward the former spouse from parental concerns." Scott & Derdeyn, supra note
56, at 492. They dwell on the acknowledged research design difficulties of the Los Angeles and
similar joint custody studies, see supra note 61, and do not take into account the similar research
design-difficulties in studies that emphasize how much conflict occurs between parents after divorce.
Id. at 492-94. Scott and Derdeyn also overlook the fact that there is no evidence undermining the
hope that mandated joint custody will facilitate future parental cooperation and that decision theory
gives that hope some basis. Finally, Scott and Derdeyn do not consider the evidence that compares
the outcomes of custody mediation programs with custody disputes settled in the shadow of the
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power of a court to enforce her will is blocked by a joint custody award,
one may speculate that experience in having to work out conflict may
develop both parents' ability to compromise and negotiate. Decision theory suggests that people who have to deal with each other over the longterm on a range of issues are more likely to cooperate than those whose
relationships are less intertwined. 132 If so, a joint custody arrangement
which forces parents into a long-term relationship over a period of time
may, in the end, promote cooperation rather than inflame conflict.
(c) The child's responses to joint custody.-The way in which a
child responds to a joint custody arrangement is the ultimate test of the
arrangement's success. Based on psychoanalytic theory, certain authorities argue that the child needs the emotional stability of a solid relationship with only one parent. 133 This argument arises from the fear that the
child will face emotional instability from shifting from one parent to the
other. The limited empirical evidence from studies of children in joint
custody arrangements voluntarily agreed to by both parents suggests that
continuity of emotional relationships with both parents seems to be a
more important value to most children than continuity of physical environment.13 4 Most children in joint custody arrangements are able to
keep complex schedules in mind and develop a sense of mastery about
switching homes. In Deborah Luepnitz' study, only two of twenty-five
children in joint custody arrangements expressed any confusion about
their living arrangements at all. "Not only were most joint children not
confused," Lupenitz reports, "but three-quarters were able to cite advantages to the two-household lifestyle. They described their arrangements
as 'more fun,' 'more interesting' or 'more comfortable.' -135 Susan
Steinman reports similar results. Only about twenty-five percent of the
children in joint custody studies-usually girls in the four-to-five-yearold age group and boys in the seven-to-nine-year-old age group-were
anxious and insecure about switching homes. 136 These findings "to some
extent, attenuat[e] concerns about the deleterious effects of separations
adversary system. Such evidence suggests that mediation promotes more lasting joint custody outcomes. See infra notes 306-23 and accompanying text. It is important to remember that this Article
advocates a combined substantive and procedural approach to promoting cooperative custody. Such
a combined approach would provide a stronger incentive for cooperation between divorcing parents
than would a substantive or procedural change alone.
132. See R. AXELROD, THE EVOLUTON Of COOPERATION (1984) (indicating that continuing
interaction makes cooperation more likely).
133. See supra notes 22-23, 40-43, 99-110 and accompanying text.
134. See sources cited supra note 98.
135. D. LEUPNITZ, supra note 83, at 47.
136. Steinman, supra note 98, at 746-47.
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and reunions in joint custody." 137
The assumption that a child cannot adjust to differing rules and
adult authority figures remains questionable. Children in school are able
to adjust to different sets of rules and expectations imposed by different
adults in the classroom and the home without suffering crippling conflict. Also, children spend considerable time under the control of adults
other than their parents as they get older. Therefore, there does not seem
to be any reason to assume that most children cannot adjust to different
sets of rules imposed by divorced parents.
Although it may be theoretically desirable for children to have one
set of norms, the issue is whether the benefits of a sole custody arrangement outweigh the costs. Joint-custody children may be able to manipulate rules more easily than their sole-custody counterparts; yet, on the
other hand, sole-custody parents tend to have more difficulty disciplining
than parents in joint-custody families largely because they feel overwhelmed by the task of child raising alone. Further, joint-custody parents can continue their role as parents after divorce, rather than one as a
parent and the other as an "indulging aunt or uncle." 138
Overall, the available data provide almost no empirical support for
the proposition that mandated sole custody is generally in the best interests of the child. There are risks to children in adopting either sole or
joint custody given the current state of knowledge. One risk is that of
causing confusion for some children and placing them in the middle of
permanently embattled parents. Another risk is that of creating a legal
regime and a parental mindset that discourages the involvement of both
parents in the child's life after divorce.
B.

Dealing with Empirical Uncertainty: Deregulation and Regulation
of Judicialand ParentalCustody Decisions

The question then is how to set policy in the face of continuing empirical uncertainty about what type of custody arrangements are in the
best interests of the child. There are two possible paths to take. One
path is to deregulate custody decisions by judges by eliminating all presumptions about what custody arrangements are in the best interests of
the child. This approach would allow judges in contested cases to shape
custody orders on a case-by-case basis, choosing sole or joint custody or
elements of each. Such deregulation of custody decisions would be to
137. Clingempeel & Reppucci, supra note 23, at 112. Interestingly, no complete study of sole
custody with its visitation rights has ever been completed with regard to this question.
138. D. LEUPNITZ, supra note 83, at 96-97.
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allow parents complete discretion to negotiate custody settlements, subjecting them to little or no state scrutiny.
A second approach is to create more certainty in custody law by
enacting presumptions favoring one kind of custody arrangement. Such
a presumption would resolve the empirical uncertainty about what is in
the best interests of the child by removing the need to decide that question in the great percentage of cases.
1.

Deregulation

(a) Judicialderegulation.-One possible resolution to the empirical uncertainty is to eliminate any custody preference. This approach
would give a court authority to impose sole or joint custody, or elements
of each, over the objections of one or both parents on a case-by-case
basis.
Although increasing judicial discretion is certainly a rational approach to empirical uncertainty, several factors caution against this solution. Most judges are skeptical about whether joint custody "works" 139
and are unlikely to impose it over the objections of one parent. Thus, an
increase in discretion to choose between joint and sole custody without a
presumption in favor of joint custody would result only in a small increase in joint custody plans in contested cases. If joint custody is the
right direction in which to move, judicial deregulation would be a small
step in the right direction-but, for the most part, it would only continue
the sole custody status quo.
An increase in judicial discretion would also increase uncertainty
and the potential for arbitrariness. There is little data"4° and no statutory guidelines to help judges choose which seemingly intractably conflicted parents will make mandated joint custody a success. The result of
increasing discretion in the absence of standards would likely be arbitrariness of application. Families in identical circumstances could have sole
or joint custody "imposed" on them based on the happenstance of which
judge decides their particular dispute.
An increase in judicial discretion could also decrease the capacity of
parents negotiating a divorce settlement to predict what result a court
will impose if they do not reach agreement. Inability to predict the result
tends to benefit the parent who is willing and able to take a gamble in
139. See Pearson & Ring, supra note 4, at 721-22.
140. A recent study does begin to address the particular problem. See Steinman, Zemmelman &
Knoblauch, supra note 125, at 561-62. The authors conducted a three-year study of 51 joint custody
families and listed the characteristics of those families likely to succeed and the characteristics of
those families likely to fail.
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court. Given the trauma the family experiences because of custody litigation,14 1 increasing the incentive to litigate seems precisely the wrong
direction to take. Allowing discretion encourages parents to seek sole
custody. Such a position may allow a parent more bargaining room, yet
it effectively sets sole custody as a standard. This system would award
intransigence, not cooperative parenting.
(b) Parentalderegulation.-Another possible response to the
indeterminancy of which substantive custody rule is in the best interests
of the child is to suggest, as Mnookin and Kornhauser do in their
landmark article, that parents be free to negotiate whatever custody arrangements they want, trading off desired financial concessions, such as
increased property or desired maintenance, for custody arrangements. 142
Freedom to make such trade-offs maximizes the satisfaction both parents
have with the resulting arrangements, and is more likely to lead to negotiated settlements. More negotiated settlements, in turn, lead to fewer
cases in which the atmosphere between the parents is poisoned by trial
combat.
[G]iven the epistemological problems inherent in knowing what is
best for a child, there is reason to doubt our capacity to know
whether any given decision is a mistake. Therefore, the possibility
that negotiated agreements may not be optimal for the child hardly
can be a1 43sufficient argument against a preference for private
ordering.
Deregulation of parental custody negotiations, however, still takes
place within a framework of substantive doctrine to decide cases that
cannot be settled by negotiations. We do know that a child is likely to be
better off if he has a meaningful relationship with both parents after divorce. As previously discussed, 1 " the completely unregulated exchange
of custody for money can have precisely the opposite effect. 145 Further141. See infra notes 194-98 and accompanying text.
142. Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 114, at 963-65.
143. Id. at 958. Mnookin and Kornhauser share the Braiman court's skepticism about the range
of cases in which court-ordered joint custody is appropriate. Id. at 980 & n.99. They do recognize,
however, that the state has a "responsibility to inform parents concerning the child's needs during
and after divorce" and an "interest in facilitating parental agreement." Id. at 958. It is thus likely
they would support many of the procedural aspects of the cooperative custody system described in
Part V-especially mediation of custody disputes-though not the presumption of joint legal custody this Article advocates. As will be discussed subsequently, although procedural and substantive
changes in the way custody disputes are conceived of are inseparable, procedural change is more
important. See infra text accompanying notes 191-93.
144. See supra notes 117-20 and accompanying text.
145. One commentator has suggested that linking custody and money issues in divorce negotiations "come[s] close to active abandonment of ethical propriety insofar as the child's interests are
concerned." Watson, The Children of Armageddon: Problems of Custody Following Divorce, 21
SYRACRUsE L. REV. 55, 59 (1969).
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more, it is not certain that allowing parents to barter custody for money
freely in divorce settlements will in fact promote more parental agreement. The opposite is also possible. Decision theory suggests that if parties reach agreement on a subset of the issues in dispute they can
decompose their dispute into more manageable pieces and create a foundation on which subsequent agreements can be built. 14 6 If, in fact, small
agreements can lead to larger ones, then the state (and the child) has a
legitimate interest in encouraging parents to reach agreement on some
issues by narrowing the range of discretion within which parental bargaining can occur, or by requiring certain issues to be settled before
others. Use of presumptive statutory formulae to set the amount of child
support each parent has to pay' 47 exemplifies how a state can promote
parentalagreement on a particular issue by narrowing the range of dis148
cretion within which parents may bargain.
2. Regulation by Substantive Custody Presumptions.-The alternate approach to the empirical uncertainty of whether sole or joint custody is in the best interests of the child is to resolve the uncertainty by
creating presumptions that refer to fairness between the parents.
(a) The "innocentspouse" preference.-One possible presumption might state that a parent at fault for the dissolution of the family
should not be awarded sole or joint custody. Such a presumption may
appeal to an abstract sense of "moral justice," but it raises the same
problems that existed under the fault concept of divorce. 149 The bitterness and anger resulting from divorces under the fault system would
again enter the litigation in order to determine custody. Fault requires
that one marital partner or the other be blamed for the break-up of the
marriage, but in most cases blame is shared, if the concept is relevant at
146. See R. AXELROD, supra note 132, at 131-32; R. FISHER & W. URY, GETTING TO YES:
NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN 72-73 (1982); T. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF
CONFLICT 45 (1960); see also M. DEUTSCH, THE RESOLUTION OF CONFLICT 369-70 (1973) (noting
that "[l]arger conflicts are more likely to take a destructive turn than small ones," and urging that
the conflict be reduced by diminishing the perceived opposition in interests or beliefs through controlled communication, role reversal, and encounter groups).
147. Many states have already adopted such guidelines. See, eg., IND. CODE ANN. § 31-1-11.512 (West Supp. 1985); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.551, (5) (West Supp. 1986); Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 452.340 (1978); see Cassetty, Child Support: EmergingIssues for Practice,65 Soc. CASEWORK 74
(1984). Federal law now requires all states to have support guidelines in place by October 1, 1987.
42 U.S.C. § 667 (Supp. 1984).
148. It may be that once the parents have settled on levels of child support because of the
formula, it will be easier for them to agree on other matters in dispute. Indeed, the state may have
an interest in separating child support from other divorce-related economic issues because the parent's satisfaction of the child support obligation is more important than how property is divided or
how much spousal maintenance is paid.
149. See supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
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all. Fault determinations encourage parents to dwell on the past and
blame each other for the marital dissolution rather than regard it as a
150
tragedy to be overcome by focusing on the future.
Reliance on marital fault to make postdivorce custody determinations also creates a danger of inconsistent and unfair'application affecting
constitutionally sensitive parental rights. 15 ' Yet, the main problem of
such a presumption is that it shifts the focus of the inquiry to the parents'
relationship with each other, rather than to the parent's relationship with
the child.152 The child has a significant interest in a relationship with
both parents after divorce, even if the child harbors anger at the parent
"at fault" for causing the dissolution of the family. In the long run, a
child needs to come to terms with the strengths and weaknesses of both
53
his parents, a process aided by a continued relationship with each.
(b) The primarycaretakerpreference.-Perhapsthe best justification for sole custody comes from the notion that custody arrangements
after divorce should parallel the family's custody arrangements before
150. Id.
151. The Supreme Court has recognized that a fit, involved parent has a constitutionally protected interest in maintaining the parent-child relationship. That relationship generally cannot be
terminated absent some manifestation of parental abandonment or other parental fault. See, e.g.,
Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 261 (1983) (noting that an unwed father's interest in contact with
his child is protected by the due process clause); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 389 (1979)
(holding that a New York statute giving unwed mother but not unwed father the right to block
adoption violates equal protection clause of fourteenth amendment); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645,
658 (1972) (noting that unwed father is constitutionally entitled to hearing on fitness as a parent
before children could be removed from his care). See generally Developments, supra note 44, at 1328
(discussing constitutionally protected family relationships in other contexts); Novinson, supra note
10, at 124-40 (discussing constitutional protection of parent-child relationship against government
interference).
152. Courts may often evaluate acts which would constitute marital fault between parents
against a "demonstrated detriment to the child," not against a moral outrage standard. Adultery per
se tends not to disqualify a parent from sole or joint custody under this test; sexual intercourse with a
lover repeatedly conducted in the presence of a child might, however, particularly if it continued
despite obvious evidence the child was emotionally distressed by it. Developments, supra note 44, at
1343-44; see Matter of Rodolfo CC v. Susan CC, 37 A.D.2d 657, 657, 322 N.Y.S.2d 388, 390 (1971)
(proof that men on occasion remained overnight with the mother in the presence of her son did not
constitute such "gross moral turpitude as would render her unfit for custody particularly since there
is no showing that such conduct was actually affecting Robert's upbringing"); cf French v. French,
452 So. 2d 647, 649 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (visitation restriction based on father's sexual conduct
can stand only if supported by substantial evidence showing conduct has an adverse effect on morals
or welfare of the child); Doe v. Doe, 16 Mass. App. Ct. 499, 503, 452 N.E.2d 293, 296 (1983)
(homosexual relationship does not justify denying otherwise devoted mother from joint custody because no resulting adverse effect on child demonstrated).
153. See supranotes 67-73 and accompanying text. Some therapists believe this principle applies
even if the parent committed the most serious acts against the child, such as incest. See, e.g., Giarretto, Humanistic Treatment of Father-DaughterIncest, in CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT: THE
FAMILY AND THE COMMUNITY 143 (1976) (discussing the theory and results of a sexual abuse
family therapy program). Cf Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 765 n.15 (1982) (noting that permanent removal from a child's natural home does not necessarily improve his welfare).

724

Cooperative Custody
divorce. If before divorce the child-rearing responsibilities are divided
unequally between the parents, it may be argued that the parent who
bears the greater burden of child care, usually the mother,1 54 should be
awarded sole custody.155 The arguments for a primary caretaker preference can be grouped around the interests of those involved in a custody
dispute: child, parents, and state. 156 From the perspective of the child, a
custody preference for the primary caretaker can be said to preserve continuity in the custody arrangement and thus to be in the child's best interests.1 57 From the perspective of the parents a primary caretaker
preference can serve several functions. It can be seen as compensation
for the extra effort the primary caretaker expended on behalf of the child
during the marriage. 158 It might be responsive to the primary caretaker's
greater emotional need to have custody after divorce, a need arguably
greater than the secondary caretaker's.' 59 Finally, it can be seen as
strengthening the bargaining power of the economically weaker party in
divorce settlement negotiations. 60 From the perspective of the state the
primary caretaker preference can provide a measure of certainty of outcome which discourages usually disastrous custody litigation and conserves judicial resources.16'
Many of these arguments have thoughtful adherents and some plausible empirical basis. Overall, however, the empirical evidence in support
154. See Louis HARRIS AND ASSOCIATES, INC., THE GENERAL MILLS AMERICAN FAMILY
REPORT 1980-81: FAMILIES AT WORK: STRENGTHS AND STRAINS 28 (1981) (national sample indicating women generally take primary responsibility for childcare in 59% of families; responsibility is
shared equally in 36% of families and father has primary responsibility in 3% of families); Sanik,
Division of Household Work- A Decade Comparison-1967-1977,10 HOME ECON. RESEARCH J.
175, 180 (1981) (study in Syracuse Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA) finding that "the
wife makes the largest time commitment to household production, even when she is employed").
Some empirical evidence indicates that in families in which both parents work, husbands are significantly increasing their share of child-care and household functions, even though the division between the sexes remains unequal. See Juster, A Note on Recent Changes in Time Use, in TIME,
GOODS AND WELL-BEING 397-419 (1984) (publication forthcoming) (University of Michigan Institute for Social Research survey comparing division of household work in same households in 19751976 and 1981-1982 showing significant increase in male participation when both husband and wife
work); leck, Men's Family Work.- Three Perspectivesand Some New Data, 28 FAM. COORDINATOR
481, 487-88 (1979) (reporting on a 1977 representative national sample and its comparison with
earlier studies with a "finding of non-trivial increments in husbands' family work associated with
wives' employment").
155. Uviller, supra note 35, at 108.
156. See Chambers, Rethinking the Substantive Rules for Custody Disputes in Divorce, 83 MICH.
L. REV. 477 (1984).
157. This is essentially the argument of Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit analyzed earlier. See supra
subpart II(A)(2)(a). Chambers summarizes the research in support of this position. See Chambers,
supra note 156, at 527-38.
158. See Scott & Derdeyn, supra note 56, at 483.
159. Chambers, supra note 156, at 541-49.
160. Id. at 563-64.
161. Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357, 360-62 (W. Va. 1981).
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of a primary caretaker presumption is just that-plausible, but not dispositive. It is subject to alternative interpretations that make the whole
notion of a primary caretaker preference questionable public policy. A
better way to view how a family's predivorce arrangements affect custody decisions is through the partnership theory of marriage. 162 The departure from the partnership principle is particularly serious in custody
disputes because it invites parents to confuse their own interests with the
child's best interests. State policy should seek to do the exact opposite.
(i) The child's best interests.-Given the uncertainty of knowing what custody arrangements are best for the child, one may argue that
the child's need for continuity and stability is best served by awarding
sole custody to the primary caretaker. 163 Notions of a predivorce contract between parents that establishes what the child's best interests are
after divorce support such a rule. In the intact family, parents delegate
child-rearing responsibilities and their decisions receive a large measure
of autonomy from state interference. 164 A decision made in the intact
family that the primary caretaker mother should have principal responsibility for raising the child should not be questioned by the state merely
because the parents wish to divorce.
Relying on the parent's allocation of child-care responsibilities
before divorce to shape judicial custody determinations, however, only
helps allocate physical, not legal, custody. Presumably, both parents
participated, or at least did not somehow waive the right to participate,
in major decisions about the child, whatever their predivorce child-care
responsibilities, even though one parent may have made more day-to-day
decisions about the child than the other.
Perhaps the strongest consideration against the argument of "continuity" behind the primary caretaker presumption is that the new living
arrangements will not likely reflect the intact family situation. Divorce
creates a radical change in circumstances for parents and children. The
state dissolves the parental partnership that created the situation in
162. See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
163. Cf Atkinson, supra note 45, at 16-17 (noting that since 1982 many appellate courts have
explicitly mentioned that primary caretakers have closer relationships with the child, more parental
experience, and a demonstrated commitment to caring for the child).
164. See, eg., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (holding first amendment gives Amish
parents the right to hold their children out of public schools after the eighth grade despite the state's
interest in compulsory universal education); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (holding fourteenth amendment gives parents and teachers the right to instruct children in a foreign language).
See generallyDevelopments, supranote 44, at 1351-57 (discussing cases that acknowledge the constitutional right of parents to control the upbringing of their children).
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which one parent acted as the primary caretaker. 165 Divorce dramatically changes the lives of husband, wife, and child as new jobs, stresses,
and lovers enter the family environment. After divorce, a child in a sole
custodial arrangement is thus not in the same circumstances as she was
before the parents separated. In the new living arrangements, the mother
will probably have a job,16 6 entirely new financial and social stresses, and
will no longer have the time she once had to devote to rearing the child.
Arguing that continuity justifies a primary caretaker preference ignores
the reality that continuity will not occur. Divorce requires all members
of the previously intact family to reorganize.
If any contract principles apply, "impossibility of performance" or
"changed circumstances" seem a more apt analogy than a "benefit of the
bargain" analysis. The harsh consequences of divorce, though, make formalistic reasoning based on contract analogies an inappropriate mode of
determining the best interests of children after divorce. Examination of
the research, however, does not answer the question whether the majority of children are better off in the care of their predivorce primary
caretaker.
Chambers' recent review of the empirical evidence reestablishes the
paucity of our knowledge of which custody arrangements promote the
best interests of children. After examining virtually every modem study
of reasonable methodological exactness, Chambers concludes that the evidence suggests that the child's trauma in losing either the primary or
secondary caretaker is of approximately equal magnitude. 167 In addition,
based on a review of the impressionistic research on the capacities of
fathers to parent, Chambers concludes that "there is less reason than in
the past to fear that a secondary-caretaking father, if given custody, will
meet his child's basic needs for continuity of attachment and nurturing
less satisfactorily than primary-caretaking mothers."' 168 Strangely,
Chambers does not then conclude that the empirical evidence does not
support the sole custody system. Instead, he chooses to try to increase
sole custody's certainty of outcome through a primary caretaker preference for children under five. He reasons:
There is still no methodologically rigorous research on children
placed in the custody of secondary caretakers at an early age.
Thus, where one comes out in the end with regard to custody deci165. See infra notes 219-28 and accompanying text (discussing whether the state should set more
stringent standards for divorce).
166. Over two-thirds of mothers with children under the age of five work after divorce, see supra
note 33.
167. Chambers, supra note 156, at 536.
168. Id.
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sions involving young children will depend in large part
not on
169
empirical research but on the persuasiveness of theory.
In Chambers' view, the persistent, though empirically tenuous, 170 belief
in the importance of placing the young child in the custody of the primary caretaker in the psychological and psychiatric community justifies
a primary caretaker preference for very young children.
There is, however, an equally plausible hypothesis, also supported
by the empirical evidence, that has significant support in the informed
psychiatric and psychological community, although perhaps a minority
thereof. This view states it is impossible to identify an inherently more
important parent to the child. 17 1 A subsidiary premise of this view is
that primary and secondary, caretaking parents can switch roles if necessary, over time and with support. 172 With these premises it is also plausible to believe that it is in the child's best interests to reallocate some of
the child's predivorce physical custody, if necessary, to promote the
child's relationship with both. 173
(ii) Emotionaljustice to parents and the primary caretakerpreference.-If the empirical evidence on the child's best interest is-and for
the foreseeable future will be-in equipoise, the question of how to allocate the burden of persuasion becomes central to the controversy between sole and joint custody. One way of allocating the burden is by
reference to the partnership principle in marriage. By enacting a preference for a primary caretaker, the state provides one parent a greater legal
entitlement to a subpart ofthe family's total labor based on her role in
the family before divorce. .Viewed as a legal entitlement, this presumption takes on new.meaning. 'Placed alongside state statutes that require
valuation of homemaker contributions in divorce-related economic decisions, the primary caretaker custody presumption then allows the primary caretaker to double-dip. the family's assets. The burden of
persuasion should rest on those Who seek to depart from the partnership
169. Id. at 537.
170. See id.
171. See generally id. at 532-38 (reviewing relevant empirical studies that indicate that the secondary parent fulfills an important role in the child's life).
172. See id. at 533-38.
173. A child's predivorce physical custody arrangements, however, do provide a useful but rebuttable starting point for considering the postdivorce physical custody arrangements. Radical
change in a child's living arrangements should not be made precipitously and without consideration
of potential adverse impact on the child. Adults do, however, seem to underestimate a child's capacity to adapt to new physical surroundifigs and willingness to accept change for the sake of continuing
relationships with the parent who left the family home. See supra notes 133-37 and accompanying
text (describing the research on the reactions of children in joint physical custody arrangements).
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principle rather than on those who emphasize the importance of the unit
as a collectivity.
Chambers, in effect, argues that the partnership principle does not
apply in custody determinations. He recognizes that the child's needs
should be paramount, but then asserts that the parents' needs should
govern when all other things are equal. His reasoning is based "on a
desire to inflict the least total emotional harm on all the members of a
family in a context in which some emotional harm is inevitable under any
resolution."' 174 Chambers concludes that the greater emotional harm inflicted on a primary caretaker from loss of custody reinforces the primary caretaker preference and justifies that preference in contested cases
even though the interests of the child or parent, standing alone, would
not. 175
Chambers cannot rely solely on the "greater harm to the primary
caretaker" rationale, however, because evidence suggests that both primary and secondary caretakers suffer equally from loss of custody,
though they perhaps articulate the depth and nature of that loss in different ways. 176 Both perceive divorce as a major failure that the loss of
custody will only exacerbate. Social policy should assume that all parents, no matter what role they play in raising the child, are anguished by
their potential loss. Indeed, after careful review of all the extant studies,
Chambers himself acknowledges:
On all the current evidence, it is thus plausible to hypothesize a
trauma of comparable magnitude for both primary and secondary
caretaker deprived of the custody of children.... We simply do
not have enough evidence to reach a firm conclusion either way.
My own hunch is that, in general, primary caretakers
suffer more
177
and for a longer period, but it is only a hunch.
Hunches about comparative harm to parents do not justify departure from the important policies and principles that underlie the partnership theory of marriage. Recognizing that comparing the emotional
needs of parents for custody departs from that core principle, Chambers
acknowledges that a primary caretaker preference cannot be justified on
the grounds that the primary caretaker has earned custody by contributing more to childraising. "If the primary caretaker 'deserves' the child
because of her contributions as childraiser, then the other parent 'deserves' to keep all stock and other assets held in his name, because they
174.
175.
176.
177.

Chambers, supra note 156, at 502.
Id. at 561.
See id. at 547-49.
Id. at 549.
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were acquired from his labors."' 78 Nowhere, however, does Chambers
reconcile the primary caretaker preference with the principle of partnership marriage, nor does he justify why, if a departure from partnership
on the grounds of comparative parental emotional suffering is supportable in the custody area, it is not also supportable on the same grounds
when the state divides economic assets for the divorcing spouses. One
can plausibly hypothesize that the secondary caretaker will suffer much
greater emotional harm from loss of control of a business he nurtured
than the primary caretaker. In the interests of inflicting the least total
emotional harm on the family, by the same logic, his needs should be
taken into account in making the distribution decision.
The pervasive problem with comparing the emotional impact of custody loss on the primary and secondary caretaker is that the loss is impossible to measure accurately, and asking the question deflects the focus
of state policy from the child to the parents. Consistent application of
the partnership principle to both custody and economic decisions prevents the state from speculating about postdivorce emotional needs based
on roles played in the intact family.
In the custody context, application of the partnership principle performs the even more important function of asking parents to place their
child's needs above their own.179 In some cases, parental failure to distinguish their own needs from their child's needs is a cause of long-term
postdivorce emotional problems in both the child and parents. Based on
her ten-year study, Judith Wallerstein has found that one characteristic
parental pattern that results in overburdened and deeply troubled children of divorce is a
repressed dependence on the child's presence as well as the parent's
acute anxiety engendered even by the child's partial absence. In
these cases, the parent consciously or unconsciously equates the
partial loss of the child for even several days of visiting with the
other parent ...

with the total loss of the child.180

All primary caretakers are, of course, not regressively dependent on their
children for satisfaction of their emotional needs. Wallerstein's identifi178. Id. at 501.
179. Chambers quotes a parent in Leupnitz's study as "summariz[ing] well the case for primary
caretakers: 'He is an excellent parent, but [the children] are the most important thing in my life, and
I would not have survived without them. They would have been happy either way, but I wouldn't
have pulled through if I had lost them.'" Id. at 544 (quotingD.LuPENITZ, supranote 83, at 23-24).
Rather than stating the case for primary caretakers, this parent's justification of custody based on
her own interests, 'not the children's, illustrates the danger of creating a primary caretaker
presumption.
180. Wallerstein, The Overburdened Child: Some Long-Term Consequences of Divorce, 19
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 165, 177-78 (1985).
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cation of such dependency as a long-term and a very serious problem for
many children of divorce even ten years after the event, however, points
out the danger in the "comparative emotional harm to parents" test for
evaluating custody rules. By its very nature, that test invites parents to
confuse their own postdivorce needs with those of their children. Some
research indicates that children need two parents more than they need
either one of them, no matter how emotionally distraught one or the
other parent is because of impending custody loss. State policy should
encourage parents to ask what is good for the child at the time of divorce,
not to wallow in their own misery, however real and important it is to
them.
(iii) Social and economic justice between spouses.-To a large
extent, the justification for a primary caretaker preference is independent
of the child's welfare: the primary caretaker, usually the mother, deserves or needs a preference to compensate for a general history of discrimination against women. Giving the mother sole custody based on
the primary caretaker presumption not only rewards her for the extra
time she spent with the child, but also strengthens her bargaining position in divorce settlement negotiations. Assured of sole custody, the
mother can barter increased visitation rights for more support payments.
It is not at all clear, however, that sole custody promotes the longrun economic benefit of divorced primary caretakers. Sole custody does
not promote regular child support payments, reentry into the labor force,
or remarriage and thus may be a net economic detriment to mothers after
divorce. In addition, time spent on child care decreases earning potential
for the mother. If fathers assumed more responsibility for care of their
children after divorce, the job opportunities and income of divorced women might increase. Empirical evidence also suggests that the presence
of children from a first marriage may somewhat hinder a mother's
chances of getting remarried. 8 1 A custody preference for primary caretakers may thus hinder, not help, women in taking the most easily accessible steps to ease their economic adjustment to divorce.
More significantly, the basic objection to considering custody as a
181. Compare Spanier & Glick, supra note 1, at 291 (reporting that divorced women with children find it more difficult to remarry as compared with divorced women with no children, although
some of this difference may be explained by the differences in age and length of the first marriage)
with Mott & Moore, The Tempo of RemarriageAmong Young American Women, 1983 J. MAR. &
FAM. 427, 431-32 (reporting that the presence of children in the home "is not a significant predictor
of remarriage" among white women once divorced) and Mueller & Pope, Divorce and Female RemarriageMobility: Data on MarriageMatches After Divorcefor White Women, 58 SOCIAL FORCES
726, 730 (1980) (reporting "data suggest[ing] that the presence of children does not affect the remarriage mobility of those [white women] who remarry").
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form of compensation for the economic suffering of primary caretakers
at divorce is that it places the parents' needs above the child's.18 2 This
Article has already shown how trading money for custody is more likely
to harm than benefit the child.18 3 If the goal of the legal system is to
promote the child's best interests, it should not promote social policy to
benefit a parent--even those who have suffered past discrimination-at
the child's expense. A child should not be a form of indirect compensation for economic wrongs, however real. Consistent application of the
partnership principle to postdivorce custody and economic determinations should preclude wealth as a factor in a custody test. Under that
principle, the wealth created by the family belongs to both members, and
both are equally important to the child's postdivorce life. The state
should set fair rules for wealth distribution without using the child as a
covert tool for this purpose.
(iv) The need for certainty to reduce litigation.-A final set of
reasons that might support a primary caretaker preference springs from
the social interest in discouraging custody litigation. An explicit primary
caretaker preference provides much greater certainty about the result of
a custody trial than an unpredictable, multifactor "best interests of the
child" standard. An explicit preference may thus discourage the nonprimary caretaking parent from litigating. The primary caretaker preference
is more attractive in this respect than the father or mother presumptions
that preceded it because it is sex-neutral. Furthermore, it rewards the
economically weaker parent in the divorce, the one less likely to have the
resources necessary for a custody fight. Finally, because the empirical
182. Chambers also recognizes this fundamental flaw in the "economic compensation" argument
for the primary caretaker preference. Chambers, supra note 156, at 541. However, not taking into
account the competing parent's comparative potential to provide the child with material things
seems inconsistent with Chambers' basic test for custody determinations-that a judge should exercise substituted judgment on behalf of the child and decide the custody dispute by projecting how a
child would experience the outcome of competing choices. Id. at 493-99. If anything, under Chambers' test, custody should be awarded to the parent who can provide the child with the most material
resources, an approach which some states seem to allow and that would disadvantage primary caretakers. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.23 (c) (West Supp. 1985) (listing the "capacity... of
the parties involved to provide the child with food, clothing, medical care . . ., and other material
needs" as a factor to be taken into account in judicial custody determinations). Chambers recognizes
the difficulties of "defin[ing] some elemental qualitites of life.., that most children would want for
themselves as they grow up and after they have grown," Chambers, supra note 156, at 497, a task
necessitated by the nature of the judicial inquiry he proposes. One of those "elemental qualities" for
many children would be more money-or an adult could at least so project on the child's behalf.
Although, from the child's perspective, the amount of money a parent has available is not the only
determinant of the quality of postdivorce life, it is certainly an important and easy-to-measure factor
in that equation. Many children, alas, are as mercenary--or can be deemed to be as mercenary-as
adults.
183. See supra note 117 and text accompanying notes 117-20.
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evidence for deciding between parents in a custody dispute is incomplete,
the primary caretaker presumption is as good a rule as any, all things
considered. 184
One problem with this analysis is the task of identifying one parent
as the primary caretaker. The certainty and predictability offered by the
primary caretaker rule varies depending on the division of child care responsibilities in an intact family. In an increasing number of families,
both parents work, and the child's primary caretaker may be a day care
center. In other cases, family circumstances change-for example, one
parent might become ill for an extended period of time-thereby changing the primary caretaker of the children.1 85 It is not hard to imagine a
couple in a custody dispute vying (with the help of lawyers and injunctions) to be the primary caretaker of the child in a jurisdiction with a
primary caretaker preference. Social policy and reality should encourage
flexible division of roles between spouses to adapt to changing circumstances and needs. The primary caretaker presumption does exactly the
opposite.
Whatever its difficulties of application, however, the primary caretaker presumption will work in many families. Even in families with two
working parents, a court should be able to find some objective indicia of
which parent is the primary caretaker. A jurisdiction that enacts a primary caretaker preference will thus almost surely discourage some custody litigation.
186
The adverse effects of custody litigation on the postdivorce family
may justify a presumptive rule of some kind to discourage litigation, but
it does not necessarily justify a particular rule. A presumption in favor of
joint custody would also create greater certainty. The question remains
184. Such was essentially the reasoning of the West Virginia Supreme Court in Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357 (W. Va. 1981), which created a sole custody presumption in favor of the "primary caretaker parent, if he or she meets the minimum, objective standard for being a fit parent...
regardless of sex" for deciding custody disputes about children of "tender years." Id. at 363. The
opinion sets forth a number of standards for determining who the child's primary caretaker is, basically turning on which parent takes major responsibility for tending to the child's physical needs. Id.
185. The West Virginia Supreme Court applied Garska to a case in which the mother was the
first primary caretaker of the child but then lost that status when she left the family home for
treatment of mental illness, illustrating some of the difficulties of applying the primary caretaker rule
and its inconsistency with the partnership theory of marriage. Although the father became the primary caretaker of the child, the West Virginia Supreme Court held that the trial court erred in
awarding custody to the father under the Garska rule because "under circumstances where the status
of primary-caretaker parent has been lost temporarily as a result of circumstances that are beyond
the control of that parent it is inappropriate for a court to look to who the primary-caretaker parent
was immediately before the divorce." J.E.I. v. L.M.I., 314 S.E.2d 67, 71 (W. Va. 1984). The
supreme court, however, affirmed the trial court's award of custody to the father on the basis of its
finding that it would be in the best interests of the child in large part because of its conclusion that
the mother was unable to take care of the child. Id. at 72-73.
186. See infra notes 194-99 and accompanying text.
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whether the price of a particular presumption is worth paying. The primary caretaker presumption risks: tearing the partnership theory of
marriage; reinforcing the perception that courts favor mothers in custody
disputes under sex-neutral labels; and decreasing the quality of the relationship between the child and the nonprimary caretaking parent. The
primary caretaker preference thus suffers the same defects as any other
sole custody rule. Based on this analysis, the justifications for the primary caretaker presumption do not arise from the substance of the presumption, and thus cannot be considered any more tenable than a
presumption for joint custody.
C. Summing Up
The empirical evidence tentatively supports a presumption of joint
legal custody. There is certainly no compelling reason to prefer sole legal
custody. At the very least a court should have the power to order joint
legal custody over the objections of one or both parents even if substantive law creates no preference for joint custody. If risks have to be taken
with children, they should be those which err on the side of keeping both
parents involved in the life of the child.
A presumption of joint legal custody also finds significant support in
the partnership theory of marriage. The important social policies behind
the partnership theory suggest that the state should be extremely cautious in making judgments that one marital partner has a greater legal
1 87
entitlement than the other to anything created by the family unit.
That caution is especially appropriate in state decisions about the allocation of parental rights that have a significant measure of consitutional
protection. A presumption of joint legal custody, viewed in this light, is
a "less restrictive alternative" to the sole custody model. By using a joint
legal custody presumption, the state does not diminish the status of a
capable and caring parent in the child's life absent a compelling showing
1 88
based on the best interests of the child.
The empirical base, however, does not yet justify a presumption that
physical custody should always be split equally between parents. Research has not yet isolated the parent, child, and environmental variables
that go into making an equally split joint physical custody arrangement
187. Cf. B. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 44-45 (1980) (articulating a
principle of neutrality in distribution of resources by the liberal state that prevents one citizen from
making a claim to a scarce resource based on an argument of unconditional superiority to other
citizens).
188. At least one commentator has suggested that a presumption of joint custody may be a
constitutional mandate. See Developments, supra note 44, at 1331-32.
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successful.1 89 A fifty-fifty physical custody presumption radically departs from the child-care arrangements that exist in most families prior
to divorce. 190 Endorsing such a presumption without further empirical
analysis of its effects on the reorganized family unit would involve significant risks for the emotional lives of many children of divorce.
Without compelling a presumption of joint physical custody, however, the current data base and social policy strongly support the principle that physical custody arrangements after divorce cannot blindly
mirror intact family patterns if the child is to have a meaningful relationship with both parents. Predivorce physical custody patterns should thus
be a starting point for analysis of what custody arrangements should be
utilized after divorce but no more than that.
Additionally, current data supports the principle that the legal system should strongly encourage each parent to be as generous as possible
to the other parent in allocating physical custody, and not view the
child's time with the other parent as something the parent has lost.
Combined, these principles lead to the conclusion that, if a court has to
order a physical custody plan, it should try to maximize the time each
parent spends with the child and, if possible, avoid grossly disproportionate distributions of physical custody.
Most significantly, the available data base illuminates the child's,
and thus the state's, enormously important interest in encouraging parental agreement and recognition by each parent that both remain enormously important to the child despite divorce. As will be seen in the
next Part of this Article, the adversary procedures traditionally used to
resolve a custody dispute fail utterly in this respect. Whatever the substantive law standard to deciding custody, the state must create procedural mechanisms to encourage parents to work through their immediate
postdivorce anger and into a reasonably cooperative parental
relationship.
III.

Adversary Procedure and Postdivorce Parental Cooperation

Skepticism about the legal system's ability to induce cooperation between divorced parents concerning their children creates skepticism
about the possibility of joint custody when the parents do not agree. The
notion that "[d]ivorce dissolves the family as well as the marriage, a real189. But see Steinman, Zemmelman & Knoblauch, supra note 125, for a good start in the right
direction.
190. If, however, the choice is between the current policy of "sole custody, visitation on weekends only" presumption and a 50-50 joint physical custody presumption, the empirical evidence and
public policy suggests that the joint physical custody presumption, easily rebuttable, is preferable.
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ity that may not be ignored," 191 promotes the idea that the legal system's
job is simply to declare the marriage dead and do an autopsy for expartners who cannot agree on their children's custody. Under this view
the legal system must declare a winner and a loser in any custody conflict. The assumption that divorce dissolves the family as well as the
marriage leads to the conclusion that the state has no obligation to facilitate cooperation between the parents for the child's benefit.
This view of divorce justifies the state's treatment of divorcing parents as adversaries whose competing claims to the child should be settled
through the traditional procedures used in all litigation. The state must
only provide the divorcing family an adversarial forum to decide which
parent's claims about the child are in some sense "right."
Adversary procedure, however, works against the best interests of
the child by encouraging delay in parental settlement, increasing antagonism between parents, and placing stress on the child's loyalties to each
parent. The present adversary system encourages parental settlement
negotiations to link custody and money issues, which, in turn, encourages parents to put their financial interests ahead of their child's interest
in a relationship with both parents. 192 Control of the process of resolving
the dispute is placed in the hands of the parents' lawyers, who have an
uncertain commitment to the welfare of the child and who are trained in
adversarial combat, not conciliation for the child's best interests. 193 In
short, to use the adversary procedural system falsely assumes that parents and their lawyers, acting in their own self-interest, will provide protection for the child's best interests.
A.

The Custody Trial

[The] experience of [a litigatedcustody dispute] reduced two fairly
sane adults to desperate, ranting maniacs whose behavior often
badly frightened the little girl they supposedly caredfor above94all
else.-Mother involved in a custody fight with her husband.1
The procedural handmaiden to the comparative fitness standard of
the "best interests" sole custody system is the adversarial trial between
parents on that issue. Thirty years ago Walter Gellhorn described the
191. Braiman v. Braiman, 44 N.Y.2d 584, 591, 378 N.E.2d 1019, 1022, 407 N.Y.S.2d 449, 452
(1978).
192. See supra note 117 and text accompanying notes 117-20, 142-48.
193. The argument for adversary procedure is at its strongest when the parties do not have
postjudgment continuing relationships with each other. Given the constitutionally based status of
the right to visitation this will not be the case in a custody dispute, see supra text accompanying note
124 and note 151
194. Quoted in Miller, supra note 52, at 412.
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emotional ambience of this procedural and substantive package in terms
equally applicable today:
As if the problem [of deciding custody] were not difficult enough
intrinsically, it comes to the court obscured in complications.
When the break-up of the marriage is stormy, the children are all
too likely to become ammunition to be expended in the bitter emotional struggle between the parents, which grows intensified as the
legal contest takes shape. Forcible seizures of the child from one
parent by the other are common newspaper stories. Attempts by
both parents to embroil the child in the parental conflict by creating hostility and even by inducing the child to help build a legal
case against the other are not unknown. These conditions of emotional conflict, aggravated by the inevitable transfer of the struggle
to the courtroom, enormously complicate the judge's getting at the
facts, let alone his making nice judgments as to how the welfare of
the child will be best advanced.195
Adversary trial procedure focuses on confrontation between parents
about the past. It is hard to believe that a procedure which dwells on
past conflict and indiscretions promotes parental cooperation in the future, the child's principal need.
The trial encourages each parent to present arguments and evidence
that maximize the shortcomings of the other parent in an attempt to escape responsibility for marital and parental failure.' 96 Adversary procedure provides an official license and awards a prize, sole custody, to a
parent for being simultaneously self-righteous and defensive. Like the
fault system of divorce, adversary custody procedure invites each parent
to take an extreme view of the other's faults and adopt the attitude that
he or she is more important to the child. Cross-examination on past
faults and indiscretions does not encourage parents to treat each other
civilly after a custody trial, much less to cooperate for the child's
postdivorce future. The symbolism and structure of the adversary custody trial functions directly against what the state, if concerned about the
child's best interests, should be trying to promote.
Adversary procedure also infects the child involved in a custody dispute. The child's preference may be significant ammunition in the adversary struggle.' 97 Parents are very aware of the importance of the child's
195. W. GELLHORN, CHILDREN AND FAMILIES IN THE COURTS OF NEW YORK CITY 308
(1954) (footnote omitted).
196. A transcript of a particularly bitter custody trial that illustrates its emotional ambience can
be found in J. AREEN, FAMILY LAW 429-535 (1978).
197. Texas law is representative as to the weight given to children in different age groups. The
child's preference carries little weight if the child is under 12; from 12-14, the preference is heard but
not always followed; and for over 14 it is followed unless clearly against the child's best interests.
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.07 (Vernon 1975 & Supp. 1986). In determining what is in the best
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views in the custody determination and many try to influence what the
child says to the judge. The emotional and material bribery that can
follow weakens the competence and authority of a parent in the child's
eyes and distorts the normal parent-child relationship already dealt a
crushing blow by divorce. It empowers the child to do something no
child should have the power to do-choose between the two most important figures in her life for whom she should be encouraged to have equal
respect. 198
The effect of a child's choosing one parent over another often devastates the child's relationship with the parent who is not chosen and directly contradicts the goal of creating an emotional atmosphere in which
the child has postdivorce relationships with both parents. One can easily
imagine how a parent reacts to the news that a child has expressed a
preference for the other parent as the primary custodian. Even if that
parent emerges from the courtroom victorious, she is likely to feel that
the child does not love her, and is unlikely to have the kind of meaningful
relationship with the child that the child needs to cope with the stress of
divorce.
The adversarial process wreaks havoc on many other aspects of the
reorganization of a child's life after divorce. In addition to creating conflict in the nuclear family, it also destroys other infrastructures of the
interests of the child, in most states the judge can consider the child's preferences and give them
more weight as the child grows older, but should not treat the child's expressed preferences as dispositive of the outcome of the litigation. See, e.g., Friederwitzer v. Friederwitzer, 55 N.Y.2d 89, 94,
432 N.E.2d 765, 767, 447 N.Y.S.2d 893, 895 (1982) ("desires of the child are to be considered, but
can be manipulated and may not be in the child's best interests"); Dintruff v. McGreevy, 34 N.Y.2d
887, 888, 316 N.E.2d 716, 716, 359 N.Y.S.2d 281, 281 (1974) ("Wihile a child's view should be
considered to ascertain his attitude and to lead to relevant facts, it should not be determinative.");
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-56(b) (West Supp. 1985) (directing the court to give "consideration
to the wishes of the child if he is of sufficient age and capable of forming an intelligent preference").
For a recent empirical study of judicial practices in and attitudes toward interviewing children in
custody cases, see Lombard, supra note 4. For a study of the process of being consulted in custody
cases from the child's perspective, see S. Meehan, Contested Custody Disputes: The Experiences of
Children and the Implications for Social Policy (1982) (unpublished Ph.D dissertation) (children's
opinions about the court's custody decision are based on factors including parent's feedback, court
records, child's age, and extensiveness of child's participation) (available through University Microfilms International).
198. Some children actively want to choose between their parents, see J. WALLERSTEIN & J.
KELLY, supra note 62, at 314-15. Many are influenced by their developmental stage and need for
independence from one parent or the other. Some children choose based on their anger toward and
desire to punish the parent who "caused" the divorce. Some children choose the "more vulnerable"
parent, the one they deem less capable of coping with separation, to avoid inflicting further pain.
Other children make their choice on the basis of which parent is more likely to be able to provide,
either emotionally or materially, competent parenting to them. These children tend to underestimate the importance to them of continued meaningful relationships with both their father and
mother. Many children who choose between their parents come to regret their choices and the
reasons for them in later life. Id. Society generally shields children from making such significant
choices until they reach the age of majority. The adversary procedure of the custody trial into which
they are drawn forces them to grow up too fast.
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child's life such as bonds with relatives. The custody battle often pits
two opposing camps in which grandparents, uncles, and aunts actively
take sides to enter the fray. Furthermore, the turmoil associated with the
custody fight provides a bad model for future behavior for the child. The
child learns that a person must turn to an outsider to resolve disputes; a
lesson diametrically opposed to the one learned from the marriage
model.
The money spent on a custody trial could be better spent on the
child instead of on the lawyers. Moreover, the judges handling these
cases often dislike custody disputes and their general antipathy for these
types of trials may affect the quality of decisions. Finally, the entire procedure is geared toward parents who do not want to agree. This bent
reduces the possibility of concessions and negotiations coming to
fruition.
In short, because of the effects of the trial on the parent-parent and
parent-child relationships, it is hard to conceive of a process for custody
decision making less designed to protect the child's interest in continuing
relationships with both parents.
B.

Negotiations in the Sole Custody, Adversary ProcedureSystem

Actual custody trials are the exception, and settlement of custody
disputes through negotiations the norm. Nonetheless, the shadow of a
custody trial creates an adversarial atmosphere and focuses negotiations
on the parents' rights, not the child's needs. Furthermore, those settlement negotiations are conducted according to an adult sense of time,
which often neglects the child's need for speedy stability of
environment. 19 9
Adversarial procedure legitimizes the notion that the parents are enemies after divorce and furthers the social acceptability of threatening a
custody trial to extract concessions on financial matters in settlement.
The custody-money negotiations that result mean one parent can be required to bargain away some or all of her involvement with the child in
return for lesser financial obligations. Or they may mean that one parent
may have to sacrifice needed financial support in return for maintaining
a relationship with the child. 2°° Furthermore, linking custody with
199. The usual time frame employed is generated by the lawyers' strategy and court calendars.
The primary caretaker's lawyer tends to seek an order granting temporary custody to the primary
caretaker and then tries to delay a final determination as long as possible in order to establish a
status quo a judge will be unwilling to disrupt at a later time. This strategy is not designed to satisfy
the child's need to find an equilibrium and adjust to postdivorce life.
200. See supra note 117, and text accompanying notes 117-19, 142-48.

739

Texas Law Review

Vol. 64:687, 1985

money delays settling custody until financial concessions are made,
rather than settling disputes in accordance with the child's sense of time.
In any event, an adversary atmosphere shifts the focus of the question the
parents must resolve in negotiations from what is good for the child's
relationship with both parents to what is in the interests of one parent or
the other, financially or otherwise.
Some device is thus necessary to help parents separate their interests
from their child's in divorce settlement negotiations. Adversary procedure relies on lawyers to help the parents if the custody dispute is settled
short of trial.2 0 1 The question thus becomes whether the parents' lawyers
who conduct the negotiations-rather than the parents themselves-pro202
tect the child's interests.
Theoretically, lawyers representing the parents can bring elements
of objectivity and reflection to the negotiating process not present if the
parents negotiated the settlement themselves.20 3 The ethical obligations
of lawyers, however, require them to focus on the desires of their clients,
not on the needs of the child. As a result, lawyers tend to have negative
attitudes toward joint custody and nonadversarial dispute-resolution
techniques. Counting on the parents' lawyers to protect the interests of
the child in parental divorce settlement negotiations leaves those interests
to the parents' selection of counsel, a choice made for any number of
reasons ranging from attractive advertising to having a reputation for
being the toughest, most uncompromising family law litigator in the
area.
No empirical research specifies the degree to which lawyers for parents try to temper extreme positions of their clients that threaten the
child's relationship with the other parent. Many prominent divorce lawyers advocate aggressive representation of the client's wishes with apparently little concern for the effect on the child.204 There is no indication
201. Short of a trial, the lawyer's influence on the negotiations is the only protective check on
the parent's possible selfishness. Any settlement agreed to is usually rubber stamped by a court so
even the court does not impose a check unless the matter is actually litigated.
202. Another relevant question, beyond the scope of this Article, is how the child's interest in a
continued relationship with both parents is protected in divorce settlement negotiations in which
parents are unrepresented by counsel. There is no constitutional right to counsel for the poor in
divorce cases. In re Smiley, 36 N.Y.2d 433, 330 N.E.2d 53, 369 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1975). Whatever
protection the parents' lawyers give the child's interests in cases in which the parents are represented
is not available to the children of parents too poor to pay lawyer's fees. Although there is a serious
question whether appointing a lawyer to represent the child in such cases is a good idea, see infra
text accompanying notes 229-51, the state presumably should devise some other mechanisms such as
publicly funded mediation systems that will provide some protection to the children of divorce
whose parents cannot afford private services. See infra subpart V(B).
203. Eisenberg, Private Ordering Through Negotiation: Dispute-Settlement and Rulemaking, 89
HARV. L. REV. 637, 660-65 (1976).
204. "When I take a case... [a]s far as I am concerned my client is always right." R. FELDER,
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that the profession seriously advocates the need to promote the child's
relationship with the other parent.
The limited data available indicates that lawyers tend to be skeptical
about the viability of joint custody arrangements. In informal surveys,
about fifty percent of the lawyers who specialize in family law express
support for joint custody in principle for "appropriate cases." Opinions
20 5
differ, however, as to how many cases are actually appropriate.
Deborah Leupnitz studied eleven families in which both parents desired
joint custody. 20 6 Yet, in three of those eleven cases one of the lawyers
consulted opposed joint custody and tried to talk the parents out of the
20 7
previously agreed upon arrangement.
Lawyers also tend to be skeptical about mediation of child custody
controversies. In 1983, only forty percent of the members of the Family
Law Section of the American Bar Association indicated that custody mediation services were available in their communities, and only thirty percent of that smaller group indicated that they would recommend
20 8
mediation services to their clients to resolve custody contests.
The reasons for these views are unclear. 20 9 Many lawyers have sincere, and in some cases justified, doubts about the wisdom of joint custody and the quality of services delivered by mediation programs.
Parents who encounter these attitudes in their lawyers will likely be discouraged from trying approaches to custody arrangements that are more
likely to promote a child's relationship with both parents than will a sole
DIVORCE 2-7 (1971). The author describes a custody dispute in which he represented a mother with
psychiatric problems who apparently had physically abused her child. The author nonetheless opposed a psychiatric examination for the mother by a court-appointed psychiatrist that the mother's
own psychiatrist had recommended. Id. See also M. FRANKS, WINNING CUSTODY (1983) (advocating a "total war" view of custody disputes; chapter three of this book is entitled "You're at War,
Buddy").
205. These opinions range from "extremely rare" to 50% on joint physical custody and from
40% to "almost every case" for joint legal custody. See Miller, supra note 52, at 370-71 (describing
results of informal survey of "several" lawyers and mental health professionals).
206. Presumably, parents who both want joint custody are ideal candidates for such an arrangement under any standard. See supra notes 99-130 and accompanying text; see also Steinman, Zemmelman & Knoblauch, supranote 125, at 558 (observing that the successful joint custody families all
had reached agreement on joint custody without court involvement).
207. D. LEUPNITZ, supra note 83, at 24. A recent survey of the membership of the American
Bar Associations's Family Law Section indicated that 36% of the respondents always encourage
joint legal custody if they believe the parents could cooperate and another 35% sometimes encourage
it under those circumstances. The survey, however, did not ask how frequently the lawyers believed
parents could cooperate with each other after divorce to make joint legal custody workable. Smith &
Troha, A Survey of the Membership of the ABA Section of Family Law, 17 FAM. L.Q. 225, 256
(1983).
208. Smith & Troha, supra note 207, at 257.
209. But see Riskin, Mediation and Lawyers, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 29, 43-51 (1982) (arguing antipathy to mediation largely results from the focus of legal education and practice on finding justice
through adversarial litigation model).
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custody system and adversarial litigation. 2 10 Although mediation and
conflict reduction is part of the credit curriculum in many law schools,
2 11
legal training emphasizes triumphing in win/lose adversarial battling,
and lawyers may thus find alternative approaches to parental custody
disputes unfamiliar and somewhat frightening. Doubts about joint custody and mediation also serve the economic self-interest of many family
lawyers. A joint custody settlement and mediation may reduce conflict
and thus the fees paid to lawyers. For lawyers representing clients who
cannot afford extensive legal fees, the negotiation and drafting of joint
custody arrangements may consume more time and effort on the lawyer's
part than a traditional sole custody/visitation arrangement, 212 thus decreasing the profit margin of a practice that relies on a high volume of
21 3
clients and the use of standardized forms.
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, the lawyer's professional responsibility obligations require her to promote the wishes and interests of
the parent-client, 2 14 instead of the needs of the child. In the adversary
system, decisions about the ultimate objectives of the representation (e.g.,
whether to use custody as a bargaining chip in negotiations) are reserved
for the client. 215 No formal ethical obligation requires a lawyer to advise
a client that the positions on custody the client wants advanced are
harmful to the child's relationship with the other parent; the attorney
may if she so desires, but is not obligated to do so. 2 16 The Code of Professional Responsibility requires the lawyer to represent and protect vig210. Empirical research indicates that attitudes of the parents' lawyers are the single most important factor in whether parents are favorably disposed to try custody mediation programs. See
Pearson, Thoennes & Vander Kooi, Mediation of Contested Child Custody Disputes, 11 COLO. LAW.
336, 340 (1982) (attorney encouragement is a key factor in motivating people to try to mediate).
211. See generally Alternative Dispute Resolution in the Law Curriculum, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC.
229 (1984) (advocating placing more emphasis in law school on nonadversarial conflict resolution
techniques).
212. See Miller, supra note 52, at 384 (describing attorney resistance to joint custody
arrangements).
213. Computer software now enables attorneys to prepare standardized divorces "petition
through decree" for up to nine children in "less than 5 minutes." Such work is apparently profitable: "One divorce per month will pay for [the software], computer and printer." Advertisement, 49
TEX. B.J. 25 (1986). "Divorce Master [TM computer software] assembles the pleadings, inputs the
client data, composes and prints the documents. The secretary does not see a word of text in most
divorces until the pleadings are printed and ready to file at the courthouse." Id. Clearly, drafting a
joint custody decree tailored to a particular family is likely to require more than the few seconds of
attorney time that signing a mass-produced decree form requires.
214. Cf Cal. State Bar Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 1976-37 (lawyer representing
parent in a child custody dispute who discovers client's interests conflict with child's may not notify
court of the conflict and suggest appointment of counsel for the child).
215. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(a) (1983); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILrrY EC 7-7, 7-8 (1980).
216. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 2.1 (1983); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-8 (1980).
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orously the client's interests, 2 17 as defined by the client, with only passing
mention of avoiding "needless" harm to third parties. 218 A lawyer with
an aggressively adversarial attitude about representing a client's wishes
can thus easily justify not seriously considering the child's needs if the
client chooses not to.
In sum, the participation of lawyers in settlement negotiations may
help some parents separate their personal needs from their child's needs
in some percentage of custody disputes. The opposite effect, however, is
also likely. Only some additional presence, supplied by the state and
charged with advocating the child's interest in a speedy stability of environment and parental cooperation throughout the dispute settlement
process, can provide any systematic assurance that parents will give their
child's needs priority over their own.
IV.

Reform Proposals Within the Sole Custody-Adversary
Procedure System

The combined sole custody, adversary procedure system for custody
dispute resolution fails to promote the child's needs after divorce. Part V
of this Article presents an alternative cooperative-custody-promoting
substantive and procedural system, designed to emphasize the interests of
the child.
The strengths and weaknesses of more limited reform must be identified before the suggested comprehensive change is described and defended. The proposals to be examined-restricting access to divorce for
parents, appointing a lawyer for the child, and involving neutral mental
health experts in the courts' custody decision-making process-essentially retain the sole custody model but seek to manipulate the substantive law or procedure of the custody dispute resolution system on the
child's behalf. These proposals are well-motivated and have features that
should be incorporated into more comprehensive reform. They do not,
however, adequately restructure the basic premises of the sole custodyadversarial system.
A.

"Child Protective" Divorce Laws

The state could protect children's interests by making divorce more
difficult for parents to obtain. Parents who seek divorce would have to
make a higher threshold showing to obtain it than would couples without
217. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7 (1980).
218. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-10 (1980). Cf MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4.4 (1983) (establishing bounds for attorney's conduct with regard to
respect for rights of third parties).
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children. 219 For example, married parents might have to show in addition to "irreconcilable differences" that the divorce would be better for
220
the children than would continuation of the marriage.
The rationale for creating a separate status of "marriage for minor
children" is that, if divorce is difficult to obtain, parents who are marginally committed to divorce will not pursue it; or will at least postpone
divorce proceedings until the children pass the age of majority. It is even
possible that faced with great difficulty in obtaining a divorce, the unhappy parents will reconcile, to the benefit of the entire family unit.
The marriage for minor children proposal shares an assumption
with certain joint custody proposals: that a state can force or at least
strongly encourage a parent to continue a relationship with the other
spouse after divorce. 22 1 The proposals differ, however, in that the joint
cugtody proposal limits the relationship the state presumes the parents
should continue in the child's best interests to that of parent, but the
marriage for minor children proposal mandates the continuation of the
marriage. Under a presumption of joint custody the parents can remarry
freely; under the marriage for minor children proposal they cannot.
Restricting access to divorce might encourage some parents to reconcile or stay together for the benefit of the children. It would certainly
deter parents from hasty divorces. 222 There are, however, other possible,
less attractive effects. A parent might produce an "illegitimate" child,
who carries the stigma and discrimination that label implies, 223 because
he could not acquire a divorce under the marriage for minor children
regime. A stringent divorce standard designed to benefit children in the
parent's formal family might thus work unwitting harm on the children
in a second, informal relationship.
In addition, it is not clear that children will actually benefit if their
parents are forced to stay married. The principal concern about a presumption of joint custody is that it might subject the children to intolerable levels of continuing parental conflict. 224 The marriage for minor
children proposal magnifies this concern. In some unknown number of
intact families, the level of parental conflict dictates that the parents
219. Cochran & Vitz, supra note 40, at 344-49; Younger, supra note 37, at 90-94.
220. Younger, supra note 37, at 90.
221. See supra subpart II(A)(2)(b).
222. See M. WHEELER, supra note 26, at 100-01 (remarking on judges who suggest that too
many couples seek hasty divorces); cf C. FOOTrE, R. LEVY & F. SANDER, supra note 26, at 1092-98
(judge extolling success rate of court-imposed mandatory marital counseling).
223. Cf Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972) ("Courts are powerless
to prevent the social opprobrium suffered by [illegitimate] children ... .
224. See supra subpart II(A)(2)(b).
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should divorce quickly in order to preserve the child's best interests. 225
The marriage for minor children proposal also fails to deal with the
fact that many divorces, even those involving children, occur because
both spouses want it and have agreed to property division, custody, and
support.2 26 There is something extremely distasteful about a legal standard that forces two adults who both want a divorce to stay married.
The marriage for minor children proposal, just as the fault divorce system, encourages collusion and perjury to satisfy the qualifying criteria for
divorce. 227 The alternative is to devote limited state resources to detecting and punishing parental collusion, a fact of life that the history of
the fault divorce system shows is easier for courts to decry than
228
eradicate.
The only way to make the marriage for minor children proposal
even minimally feasible is to revise the current practice in most courts
and conduct serious hearings into whether the custody arrangements in
uncontested divorce settlements are truly in the best interests of the
child. Given the difficulty of a court's making that evaluation even in
contested cases and the costs to parental authority that result when a
court overrules a parental agreement, it is doubtful whether a marriage
for minor children proposal spends limited resources wisely.
In short, keeping parents married against their will has all the disadvantages of the presumption of joint custody plus the problems of the
fault divorce system. It is far less intrusive on personal privacy to give
parents the freedom to divorce but to require that they act responsibly
towards their children by developing an appropriate custody plan than it
is to force parents to stay married.
More significantly, a marriage for minors statute sends out a perverse message to parents already embroiled in conflict. The state essentially tells the parents that they can "win" (obtain a divorce) by creating
225. See L. FRANCKE, GROWING UP DIVORCED 54-55 (1983) (using children's reactions to
demonstrate that a "house filled with tension can take a far greater toll on the children than resolution of the tension through divorce").
226. See M. WHEELER, supra note 26, at 6-8 (noting that one party must still sue the other for
divorce in a fault system, even though both desire to end the marriage).
227. Cf C. FOOTE, R. LEVY & F. SANDER, supra note 26, at 954-57 (describing techniques to
make divorces appear uncontested in court under a fault system).
228. See id. at 1004 (describing experience in England with Queen's Proctor whose job it was to
investigate divorce cases at random for signs of perjury). A related problem with making the
grounds for divorce more stringent for parents is that unless similar grounds are adopted in every
state simultaneously, the problem of "migratory divorce" that plagued the fault divorce system
could reappear. Some married couples who have children and who agree to divorce quickly but who
do not meet the more stringent criteria of their home state could establish residence in another state
with less stringent grounds. This system would discriminate against those parents not wealthy
enough to move to the more permissive state. See M. WHEELER, supra note 26, at 11 (describing the
problem of migratory divorce under the fault system).
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a climate that makes the child's life miserable. A state with a joint custody presumption, on the other hand, tells parents that they can "win"
by being decent and cooperating for the benefit of their child. The marriage for minors proposal encourages conflict; the joint custody presumption fosters cooperation.
.

Lawyers for Children

Many commentators advocate court-appointed counsel for the child
in parental custody disputes and identify several functions such lawyers
can perform. 22 9 Lawyers for children can function as mediators, attempting to reduce antagonism between parents; 2 30 they can be procedural expediters, helping to move the dispute towards resolution in
accordance with the child's sense of time; and they can serve as independent investigators and advocates for a particular result, bringing
data and recommendations about the fitness of the parents and proposed
custody plans to the attention of the court if lawyers for the parents do
not do so because of tactical calculation or incompetence. 23 1 A lawyer
for the child can be the child's ally outside the courtroom by explaining
the legal process and the parents' positions, and by providing emotional
comfort and counseling. Finally, the lawyer for the child can serve as the
child's advocate within the courtroom, cross-examining witnesses and
presenting evidence that furthers the child's preferences for a custody
2 32

plan.

All of these functions are important and serve the child's interests in
speedy stability of environment and post-divorce parental cooperation.
Expedited decision making, mediation, and independent evaluation are
prominent features of a cooperative custody system. 23 3 Yet the assumption that all of these functions are best performed by a single, legally
trained professional raises many questions. It is extremely difficult to
design a service delivery system that supplies competent lawyers to perform traditional advocacy functions for children, much less nonadver229. The classic piece advocating the need for separate legal representation is Note, supra note
92. See also Guggenheim, The Right To Be Represented But Not Heard: Reflections on LegalRepresentationfor Children, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 76, 117 n.169 (1984) (listing sources that advocate separate counsel for children in divorce-custody cases).
230. Note, supra note 92, at 1172-77.
231. Guggenheim, supra note 229, at 122-26.
232.

Cf INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION,

AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STAN-

DARDS RELATING TO COUNSEL FOR PRIVATE PARTIES, JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS 7 (1979)
("[The goals of adequate disclosure of all relevant information and the achieving of just results in

juvenile proceedings can best be obtained by counsel assuming in juvenile court the functions of
counselling and advocacy in the same manner as in other courts of civil and criminal jurisdiction.")
[hereinafter cited as JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS].

233. See infra subparts V(B)-(C), VI(C).
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sarial tasks for which lawyers are generally not well-equipped. In a large
number of cases, a competent, well-trained lawyer for the child will be
torn between performing adversarial and nonadversarial functions. If a
lawyer for the child takes the client-centered view that the child's preferences should govern the objectives of the representation, 234 the pressures
on the child to choose between parents will only be increased, thereby
magnifying the generally negative consequences that result from a child's
having to make that choice.2 35 If, on the other hand, the lawyer's actions
are not governed by the child's preferences, the lawyer's own outlook
about custody disputes becomes an additional wildcard in a decisionmaking process that is already too unpredictable.
Some current practices must change for the child's counsel to act as
mediator, evaluator, and ally for the child both in the courtroom and in
settlement negotiations. First, few states now mandate that counsel for
the child be appointed in custody disputes; most states make such an
appointment discretionary with the court. 236 Additionally, in certain
states, lawyers for the child in custody disputes are not always adequately compensated for their services.
To be effective, counsel for children must be appointed routinely, as
soon as the matter comes to the attention of the judicial system. In addition, compensation for counsel must be set at a level high enough to recruit competent lawyers to accept appointments in hundreds of custody
cases every year, as it is unlikely enough competent lawyers will volunteer to do the job on a pro bono basis. The money to fund these lawyers
cannot come from the children themselves as they do not generally have
it. One possibility is to ask the parents to pay the fee of the lawyer for
the child jointly in proportion to their ability to pay. This arrangement
will provide compensation to the lawyer for the child in the small
number of instances where the parents are well-off financially. Paying
three lawyers instead of two, however, will strain the limited financial
resources of many divorcing parents. For the children involved in custody disputes whose parents cannot afford to pay additional lawyers'
fees, the state needs to compensate the children's attorneys.
A system for appointing counsel for children from a private panel of
attorneys and compensating them from state funds currently exists in
234. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct dictate that a lawyer appointed to represent a
child should, "as far as reasonably possible, maintain a normal client-lawyer relationship with the
client." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.14 and comment (1983); see also JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS, supra note 232 (counsel in juvenile proceedings should act as counsel
would in any other proceedings).
235. See supra notes 197-98 and accompanying text.
236. Guggenheim, supra note 229, at 117-18.
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New York State Family Court. 237 Appointments are mandatory in some
cases but discretionary in other cases, including custody disputes between parents. The rate of compensation is $25 per hour for in-court
time, $15 per hour for out-of-court time.2 38 This long-standing "law
guardian" program provides some indication of what the likely result
would be of appointing counsel for children in the large number of custody disputes that come to the courts.
A recent comprehensive empirical study 239 clearly establishes that
in a large percentage of cases the quality of representation law guardians
provide children borders on incompetence. 240 Few of the court-appointed counsel for children bother to interview their clients, examine
necessary files and witnesses, or participate in out-of-court settlement negotiations with any vigor.241 Few have familiarity with the mental health
concepts and resources dealing with the relationship of children to the
legal system or have any training in or special qualifications for representation of children. 242 Many law guardians do their clients more harm
than good. 243 This study shows that some special system of training
must be developed and an adequate level of compensation provided
before the role of lawyers for children can be expanded.
Assuming that the state can somehow solve the problems of competence and compensation, there remains the serious problem of defining
how a lawyer for the child should act in custody cases: whether the lawyer should advocate the child's best interests or the child's preferences.
A lawyer may believe that it is in the best interests of the child-client to
maintain relationships with both parents, even if the child expressly
states that she does not want to see one parent ever again. 244 If the
237. See N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT § 249 (McKinney 1983) (authorizing court appointment of law
guardians in Family Court cases).
238. J. KNITZER & M. SOBE, LAW GUARDIANS IN NEW YORK STATE: A STUDY OF THE

LEGAL REPRESENTATION OF CHILDREN 3 (1984). Some states do not limit the amount of compensation for court-appointed counsel for children. See, eg., TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 51.10(i) (Vernon
1975) (appointed attorney paid from county's general fund). Compensation is important only as it
affects the quality and competence of the lawyer.
239. This study, apparently the first in the country, was conducted under the auspices of the
New York State Bar Association. J. KNITZER & M. SOME, supra note 238, at 3.
240. See id. at 131.
241. See id. at 39-40.
242. See id. at 131-33.
243. Another aspect of the question of the lawyer's competence hinges on the lawyer's knowledge of what is in the best interests of the child in custody disputes. Many attorneys seeking a clearcut, easy-to-apply solution might employ Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit's view of what is in the best
interests of the child. See supra subpart II(A)(2)(a). With that background, a lawyer would be less
likely to explore possibilities of joint custody.
244. For instance, assume that a lawyer has been appointed to represent a six-year-old girl who
blames her father for the family break-up because of his involvement with another woman. The girl
tells her lawyer that she never wants to see her father again under any circumstances. The lawyer
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child's lawyer believes it appropriate to represent the probably transitory
and certainly self-defeating preferences of the child, the attorney would
have great difficulty juggling the adversarial and nonadversarial functions assigned to her. Under prevailing conceptions of professional responsibility, adult clients generally have the right to control the
objectives of the lawyers' representations and youthful clients generally
have the right to be treated by their lawyers as adults. 245 Under this
view, the core function of a lawyer is to maximize the possibility that the
court will follow the child-client's preference. Thus, the lawyer representing the child must advocate the child's preference in settlement negotiations and in the courtroom, 246 thereby interfering with the attorney's
mediational or neutral fact-finding role.
The only solution, short of withdrawing from representation, is for
the lawyer to disregard the child's wishes. Many lawyers for children in
custody disputes view their roles as mediators and facilitators of parental
desires and take this course. 247 Data from the New York State law
guardian report confirms that most court-appointed law guardians for
children in juvenile delinquency and social welfare cases frequently disregard their clients' wishes and advocate instead what the lawyers perceive
is in their clients' best interests. 248 This practice is fundamentally at odds
with formal notions of professional responsibility. Departing from a
model of the lawyer's representation of the child centered on client preferences frees the lawyer to advocate his or her own view of what is in the
child's best interests, whether the child actually wants that result.24 9 It is
impossible to predict how a lawyer for the child advocating his own idiosyncratic views of what is in the child's best interests will influence the
results of pretrial negotiations and trial. There is no guarantee that a
lawyer freed from the constraints of advocating client-defined objectives
will support the child's need for a continued relationship with both
2 50
parents.
for the child repeatedly counsels his client that her best interests suggest she should visit with her
father regularly and frequently to redevelop a relationship with him. Nothing, however, will change
this child's mind. She adamantly insists that her lawyer advocate a custody plan where she has little
or no contact with her father.
245. See supra note 232.
246. In the hypothetical case, supra note 244, the attorney should take the mother's side in
pretrial negotiations and make settlement proposals that limit the father's postdivorce relationship
with the child, or attempt to delay proceedings, assuming good cause exists and that the mother and
child's position might benefit. The attorney must also not present evidence that is favorable to the
father should a custody trial occur.
247. See Note, supra note 92, at 1172-77.
248. J. KNITZER & M. SOMIE, supra note 238, at 36-43, 130-35.
249. See Guggenheim, supra note 229, at 100-07 (describing the function of the "champion" as
"advocat[ing] what he believes to be the appropriate outcome").
250. See supra note 243.
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If the aim of appointing a lawyer for the child is to provide mediation, neutral fact-finding, or an emotional ally for the child, then the
state should explicitly outline those duties when assigning a lawyer to a
custody dispute. With special training, a lawyer can be an excellent mediator or independent fact-gatherer. Nothing in a lawyer's traditional
education or professional orientation, however, suggests attorneys are
likely to be better than mental health professionals in performing these
tasks. Indeed, given the lack of emphasis in legal education on mediation, lawyers are likely to be less suited to act as mediators or independent fact-finders in family conflict resolution than are professionals from
disciplines in which formal training emphasizes encouraging cooperation
and self-understanding.
In any event, appointing a lawyer for a child to perform only
nonadversarial dispute resolution functions obscures the state's role in
custody disputes. A court-appointed lawyer is most appropriate in cases
involving teenage children whose cognitive and moral capacities approximate those of an adult and who, as a practical matter, can sabotage any
custody plan to which parents agree or a court imposes. 2 51 A lawyer
representing such older children should allow the child to define the
objectives of representation; the lawyer's aim should be to insure the
child has input into the decision-making process.
C. Neutral Mental Health Experts
Another improvement frequently proposed for the sole custody system is increased reliance on mental health experts not affiliated with
either parent to recommend a custody plan to the court. 252 A court can
appoint a neutral psychiatrist to examine mother, father, siblings, and
other important persons in the child's life and to present findings and
conclusions to the court in a written report. The psychiatrist is available
as a witness at trial and can be cross-examined by either parent. The
judge can-but is not required to-rely on the psychiatrist's report and
recommendations.
A court-appointed neutral mental health expert is an attractive concept because it softens the adversary mode of dispute resolution. A psychiatrist paid by one parent and selected by that parent's lawyer will
251. A lawyer for the child should also be appointed in circumstances where a child has significant financial interests such as a trust fund or contract income that would be affected by the divorce
settlement.
252. See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, CHILD CUSTODY CONSULTATION: A REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON CLINICAL ASSESSMENT IN CHILD CUSTODY (1982) (encouraging
psychiatrists to become involved in the process); R. GARDNER, FAMILY EVALUATION IN CUSTODY
LITIGATION (1982).
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always be suspected of being a "hired gun,"' 25 3 and often will not have the
254
opportunity to interview the other parent before reaching conclusions.
Such reports are, therefore, inevitably incomplete and subject to attack
for partisan bias. A court-appointed psychiatrist on the other hand has
no financial allegiance to either parent and can insist on an interview
with all parties concerned and use the compulsory process of the court to
enforce this ground rule.
A court-appointed psychiatrist may also favorably affect the behavior of the parents before the trial. Parents will probably control their
most aggressive actions and impulses toward each other for fear of the
psychiatrist sending an unfavorable report to the court. This, in turn,
might encourage settlement. Each parent might rather settle than take
the risk of an adverse recommendation from the neutral psychiatrist.
The psychiatrist's report itself might stimulate the negotiation process. Her explanation of recommendations might encourage the parents
to settle because of enhanced understanding of the needs of the child and
their strengths and weaknesses as parents. The psychiatrist's recommendations, coming from a neutral source, are likely to be seriously considered by the judge. The parent whose custody position is weakened by the
report will think seriously about settling rather than pushing the dispute
to trial, where the outcome could be even worse.
Use of neutral psychiatrists to make recommendations to courts in
custody disputes would be a desirable movement away from exclusive
reliance on the adversary process, but it still would have some drawbacks. One is the question of funding. The system runs afoul of the same
problems as the lawyer for children proposal. If the parents are required
to split the fee, some families could not afford it.255 If the state pays for
the neutral psychiatrist, the questions of knowledge, competence, and ad256
equate compensation arise.
Another drawback is that use of neutral psychiatrists does not
change the sole custody system. The appointment of a neutral psychiatrist, without more, will still likely result in sole custody if the psychiatrist shares the psychoanalytic assumption that one parent is more
important than the other in the child's emotional life. 257 A psychiatrist
253. Cf W. GAYLIN, THE KILLING OF BONNIE GARLAND 203-41 (1982) (describing the role of
psychiatrists in the adversarial system in making determinations of insanity in criminal cases).
254. In the custody trial transcript in Judith Areen's family law casebook, numerous mental
health experts testified on behalf of the mother or the father. Only one interviewed both parents and
the conditions of the interview with each parent separately were greatly different. J. AREEN, supra
note 196, at 429-35.
255. See supra text preceding note 237.
256. See supra text accompanying notes 237-43.
257. See supra notes 22-23, 40-43, 110-11, and accompanying text.
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does not help parties settle disagreements themselves except incidentally,
and then only in the coercive shadow of an adverse recommendation on
custody to the court. The legal standards within which the psychiatrist
evaluates the child and parents remain the same. If a case goes to trial in
a jurisdiction that disfavors joint custody, the psychiatrist only helps the
court decide sole custody: one parent still wins and one parent still loses.
Furthermore, there is serious question about even the very best psychiatrist's capacity to predict which of two involved, fit parents is more
important to the child over several years. 258 Although neutral psychiatrists may be able to provide valuable descriptive data about the emotional development of the child and relationships within the family, there
is no indication that they are better able than judges to identify which
parent is more important to a child, especially as the available evidence
indicates that children need both parents for optimal development.2 59
Using psychiatric expertise to make sole custody decisions does not make
the sole custody standard less problematic.
Employing neutral psychiatric experts would improve the sole custody system. The sole custody system, however, even with whatever improvement neutral psychiatrists make in it, should be a second, not first,
line of defense in trying to protect the child's interests.
V.

The Cooperative Custody System

There is an alternative to the pessimistic adversarial role of the legal
system at the time of divorce. 260 This alternative emphasizes that children's emotional and financial links with their parents and the parents'
common interest in the welfare of their children continue long after marriages dissolve. Divorce is the occasion for the family's reorganization,
not its funeral. As protector of the child's interest in establishing stability quickly, the state should structure parental interaction through a
combination of joint custody, mediation, and active judicial manage262
ment, 26 1 which together, create a cooperative custody system.
258. See Ennis & Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise: Flipping Coins in the
Courtroom, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 693, 711-16 (1974) (describing similar studies to the same effect);
Okpaku, Psychology: Impediment or Aid in Child Custody Cases?, 29 RUTGERS L. REV. 1117, 1152
(1976) (rejecting psychological testimony as a basis for deciding custody cases); cf Steadman &
Cocozza, Psychiatry, Dangerousnessand the Repetitively Violent Offender, 69 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 226, 230-31 (1978) (empirical study of psychiatric predictions of violence for indicted felons
found incompetent to stand trial suggests no special ability of psychiatrists to predict future violent
behavior beyond that expected by chance). But see Litwack, Gerber & Fenster, The ProperRole of
Psychology in Child Custody Disputes, 18 J. FAM. L. 269 (1979-1980) (replying to Okpaku article).
259. See supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text.
260. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
261. See generally Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing, 70 F.R.D. 111, 122 (1976) (applying
alternative dispute resolution methods to parental and custody conflicts). Court control legitimizes
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The cooperative custody system places the state and the courts in
the business of "family crisis management" by helping parents organize
their relationship with their child to minimize the harm of divorce. The
system is based on social acceptance of the tragedy of divorce 263 and the
the cooperative custody system in the perception of the public and the lawyers from whom it has to
gain confidence and assures the system's public accountability. A dispute resolution system could
also be structured around the notion that child-related divorce conflicts can be resolved more appropriately by a specialized administrative agency subject to judicial review only for abuse of discretion
and procedural irregularity. The Michigan Friend of the Court, an administrative agency of local
government, for example, removes from private parties the burden of initiating child support enforcement proceedings in court by delegating collection and enforcement decisions to a public official. See D. CHAMBERS, supra note 75, at 10-15. The Friend recently began to provide custody
mediation. See MicH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 552.513 (West Supp. 1986). Michigan thus seems to be
creating a kind of administrative agency to deal with all aspects of divorce and custody problems.
Delegating fact-finding and decision-making power in family disputes to an administrative agency
that operates under less formal decision-making processes with minimal judicial review would raise,
however, serious constitutional and policy questions beyond the scope of this Article. Cf. Foster &
Freed, Child Custody and the Adversary Process. Forum Conveniens?, 17 FAM. L.Q. 133, 147 (1983)
(noting that delegating custody cases to a panel of experts "may offend due process"). The cooperative custody system advocated by this Article assumes that for the foreseeable future the judiciary
will continue to be the fact finder and decision maker in divorce related controversies and that
ancillary professionals will assist the court operating under a judge's supervision. Under that assumption the finder of fact in a contested case must be a judge rather than, for example, a
psychiatrist.
262. The same system might also be used to facilitate settlements of disputes between parents
and grandparents concerning visitation and between parents and third parties who assume custody
of a child in informal foster care type placements. There may be, however, significant objections to
using mediation to resolve such disputes. Both married and involved unmarried parents claims to
custody are constitutionally based. Cf Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979) (holding New
York Domestic Relations law unconstitutional because it allowed an unwed mother to block her
child's adoption but not the unwed father). On the other hand, traditionally parents and grandparents, and parents and third parties who have assumed care of a child have not been thought of as
legal equals to parents. One underlying assumption of using mediation to resolve disputes is that
both parties possess roughly equal status and rights. The legal system has historically rejected this
assumption in grandparent-parent disputes, eg., Herron v. Seizak, 321 Pa. Super. 466, 470, 468 A.2d
803, 805 (1983) (noting that neither Pennsylvania statutes nor case law give grandparents visitation
rights over the parents' objection), and in parent-third party disputes, see, eg., Dickson v. Lascaris,
53 N.Y.2d 204, 208, 423 N.E.2d 361, 363, 440 N.Y.S. 2d 884, 886 (1981) (stating that, absent grievous cause, parents' rights over third parties are supreme); Bennett v. Jeffreys, 40 N.Y.2d 543, 550,
356 N.E.2d 277, 284, 387 N.Y.S.2d 821, 827 (1976) (finding that only extraordinary circumstances
should trigger court consideration of the child's best interests in parent/third-party custody disputes). Discussion of the uses of cooperative custody concepts in such cases, however, is beyond the
scope of this Article, as is the usefulness of those concepts when one or both parents do not want
legal or physical custody of the child. See generally Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthoodas an Exclusive
Status: The Need for LegalAlternatives When the Premiseof the NuclearFamily Has Failed, 70 VA.
L. REv. 879 (1984) (advocating the availability of nonexelusive parenthood alternatives and examining custody dispute resolution of the claims of stepparents, unwed fathers, foster parents, and
nonparent caretakers).
263. This assumption distinguishes the cooperative custody system from the marriage reconciliation programs that accompanied the advent of no-fault divorce laws in some states. New York
disbanded this program for many reasons, including lack of political support, low quality of personnel doing the work, and the apparent futility of trying to reconcile couples who had taken the emotionally significant step of consulting lawyers and filing for divorce. Articulating the goal of the
system as divorce management rather than marriage preservation, however, retains the most valuable feature of the marriage reconciliation programs, helping parents cope with the consequences of
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premise that, in most cases, the child will be better off if both parents
remain involved in the child's life.
The child's need for a stable emotional and financial environment
should cause the state to seek speedy parental agreement on custody and
support arrangements. Judges should recognize and accept that working
in an emotionally charged family environment will strain their emotions
and test their values. The state, however, should operate on the belief
that most divorcing parents are concerned about the welfare of their
child and can be encouraged to work together for the child's benefit.
Judges should avoid choosing between parents and, instead, reward parents who can put aside their animosity toward each other for the sake of
their child.
The purpose of this Part is to detail how the cooperative custody
system operates. 264 The following Part responds to criticisms of the
system.
A.

The Single-Judge Calendar-ManagementSystem

The system's work is triggered only when a parent notifies it that a
controversy over custody or child support exists or an existing controversy is referred to the system from other sources; ministerial review is
provided for agreements consented to by both parents. The form of the
notification and the type of action 265 does not determine whether the
problem is referred to the system; all that matters is whether a dispute
2 66
exists between parents concerning a child's custody or support.
the decision to dissolve the family. See generally M. WHEELER, supra note 26, at 98-115 (noting that
conciliation programs help divorcing couples reach financial and custodial agreements).
264. The system about to be described does not exist in precise form in any state. The model
combines the best features of the custody dispute resolution systems of several different jurisdictions.
A recent report of the New York State Law Revision Commission contained the procedural but not
the substantive features of the system. See Recommendations, supranote *. Many of the features of
the system to be described can be found in different states such as Connecticut, Michigan, and
especially California. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 4607 (West Supp. 1986) (mandating mediation of contested issues in private custody disputes); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 552.513 (West Supp. 1986)
(directing that the State's Friend of the Court make mediation services available to couples who
desire it, either through state employees or preferably with private mediators under contract with the
state). See generally Comeaux, ProceduralControls in Public Sector Domestic Relations Mediation,
in ALTERNATE MEANS OF FAMILY DISPUTE RESOLUTION 79 (1982) (surveying the mediation pro-

cedures of various states, with particular emphasis on California's procedures). This Article's model
is intended to be illustrative, not definitive. There are many ways to organize a dispute-resolution
system promoting cooperative custody. Much more research and reflection is required before definite statements can be made about which professionals-lawyers or mental health experts-are "better" for conducting custody mediation.
265. Types of action include a complaint for divorce and custody, modification of a custody
agreement or previous order, or a claim for nonpayment of child support with a defense of denial of
visitation.
266. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 4607(a) (West Supp. 1985) (requiring custody disputes to be mediated when custody or visitation issues are disputed).

754

Cooperative Custody
Within thirty days after the court is notified of the existence of a
custody dispute, the litigants and their lawyers attend a mandatory conference with the judge who will preside over their dispute and who has
special training on the needs of children of divorce. The purpose of the
conference is two-fold. First, the judge becomes acquainted with the
family's situation and attempts to see if the parents can agree on a custody plan without in-depth settlement efforts. Second, if the parents cannot agree quickly, the judge orders a prehearing schedule for the parents
267
and their attorneys.
The order reflects the family's specific situation, usually requiring
the parents to mediate their dispute with the help of the court mediation
service. 268 It calls for mental health and other evaluations to take place
simultaneously with or subsequent to mediation. The order further includes a schedule for completion of financial disclosure, 269 other prehearing discovery, motions, and a firm custody hearing date. 270 It also states
whether the court is appointing a lawyer for the child. 27 1 The order usu272
ally separates custody and child support from other issues in dispute.
The conference ends with the judge's strong statement to the parents and
their lawyers that the court hopes that the parents will settle on a custody plan as it is in the best interests of the child that they do so; that
they should cooperate with the mediation service in trying to reach
agreement; and that the court will take into account one parent's willingness to facilitate the child's relationship with the other parent if the parents cannot agree.
267. Cf FED. R. Civ. P. 16(b)-(f) (generally providing for pretrial conference, scheduling, and
planning within 120 days of filing and for order to be issued after the conference, with sanctions for
noncompliance by a party or a party's attorney, including an award of attorney's fees). Some
mediators believe the parents' initial conference should be with a mediator rather than a judge. This
alternative may be feasible in a jurisdiction in which the public and the bar accept mediation as the
primary forum for custody dispute resolution. Some jurisdictions, like New York, have a strong
adversarial tradition in family law disputes. These jurisdictions will require a greater public display
of judicial support for a period of time to make the transition from an adversarial to a cooperative
custody system.
268. Parents may also be allowed to opt for mediation conducted by a private practitioner on a
court-approved list who agrees to be bound by the court's timetable for dispute resolution. In these
cases the parents would pay the mediator's fee.
269. See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(4) (McKinney Supp. 1984) (requiring compulsory financial disclosure in alimony maintenance and child support controversies); N.Y. ADMIN. CODE tit.
22, § 117.2 (1983) (specifying the detailed "statement of net worth" required to satisfy the compulsory financial disclosure requirements).
270. The hearing usually occurs no later than 120 days after the conference. Cf. CAL. CIV.
CODE § 4600.6 (West 1983) (giving contested custody cases priority over other civil cases); NEW
JERSEY SUPREME COURT, COMMITTEE ON MATRIMONIAL LITIGATION, FINAL REPORT, PHASE

Two (reprinted as a supplement to N.J.L.J., July 16, 1981) (suggesting 90 day deadline) [hereinafter
cited as NEW JERSEY REPORT].

271. See supra subpart IV(B).
272. See infra subpart VI(D).
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B. Mediation
A publicly-financed and compulsory program of confidential mediation for the parents is the centerpiece of the cooperative custody system.
The mediators are specially trained mental health professionals or lawyers with family mediation training. 2 73 Often, two mediators, a male and
female team, work together to reduce the risk of a parent feeling the
mediator is biased. 274 The number and length of mediation sessions is
unlimited. The mediation sessions are confidential-nothing said in the
mediation can be revealed in court by the mediator, the parents, or their
attorneys. 275 The mediator periodically informs the supervising judge
only whether mediation sessions have taken place and whether more
would be useful. At the discretion of the mediator, the parents' lawyers
may be excluded from the mediation sessions, 276 although the parents
may consult with their lawyers between sessions. The mediation covers
physical and legal custody issues as well as child support issues. The
mediator reviews the parents' financial disclosure forms and uses a
formula to help the parents determine appropriate levels of child support
in light of their income and assets. 277 The mediator may interview the
child and, if appropriate, include the child in some of the mediation sessions. 278 If the parents reach an agreement, the mediator creates a memorandum of understanding embodying the essential terms of the
agreement or asks the attorney for one of the parents to draft a settlement document for review by the mediator and the other parent's
273. See CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE § 1745 (West Supp. 1985) (requiring mediators in state's
mandatory custody mediation program to have a master's degree in a behavioral science); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 749.01 (West 1985) (allowing counties to establish family negotiation or conciliation
services); OR. REV. STAT. § 107.775 (1983) (mediator qualifications are the same as those providing
conciliation services; conciliator must have master's degree in behavioral sciences, or bachelor's degree and one year graduate training in behavioral sciences and two years case work or clinical experience, or behavioral science bachelor's degree and four years case work or clinical experience).
274. A. Salius & S. Maruzo, Mediation of Child Custody and Visitation Disputes in the Connecticut Superior Court 27-28 (November 1982) (unpublished paper by the Director and Deputy
Director of the Connecticut program on file with the author). Obviously, the more professionals
involved in the process of resolving a custody dispute and the higher their qualifications, the more
money will be required to operate the system. See infra subpart V(G).
275. See Schepard, Philbrick & Rabino, Ground Rulesfor Custody Mediation and Modification,
48 ALB. L. REV. 616, 645-48 (1984) (discussing likely success of mediation in which confidentiality
is assured).
276. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 4607(d) (West Supp. 1985) (allowing mediator to exclude lawyers
from the custody mediation process); Schepard, Philbrick & Rabino, supra note 275, at 637-38 (suggesting mediation will be less adversarial when lawyers are excluded); see also supra notes 202-18
and accompanying text (discussing the role and effect of lawyers in divorce settlement negotiations
involving children).
277. Beginning October 1, 1987, states are required to have guidelines to determine appropriate
levels of child support. 42 U.S.C. § 667 (Supp. 1984).
278. See Schepard, Philbrick & Rabino, supranote 275, at 641-42 (suggesting factors to consider
in deciding whether to include the child in mediation sessions).
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attorney. 279
In addition to facilitating agreement, the mediator performs different tasks for the parents, depending on their attitude toward each other
and their child when mediation begins. 280 These tasks can include:
1. Opening Civil Communication.-Mediationrequires the parents
to be in the same room together and to listen to each other. The media-

tor can introduce civility into this dialogue by imposing basic procedural
rules on the parents. It may be, for example, that at the end of their
marriage, the husband and the wife could not speak to each other without shouting. The mediator can insist that they speak in turn without
interruption. Only in an atmosphere of civility will the parents redevelop

a sense of mutual respect so essential for a successful custodial
arrangement.

2. Providingthe Parents with Information About the Child's Needs
and Reactions to the Divorce Crisis.-Parentsinterpret their child's reactions to divorce from the perspective of their own reaction to it. The
parent who sought the divorce wants to believe she has not inflicted pain
on the child, while the parent who did not may exaggerate the child's
distress. A mediator can provide parents with objective information
about how a child tends to experience divorce and with a neutral assessment of their child's reactions. 2 81
279. Id. at 652-53.
280. The following list of functions that a mediator in a custody dispute could perform should
give the reader a sense of how mediation can benefit parents and children involved in custody disputes. Several authors have described other systems of family mediation which accomplish to a
greater or lesser degree all of the functions on the list that follows. See 0. COOGLER, STRUCTURED
MEDIATION IN DIVORCE SETTLEMENT 26-27 (1978) (suggesting that divorce mediation include
maintaining control of negotiations, approving the agreement, and evaluating the settlement); J.
HAYNES, DIVORCE MEDIATION 56-78 (1981) (implementing the mediation model); H. IRVING, DIVORCE MEDIATION: A RATIONAL ALTERNATIVE TO THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM 19-20 (1981)
(describing a multi-faceted system for divorce mediation); D. SAPOSNIK, MEDIATING CHILD CUSTODY DISPUTES 169-92 (1983) (delineating strategies for inducing cooperation between spouses and
discussing methods of handling conflict). See generally H. RAIFFA, THE ART AND SCIENCE OF
NEGOTIATION 218-34 (1982) (discussing the functions mediators perform in a variety of settings).
281. See Schepard, Philbrick & Rabino, supra note 275, at 639-42 (discussing the mental health
professional's role in assessing individual family members' interests and needs). The role of the
mediator is not one of general educator. The information given by the mediator should be specific to
the parents' particular dispute. The court itself can design general education programs parents must
attend as part of the dispute resolution process that supplement and facilitate case-specific mediation. In California, for example, families participate in a mediation orientation session that includes
viewing a videotape with interviews of divorced parents and their children and with experts discussing how to cope with children's needs during the divorce process. McIsaac, The Family Conciliation
Court ofLos.Angeles County, in ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF FAMILY DISPUTE RESOLUTION 131, 133
(1982).
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3. Identifying Common Interests and Concerns in the Child's Welfare and EncouragingJoint Problem-Solving.-A mediator can facilitate
development of a joint problem-solving approach to the custody dispute28 2 by getting parents to articulate and agree on their concerns for
the child and plan concretely for the future. The mediator, for example,
can ask both parents to make up projected schedules for the child's physical custody and finances. The mediator can then compare schedules
with the parents, emphasizing the similarities in them, and suggest ways
to bridge the differences.
4. Reducing Fear.-A mediator can reduce a parent's fear of losing the child through the divorce by explaining the dispute-resolution
process and its likely results. The parent can then confirm this information with her own attorney.
5. Identifying and Tempering Emotional and Unreasonable Positions.-The mediator can provide parents with an objective perspective
on their current positions2 83 and the emotions they reflect. A mediator
can thus help a parent distinguish between positions the parent is taking
out of anger and those based on perceptions about the child's welfare.
6. Eliminating the Perception that Compromise Means Weakness.-A parent or her lawyer may be afraid to propose to compromise
for fear of showing weakness, that might result in being taken advantage
of on other issues. The possibility of such strategic posturing is substantially reduced by having proposals for compromise come from a neutral
source.
Z Narrowing Areas of Differences.-Even if the mediator cannot
facilitate agreement on all matters in dispute, he can help the parents
narrow the range of disputed issues by encouraging partial agreements.
For example, the parents might accept shared legal custody while disagreeing on the details of a physical custody plan; or the parents could
agree on child support amounts but not on custody issues. The mediator
could then report the partial agreement to the court, leaving the unresolved issues for neutral evaluation or judicial decision.
282. See generally R. FISHER & W. URY, supra note 146 (discussing the method of "principled
negotiation" which encourages deciding issues based on objective merits by focusing on mutual gains
where possible, and using independent, fair standards when interests conflict).
283. Cf Eisenberg, supra note 203, at 661-64 (advocating use of affiliates in dispute negotiation
because of their ability to remain objective).
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8. Referrals to Community Resources.-A mediator should be able
to identify parents and children who need psychotherapy on an individual or family basis, professional help in formulating a postdivorce financial plan, or job training. The mediator could refer those family
members who need these services to programs in the community that
meet their needs.
The overall purposes that custody mediation serves by performing
these functions were well-described by Lon Fuller in a classic article:
[T]he central quality of mediation [is] its capacity to reorient the
parties toward each other, not by imposing rules on them, but by
helping them to achieve a new and shared perception of their relationship, a perception that will redirect their attitudes and dispositions toward one another.
... The creation of rules is a process that cannot itself be rulebound; it must be guided by a sense of shared responsibility and a
realization that the adversary aspects of the operation are part of a
larger collaborative undertaking. The primary task [of the mediator] is to induce this attitude of mind and spirit, though to be sure,
he does this primarily by helping the parties to perceive the concrete ways in
which this shared attitude can redound to their mu2 84
tual benefit.
In essence, the mediator helps parents create rules to govern their
postdivorce relationship in an effort to increase cooperation.

C. Neutral Evaluation
Evaluation is a different process than mediation, and it is important
284. Fuller, Mediation-ItsFormsand Functions,44 S. CAL. L. REV. 305, 325-26 (1971). It is
important, however, to distinguish the classic model of mediation which Fuller articulates from the
public mediation program that forms the core of the cooperative custody system. In the private
mediation model, parents may agree to designate anyone they wish as mediator of their custody
dispute. The parents negotiate the mediator's compensation with the mediator, as well as the
"ground rules" for the mediation-what issues will be on the agenda of the mediation; whether the
proceeding will be confidential; and when a parent or the mediator can terminate the mediation
process. The parents' decision to mediate is entirely voluntary. The state creates no incentives or
compulsion to seek mediation. The state exercises no direct control over the identity or the quality
of the mediator or the way the mediation process is conducted. Finally, the state provides no financial subsidy to engage in mediation.
The cooperative custody system relies on a public mediation program that reverses many of the
characteristics of private mediation while maintaining the same aim. In public mediation programs
parents are compelled, or at least strongly encouraged, to mediate their dispute by the state. The
mediator is a state employee, or is chosen from a panel selected by the court. Mediation services are
supplied free of charge, or parents are charged according to their ability to pay. Statutes or court
rules specify the ground rules and timetables for mediation. In short, in a public program the parents have little choice whether to participate in mediation, and have little control over its terms and
conditions.
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to keep the two conceptually and practically distinct. In mediation, a
third party with no coercive power facilitates a voluntary settlement between the parents. Although the parents may experience coercion to mediate, they are not coerced to agree to anything during the process. The
mediator has no power to make a recommendation to the court based on
the parents' statements during mediation or based on a personal evaluation of the comparative fitness of the parents. Everything said in mediation is confidential and cannot be used against the parents.
The purpose of evaluation is different. In evaluation, a third party
intervenes in the custody dispute to recommend to the court a custody
plan in the child's best interests. The evaluator interviews the parents
and the child in a nonconfidential setting to provide the court with information and recommendations from an informed and neutral source. A
settlement may be a by-product of the evaluation process (e.g., a parent
may settle before an evaluator's report is sent to the court for fear of an
adverse recommendation), but it is not its principal object.
The dispute resolution system should encourage the maximum
number of parental settlements with minimal state coercion and adversary procedure. Thus, evaluation of the family's situation by a courtappointed mental health professional should generally occur only after
mediation between the parents reaches impasse. On the other hand, delaying evaluation until after mediktion leads to delays in an ultimate custody determination and thus increases the time of instability for the
child. Furthermore; simultaneous mediation and evaluation with the
pressure of an impending trial might encourage parents to take mediation
more seriously. In some cases, then, mediation and evaluation should
take place simultaneously rather than sequentially. The judgment about
the timing of mediation and evaluation, however, should be left to judicial discretion, exercised at the first conference with the judge, and
should depend on the urgency of a final disposition.
In order to preserve the confidentiality of the mediation process,
however, the evaluator should not be the same person as the mediator,
unless the parents and their attorneys stipulate otherwise.2 85 The evaluator cannot consult with the mediator nor can information revealed in
mediation be imparted to the evaluator.
After discussing the evaluation process with the parents and their
285. See A. Salius & S. Maruzo, supra note 274, at 9 (discussing evaluation of family situation
after mediation process); cf. McLaughlin v. Superior Court, 140 Cal. App. 3d 473, 189 Cal. Rptr.
479 (1983) (parties have a right to cross-examine mediator/evaluator who recommends a custody
plan to the court under California's mandatory mediation law); Kessler v. Kessler, 10 N.Y.2d 445,
180 N.E.2d 402, 225 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1962) (discussing due process requirements when court-appointed
mental health experts make custody recommendations to the court).
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attorneys, the evaluator interviews the family members and observes the
parents' interaction with the child.28 6 Interviews with the parents focus
on their plans for involvement of the other parent in the child's life. Interviews with the child focus on his reactions to the divorce and his relationships with his parents. The evaluator reviews the child's school
records and discusses the child's educational progress with teachers. She
also reviews any relevant social agency or medical records concerning the
child and arranges for any necessary medical or psychological testing for
the child and family members.
All of this information is summarized in a report to the court which
meets carefully articulated standards as to its form and content. The
report also contains the evaluator's recommendations for a custody plan.
Before the report is filed with the court clerk, the evaluator meets with
the parents and their attorneys and reviews a draft of the report with
them, noting any objections in the final copy.
D.

Custody Trials

Even in a cooperative custody system, disputes may have to be resolved by a judge after an adversary hearing. Several major differences,
however, exist between trials in the cooperative and the adversary system. The first difference concerns the issues to be decided. The court in
the cooperative system separates custody and child support issues from
any other disputes between the parents. Grounds for divorce, property
distribution, and spousal maintenance are severed for nonpriority resolu287
tion, except for temporary support orders.
A second major difference is that the judge in the cooperative system actively seeks to move the case to trial if settlement cannot be
reached. A target date for trial is set at the initial conference and extended only on a showing of good cause, 288 such as the realistic possibility that further mediation sessions will result in parental agreement. The
parents, their lawyers, and the mediator or evaluator must appear in
court personally before the judge to request an extension of time. The
judge's aim should be to hold a hearing on custody within 120 days of the
initial conference date. The parent who seeks to delay a final resolution
for tactical reasons does not respect the child's immediate need for a sta286. The following description of how the evaluation process should be conducted is largely
based on the recent report and recommendations of the New Jersey Supreme Court's Committee on
Matrimonial Litigation. See NEW JERSEY REPORT, supra note 270, at 7 (recommending increased
judicial reliance upon professionals for evaluative purposes).
287. Id. (recommending separation of child custody from other issues in dispute).
288. Id. (noting importance of expeditious resolution).
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ble environment, is less likely to be the better sole custodial parent, and
should be treated accordingly by the judge in a final decision.
A third major difference between custody trials in the adversary system and the cooperative custody system is the routine use of the neutral
evaluator in the latter. The evaluator's report and cross-examination testimony are likely to be the principal focus of the trial.
E.

The Substantive Law Standardsfor Contested Cases

In a cooperative custody jurisdiction, the judge begins with a presumption of shared legal custody, rebuttable only by a showing either of
parental incompetence to make rational decisions for a child or hopeless
embattlement of the parents. 28 9 If either parent contests shared legal
custody, the court then tries to isolate the classes of decisions that the
parents can discuss from those on which discussion is impossible. It may
be, for example, that the parents can speak to each other about the
child's medical care but not about education. If it is impossible to separate out some issues for cooperative decision making, the court chooses
as legal custodian the parent who is more likely to consult with the other
parent in making decisions, assuming all other things are relatively equal
between them.
The division of duties between parents in the intact family only begins the consideration of the child's postdivorce physical custody plan.
The court recognizes parental division of duties will necessarily change
as both parents likely will be working after the divorce and making other
adjustments to get on with their lives. 290 The judge recognizes the child's
need for a meaningful and realistic relationship with both parents as a
legitimate reason for changing physical custody arrangements that existed before the separation. She also recognizes the desirability of preserving the child's school and peer environment and evaluates any
difficulties the child may have with a complex joint physical custody
plan.
The court also asks each parent and the evaluator to submit a
weekly physical custody plan for a full year that describes parental responsibilities for the child's physical care.29 1 In evaluating the competing plans, the judge adopts a plan that gives each parent enough time
with the child to develop or continue a meaningful relationship.
289. See supra notes 187-88 and accompanying text.
290. See supra text accompanying notes 165-66.
291. See Steinman, supra note 98, at 759-60 (explaining usefulness of parentally-developed custody plans submitted to court).
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F. Postdecree Remedies for ParentalViolations
The cooperative custody system is based on the premise that a child
needs a stable environment, both financially and emotionally. Devising
effective methods for dealing with parental violations of child custody
and support obligations is essential. A fundamental aim of postdecree
remedies and social services should be to make failure to pay child support and interference with parent-child relationships equally serious violations of court decrees. 292 Treating these violations as equally important
improves the perception that the legal system acts evenhandedly in dealing with the problems in the postdivorce lives of both fathers (who tend,
as a class, to be more interested in enforcing custody than child support
obligations) and mothers (whose interests tend to be the opposite). Resort to self-help remedies will be eliminated only if each parent has equal
access to an effective and sympathetic legal system.
One major result of deemphasizing the adversary atmosphere surrounding custody and support discussions may be to encourage compliance with the resulting agreement. Evidence to support this hope is
found in the significant difference in child support payment rates that
exists between men paying pursuant to a court order and men paying
pursuant to an out-of-court agreement reduced to writing. 293 Those parents who voluntarily enter into agreements to pay are far more likely to
meet their obligations, perhaps because the process of negotiation helps
them develop a working relationship with their spouses concerning the
child.
Remedies for custody plan violations should be graduated in proportion to parental intransigence. For example, a remedy for violation of
physical custody plans might include make-up time, before more drastic
sanctions are tried.294 The child would make-up the lost physical custody time at times and places of the aggrieved parent's choosing, consistent with the child's schedule and desires. It would temporarily increase
292. See generally Note, Making ParentsBehave: The Conditioningof ChildSupport and Visitation Rights, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1059 (1984) (urging limited use of linking child support and visitation rights and suggesting alternative remedies and enforcement mechanisms).
293. Women with court orders for payment of child support received 55% of the amount they
were due. The mean amount of the court order was $2,050, but the mean amount received was only
$1,120. In contrast, women with written agreements received 78% of what they were due and both
the mean level of the payments due ($2,870) and received ($2,240) were significantly higher. U.S.
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, SERIES P-23, No. 124, CHILD SUPPORT AND
ALIMONY: 1981 (ADVANCE REPORT) 2 (May 1983).

294. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 552.601-.650 (West Supp. 1986) (comprehensive statutory scheme under which parental support and visitation obligations are treated equally includes
make-up time remedy); Note, supra note 292, at 1081-88 (discussing alternatives to child support, or
visitation sanctions, including garnishment of wages for failure to pay child support, and imprisonment for contempt for violation of visitation rights).
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the presence and importance of the aggrieved parent in the child's life,
counteracting the effects of the violation.
The next level of remedy might be a permanent shift of some or all
legal or physical custody rights to the aggrieved parent. 295 Absent extenuating circumstances, parents who seek to thwart their child's relationship with the other parent do not act in the best interests of the child, and
their fitness as a decision maker for the child is open to serious question.
Shifting legal and physical custody to the other parent might then be
appropriate, and could minimize the amount of disruption the child
experiences.
G. Financingthe System
The system for resolving custody disputes just described is expensive; skilled personnel would be required to operate effectively and to
gain the confidence of parents, attorneys, and judges. The staff must
have a manageable caseload of mediation and evaluation so that the dispute is resolved in accordance with the child's sense of time and the
schedule the judge sets at the planning conference. An estimate prepared
for the New York Law Revision Commission calculates the expense for
the mental health professionals necessary to conduct mediation and evaluations in divorce-related custody cases filed in state trial courts of general jurisdiction at approximately eight million dollars a year. 296 Some
295. See Beck v. Beck, 86 N.J. 480, 499, 432 A.2d 63, 72 (1981) ("When the actions of an
uncooperative parent deprive the child of the kind of relationship with the parent that is deemed to
be in the child's best interests, removing the child from the custody of the uncooperative parent may
well be appropriate as a remedy of last resort."); Strosnider v. Strosnider, 101 N.M. 639, 647, 686
P.2d 981, 989 (Ct. App. 1984) (holding that when joint custody parents fail to accommodate one
another, the court may modify custody after reevaluating the child's best interests).
296. Recommendations, supra note *, at 105, 158-63. Readers must be cautioned that the cost
estimate for New York courts quoted in the text does not cover all of the cases that the system would
process. New York divides jurisdiction over custody disputes among the supreme court, the trial
court of general jurisdiction, and the family court. The supreme court can decide custody disputes
associated with divorce but does not currently keep statistics on how many contested divorces involve custody issues. The trial court has the exclusive power to grant divorces and can, depending
on the wording of the divorce decree, also hear petitions for modification. The family court has the
power to hear custody disputes on referral from the supreme court and petitions for custody modification. The family court also has jurisdiction over paternity and support actions, which can raise
custody and visitation issues, and custody disputes between unmarried parents, all of which are
included in the cooperative custody system described in this Article. The family court does not keep
separate statistics that allow estimation of how many support and paternity actions would be subject
to the system described in the text. In short, there is no way to estimate accurately how many
contested custody disputes occur in New York courts every year that would be subject to the cooperative custody system. The quoted figures were included solely for "guesstimate" purposes. Each
jurisdiction would have to do its own cost analysis based on available statistics describing its
caseload. Id. at 107-09; see also Coogler, Estimating Caseloadand PersonnelRequirements in Court
Related Conciliation Programs, in ALTERNATE MEANS OF FAMILY DISPUTE RESOLUTION 161-72

(1982) (describing an analysis for the Family Conciliation Unit of Fort Lauderdale).
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perspective on this figure can be obtained by recognizing that the operating budget for New York state in fiscal year 1984 was forty-six billion
dollars 297 and the operating budget for the New York state court system
298
in 1984 was 654 million dollars.
Two possible sources of funding suggest themselves: general tax
revenues and increased fees for marriage licenses and divorce filings.
The argument for the former adopts the rationale behind taxing to support public education: the entire society has an interest in the welfare of
the children who will be its future citizens.2 99 Using the general tax base
to support the social services necessary for the cooperative custody system recognizes that the system performs public functions that should be
available to all families regardless of ability to pay.
Support for the system from an increase in marriage license fees and
divorce filing fees is based on a different rationale. 30° For those parents
who use the system, the increase in filing fees is, in effect, a user charge
for the benefit of their children. The case for increasing marriage license
fees to support the system is more tenuous, and can only be supported as
301
a form of insurance payment to benefit their children.
The cost of implementing a cooperative custody program will be
offset to a certain extent by savings to the state. Divorce filings are the
highest number of civil filings in our court system with about ten times
the number of any other type of civil case. A cooperative system should
significantly reduce the number of custody trials and therefore result in
less demand for new courts. The savings could be substantial. In addition, the actual parties will save an enormous amount of money because
mediation costs substantially less than a full-blown adversary procedure.30 2 The savings would in some sense negate much of the costs.
Whatever method of funding is chosen, financing must be sufficient
to attract qualified personnel who will help the mediation and evaluation
processes earn the respect and support of parents and their attorneys. If
297. NEW YORK STATE EXECUTIVE BUDGET, APRIL 1984-MARCH 1985 at A-6.

298. Id.
299. See Ratner, 4 New Dutyfor Urban PublicSchools: Effective Education in Basic Skills, 63
TEXAS L. REV. 777, 781-85 (1985) (discussing society's interest in education).
300. If this system of financing is adopted, provision must be made for a waiver for those parents
too poor to pay for the increased marriage and divorce filing fees. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401
U.S. 371 (1971) (holding that because of the basic position of marriage relationships in society and
state monopolization of means for dissolution, due process prohibits denial of access based solely on
ability to pay court costs and fees).
301. Texas, for instance, has authorized user-fee funding for Domestic Relations Offices, closely
analogous to the Michigan Friend of the Court offices. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5142a-I
(Vernon Supp. 1986).
302. Pearson & Thoennes, Mediating and Litigating Custody Disputes:. A Longitudinal Evaluation, 17 FAM. L.Q. 497, 507-08 (1984).
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a choice has to be made, it would be better not to create the system than
to underfund it and staff it with poorly qualified personnel. The history
of the abortive New York conciliation courts provides an example of how
an underfunded and poorly staffed program can do more harm than
good. 30 3 State rather than local control over who is hired to perform
mediation and evaluation services, uniform statewide qualification standards for personnel, and perhaps competition between the state-funded
services and the private sector 304 might help ensure that quality services
are delivered by personnel operating under the court's auspices. But
above all, adequate funding for the system is essential to help ensure it
comes close to achieving its aims.
H.

The Effects of the Cooperative Custody System on PretrialParental
Negotiations and Settlement

The cooperative custody system should have a profound effect on
out-of-court settlement negotiations between parents. Lawyers should
tell a parent-client that the court's first priority in resolving the dispute
will be the welfare of their child and that their attitude toward the child's
relationship with the other spouse will have a significant impact on any
final custody plan. Lawyers should thus encourage clients to behave reasonably toward the other spouse. With this encouragement, negotiations
should proceed primarily on a no-fault, problem-solving basis with issues
concerning the child being the first items for resolution.
Some parental disputes will come to the formal system for resolution. It is hard to say with any degree of certainty what percentage of
cases will settle after each stage of the dispute resolution process. 30 5
303. In addition to being assigned the difficult task of attempting to reconcile couples, many of
whom had already agreed to divorce, see supra note 263 and accompanying text, the quality of
personnel who staffed the marriage conciliation bureaus in New York State contributed to the system's demise. Conciliation commissioners were only required to be members of the bar for five
years; special training in counseling or family problems was not required. "The job [in 1974] pays
thirty-four thousand dollars a year, which has made it an attractive sinecure for former legislators
and judges who failed to be reelected. One New York lawyer says of the commissioners, 'They're
nice enough guys, but a lot of them are political hacks.'" M. WHEELER, supra note 26, at 104.
304. Cf. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 552.513(1) (West Supp. 1986) (Michigan Friend of Court
in local judicial districts required to provide domestic relations mediation but may use its own employees to do so only "if the service is not available from a private source, or if the [supervising]
court can demonstrate that providing the service within the friend of the court office is cost beneficial."). See generally Rose-Ackerman, Social Services and the Market, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 1045
(1983) (advocating "proxy shopping," in which funding agencies reimburse suppliers directly for
services rendered, as an alternative to state-run social services).
305. No program that currently exists incorporates all of the substantive and procedural features
of the cooperative custody system just outlined in this Article. Reports from existing programs may
overestimate the usefulness of mediation and evaluation to justify their continued support. Data
from different jurisdictions are not comparable because of differences in programs and case classifications. Nor are many large-scale studies available that compare the processing of cases through a
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Nonetheless, the limited available data do give some grounds for optimism about the usefulness of mediation and evaluation programs in decreasing the number of custody trials and facilitating parental
settlements. The data also support the proposition that mediation encourages a larger degree of postdivorce parental cooperation than adversary system procedures.
Connecticut has an established, publicly funded mediation/evaluation program in which family relations counselors attend court sessions
and encourage parents and their attorneys to use the available services. 30 6
Connecticut statistics do not indicate what percentage of all custody disputes are referred for mediation and evaluation, nor do they compare
outcomes in disputes referred for mediation against those that are not.
The data do indicate, however, that only approximately five percent of
custody disputes that go through mediation require an adversary hearing.30 7 Sixty-eight percent of custody cases referred for mediation settle
through that process alone. 30 8 The remaining settlements occur during
or after evaluation but before trial.
California programs, which operate in a jurisdiction that mandates
mediation of all custody disputes and has a statutory preference for joint
legal custody, report similar results. The Director of the Family Counseling Service of the Los Angeles County Superior Court reports a settlement rate of about fifty-five percent of all disputes referred to mediation.
Another fifteen percent of the referred families reach agreement following the breakdown of mediation but before the next court date. Another
twenty-five percent of the families are referred for an evaluation and report, with most disputes being resolved after the report is submitted.
Less than two percent of all relevant filings go to trial on custody
09
issues.3
One presiding judge of the Family Law branch of the San Francisco
Superior Court had five to fifteen custody cases a day on his calendar and
spent two afternoons a week trying custody cases prior to the establishment of a mandatory mediation program in his jurisdiction in 1977. In
the first eleven months of 1981, the entire San Francisco Superior Court
mediation system and the adversary model. We are, as usual, left with suggestive but not definitive
data.
306. The description of the Connecticut program and the statistics from it are found in A. Salius
& S. Maruzo, supra note 274, at 8-30, app. B. The counselors also identify cases they deem inappropriate for referral to mediation by the judge: cases involving child abuse; parents with serious emotional problems or patterns of violent or antisocial behavior; and families with numerous prior social
service agency contacts.
307. Id. at 29.
308. Id.
309. Mclssac, supra note 281, at 134-35.
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heard only three custody cases. 3 10 Furthermore, the number of custody
disputes returning to court for modification dropped dramatically after
3 11
introduction of mandatory mediation.
The beneficial effects of an out-of-court settlement on child support
payment rates and the negative effects of an adversary custody trial on
the family and the child combine to create a substantial incentive to settle
these disputes out-of-court. The tentative mediation program data also
indicate that the settlements promoted by such programs benefit the
child. 312
The most extensive research comparing the results of custody agreements in the sole custody/adversary system and those resulting from mediation has been conducted by the Denver Custody Mediation Project,
which organizes and administers cost-free voluntary mediation services
to divorcing couples in the Denver metropolitan area. 313 The Project
evaluated the effect of mediation on custody disputes by comparing the
perceptions of randomly selected participants who agreed to mediate
their cases, with a random sample of custody disputes in the Denver
courts in which the parents were not exposed to mediation. The results
of their research can be summarized as follows:
1. Mediation Encourages Agreements.-The Denver project data
showed that fewer than twenty percent of couples exposed to mediation
actually went to trial compared to a fifty percent rate for those couples
not exposed to mediation. 3 14 In effect, then, more than eighty percent of
the couples exposed to mediation achieved a settlement either during or
after the mediation process, but before trial. 3 15 Apparently, the mediation process creates a type of "halo effect" that facilitates a settlement by
opening lines of communication and encouraging compromise and cooperation in a large number of couples with custody disputes.
310. King, Handling Custody and Visitation Disputes Under the New Mandatory MediationLaw,
2 CALIF. LAW. 40, 41 (1982).

311. Id.
312. Recommendations,supra note *, at 127-28; Pearson & Thoennes, supra note 302, at 506-07,
510.
313. The research is reported in Pearson & Thoennes, supra note 302. The research methodology and data are criticized in Levy, Comment on the Pearson-ThoennesStudy and on Mediation, 17

FAM. L.Q. 525 (1984). The researchers reply to the criticisms of their study in Pearson & Thoennes,
Dialogue: A Reply to Professor Levy's Comment, 17 FAM. L.Q. 535 (1984).

314. Pearson & Thoennes, supra note 302, at 504.
315. Id. This finding is consistent with results reported in Connecticut, A. Salius & S. Maruzo,
supra note 274, at 28, and California, Pearson & Thoennes, supra note 302, at 514. It should be
noted that the referrals from which the Connecticut results were obtained included a majority of
postdivorce disputes. A. Salius & S. Maruzo, supra note 274, at 28.
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2. Mediation Reduces Relitigation.-Mediation also furthers the
durability of settlements agreed to by the parents. Couples who reach a
custody agreement through mediation are less likely to return to court to
relitigate than are those who depend on the court to mandate an arrangement. 31 6 Moreover, participants report greater compliance with agreements reached through mediation than with court-imposed
3 17
arrangements.
3. Mediation Achieves Some Cost and Time Savings.-Economic
costs of a custody trial are divided into costs paid by private litigants,
mostly attorney's fees, and costs paid by the public in funding the operation of the court system. In the Denver study, mediation resulted in only
a slight savings in attorney's fees, possibly because many of the parents
had retained lawyers before beginning mediation and incurred substantial expense before the process began. 318 It is easy to speculate about
more substantial cost-savings in terms of funding the courts. If mediation facilitates an agreement in a dispute that would otherwise go to trial
it eliminates the need for a trial and the publicly funded custody evaluations that often precede it.319
4. Mediation Improves the Attitude of Parents.-The majority of
couples who participated in mediation viewed the process favorably,
whether or not they reached agreement. Parents who reached a compromise thought the agreements were "fair" and "just," a perception not as
widely shared by couples who stipulated to custody plans before trial
without exposure to mediation. Even a majority of couples who participated in an unsuccessful mediation attempt viewed the process itself as
320
basically fair.
5. Mediation FacilitatesCustody Arrangements that Give Children
Meaningful Relationships with Both Parents.-The Denver mediation
program sought to help parents develop their own custody plan, not to
promote joint custody. 321 Agreements facilitated by mediation, however,
316. Pearson & Thoennes, supra note 302, at 505, 509.
317. Id.
318. Because mediation for dispute resolution is not as well known and understood as negotiations between lawyers in the adversary system, parents involved in mediation for settlement of custody disputes might continue to retain counsel for security. This tendency may diminish as public
confidence in the fairness and competence of the mediation process grows. It should also be noted
that failed mediation in which attorneys participate can raise the costs of representation to parents.
319. The Denver study did not engage in such speculation; it is the author's own. See supratext
preceeding note 302.
320. See Pearson & Thoennes, supra note 302, at 505, 518-19.
321. Id. at 503-04.
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seem to result in joint custody arrangements more frequently than custody arrangements negotiated by lawyers in the shadow of litigation or
imposed by the court after a trial. 322 Even comparing all families who
arrange for joint custody, children of divorcing parents who mediated
spent more time with their noncustodial parent than did their counterparts whose parents were not exposed to mediation. Mediation thus
seems to help educate the parents about the needs of their children for
323
meaningful contact with both of them after divorce.
Summing Up
Although the available data suggest that the cooperative custody
system will produce better settlements, fewer custody trials, and more
joint custody arrangements, those data are far from definitive. The ultimate question for social policy is what message the legal system should
send parents about what society expects from them. Because parents enjoy virtually unrestricted rights to have a child, as well as virtually unrestricted access to divorce, society has a right to ask in return that they
make the child's interest their foremost consideration in dissolving the
family. Adversary combat may gratify a parent's fantasy of disposing of
the other parent and escaping all blame for the failed marriage, but that
gratification does not justify the harm that adversary combat causes the
child. The cooperative custody system symbolizes the inescapable reality
that parents are forever, even if marriages are not.
VI.

The Cooperative Custody System: Commentary

This Part analyzes the policies behind, as well as the
tions to, the cooperative custody system outlined in Part V.
tive law standards of the cooperative custody system have
analyzed in Part II. The commentary in this Part focuses
nales for the procedures the system uses.
A.

major objecThe substanalready been
on the ratio-

The Role of the State

One objection to the cooperative custody system is that the state's
active attempt to minimize the effects of divorce on children invades pa322. One probable reason is that participation in mediation helps the parents perceive the benefits of joint custody and develop the communication skills and attitudes toward each other that help
make joint custody arrangements possible.
323. Another study conducted by the Divorce Mediation Center in Charlotte, North Carolina,
confirms the Denver Project data on this point. Fifty-two percent of the mediated custody disputes
resulted in joint custody, but only 3% of the disputes processed by the sole custody system ended in
what the researcher calls "shared parenting responsibilities." L. FRANCKE, supra note 225, at 259.
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rental autonomy. This argument assumes that the state's only obligation
to the child of divorce is to designate a single custodial parent and settle
subsequent parental disputes in the adversary system. 324
The state, however, has historically performed two functions in
child custody cases: parental dispute resolution and child protection. 325
The dispute-resolution function is inescapable to prevent child stealing
and violence; the question is whether the state should actively structure
its dispute-resolution process to do more than just prevent these extreme
actions.
The cooperative custody system assumes that the state can and must
protect the child of disputing parents and realizes that both parents are
likely to take positions about the child's welfare that serve their own
ends, not those of the child. 32 6 In an intact family, the state must provide
a large measure of autonomy to the parental decisions about the child's
welfare, 327 because the partnership principle protects the child from
overreaching by one parent. 328 The parents in the intact family, as a
coordinated unit, decide the custody arrangement that is in the child's
best interests. 329 Each parent is presumed to act in the child's best interests; 330 the necessity of mutual agreement functions as a check on the
other's judgment about what those best interests are. The partnership
mode thus justifies the state deferring to parents to make most major
decisions about the child, except in those decisions that threaten the
331
child's life or basic welfare.
Divorce removes some restrictions on state interference on parental
decisions; legal relationships change because the state allows parents to
change their marital structure. It is no more of an intrusion into parental
autonomy to mandate mediation to promote agreement on child custody
than it is to award sole custody to the primary caretaker over the objection of the other parent. In each case the state helps determine the rela324. This is the argument adopted by the Braiman court, see supra note 113 and text accompa-

nying notes 112-16.
325. Mnookin, supra note 45, at 229.
326. See supra notes 117-20 and accompanying text.

327. See Developments, supra note 44, at 1213-21.
328. Cf id. at 1219 (distinguishing between state's interest in reserving decisions to the family
unit from its interest in deciding which family member has the authority to make a particular
decision).
329. See supra notes 163-64 and accompanying text.
330. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602-03 (1979) (stating that although parents may at times
act against the interests of their children, human experience teaches that "parents generally act in
the child's best interests").
331. See Goldstein, Medical Carefor the Child at Risk-- On State Supervision of ParentalAutonomy, 86 YALE L.J. 645, 648-61 (1977) (advocating that limits be placed upon the power of the state
to override parental decisions about health care for the child, except in extreme circumstances).
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tionships that will exist between the two parents and the child. If the
parents require the state to function as dispute resolver by failing to
agree, the state has a moral obligation to intervene in a manner that protects the most vulnerable member of the family unit, the child.
The question then becomes how to structure that intervention.
Structuring the intervention along sole custody/primary caretaker/adversary system lines still requires coercion from the state, without recognizing the primacy of the child's interest in maintaining relationships
with both parents. Structuring the intervention along cooperative custody lines, on the other hand, makes the best interests of children paramount. In such a system, the state realizes that parents may be unable to
project what kind of long-term relationship they really want with their
child and ex-spouse in the bitter aftermath of divorce. Instead of recklessly cementing the status quo, the state fosters an environment of reflection and cooperation in order to protect the child's best interests.
Although it does require some degree of intrusion into the privacy and
autonomy of parents, the cooperative custody system makes the state
role a creative as opposed to a static one.
B. State Involvement in Uncontested Parental Custody Settlements
The converse argument suggests that the cooperative custody system does not go far enough in protecting the child's welfare because
agreements made by parents will still be subject only to ministerial review. Parents will thus still be able to barter custody for increased financial support without regard to the child's welfare and without state
332
intervention.
The issue of whether to review parental agreements extends only to
those agreements negotiated without the intervention of the cooperative
custody system. For agreements reached after mediation and evaluation,
the state can presume that expert personnel acting under the auspices of
the state have helped structure the parental decision-making process to
33 3
educate parents about what the child's welfare requires.
The question remains of how the state should view a parental agreement not facilitated by the cooperative custody system. As previously
332. See supra notes 117-19, 142-48 and accompanying text.
333. See Schepard, Philbrick & Rabino, supra note 275, at 659-62. Empirical studies indicate
that mediation leads to more joint custody agreements than the adversary process. See supra text
accompanying notes 321-23. Agreements after evaluation have the benefit of an expert's recommendations, and a mediator's knowledge of the child's needs. The participation of outside neutral experts to facilitate parental agreement in the cooperative custody system, therefore, ensures that the
agreement was made with due consideration for the child's interests, limiting the need for further
judicial review of the parents' agreement.
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discussed, meaningful state review of uncontested parental custody
agreements ancillary to a divorce presents significant practical and conceptual problems similar to those that plagued the fault-based system of
divorce. 334 More fundamentally, state review of uncontested custody settlement agreements conflicts with the autonomy of parental decisionmaking. One of the major problems of the postdivorce family is the crisis
of parental competence that develops in it. 335 The state must balance the
goal of child protection against the need to reinforce parental competence at a time of family crisis.
The state does not encourage parental competence by questioning all
parental custody agreements. Society operates on the belief that parents,
even if divorced, are better able to rear their child than a state-provided
alternative family structure. Therefore, the state should limit its interference with the autonomy of divorced patents. The cooperative custody
system seeks to diminish a parent's incentive to trade custody for money.
Parents who agree on a custody and support plan already indicate that
they understand the child's needs in the postdivorce family. Any review
of such an agreement can only marginally improve custody plans of some
children and is outweighed by the need to respect and reinforce parental
autonomy. These factors suggest that once the cooperative custody system is established, the state should deem a parents' willingness to trade a
relationship with the child for money-or money for time with the
child-as a human failure beyond its power to affect, not a failure of its
dispute resolution system.
C. Serving the Child's Sense of Time
Trial courts use two basic techniques for managing their calendars:
the single-judge system in which the same judge manages both pretrial
and trial aspects of a dispute, and the master calendar system in which
different judges may handle pretrial motions and settlement conferences
and trial. 33 6 For a variety of reasons, the single-judge system is especially
334. See supra text accompanying notes 139-41.
335. See supra subpart II(A)(1)(a). Long-term diminution of parental competence is apparently
a serious problem in a subgroup of divorcing families. Based on her follow-up study of the children
of divorce, Wallerstein believes that some parents are never able to reconcile their conflicting desires
to abandon the child at the time of divorce and "passionate attachment to and dependence on the
child that intensifies or develops at the time of the marital breakdown." Wallerstein, supra note 120,
at 168. Failure to resolve the conflicting feelings creates, in Wa~lerstein's view, permanently diminished parental capacity and authority. The children of such parents have to grow up too fast and
become spouses and friends and, in a sense, psychological lovers of their parents rather than children. The result is a subgroup of the children of divorce who cannot maintain their normal developmental course because they shoulder responsibilities for themselves and others beyond their
capacities.
336. See T. CHURCH, J. LEE, T. TAN, A. CARLSON & V. MCCONNELL, PRETRIAL DELAY: A
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appropriate for parental custody disputes.
A single-judge calendar system ensures that at least one neutral person becomes familiar with the family's history and background and can
support the child's interests from the time the dispute enters the system
until it is resolved. Instead of appointing an attorney for the child and
creating all of the problems associated with that concept, 337 a judge, or a
mental health professional functioning under the judge's supervision, can
ensure that the child does not get lost in the parental and judicial shuffle.
The single-judge calendar system also leads to more rapid disposition of civil cases. 338 A judge responsible for all aspects of a case tends to
push for settlement and to require attorneys to adhere strictly to court
rules and deadlines. 339 This increased efficiency processes the dispute
more in accordance with the child's sense of time than a master calendar
system.
The mandatory planning conference, held as soon as possible after
the case is filed, allows the judge to impress upon the parents that the
child's interests are the state's highest priority and that the matter must
be resolved quickly. At the conference, the judge creates a coordinated
schedule for mediation and evaluation as well as setting a trial date.
Creation of a short deadline for determination of custody and support ensures that lawyers will give custody cases the priority the child's
sense of time requires. It will also give the parents a sense that the court
is a significant presence in resolving their dispute, not an abstraction to
be dealt with later. The court's power to draw inferences against a parent who delays the resolution of the dispute should encourage parents
and their lawyers to be sensitive to the child's sense of time in pretrial
negotiations, thereby encouraging cooperation with mediation and evaluation and preparation for trial.
Finally, the single-judge system creates the possibility that one or
more judges will develop special expertise in and a concern for custody
cases. Such judges usually become the principal leaders in campaigns for
34 °
improvements in custody procedures and laws.
REVIEW AND BIBLIOGRAPHY 30 (1978) (National Center for State Courts Publication No. R0036)
(surveying the relative merits and disadvantages of each court calendar system).
337. See supra text accompanying notes 229-51.

338. The research is summarized in E. McClanahan, Memorandum No. RIS 81.122, Master v.
Individual Calendar System (June 16, 1981) (available from the National Center for State Courts).
339. Recommendations, supra note *, at 122-23. See generally E. McClanahan, supra note 338
(listing source materials that discuss the pros and cons of the single-judge calendar system).
340. See, e.g., Foster, Conciliation and Counselingin the Courts in Family Law Cases, 41 N.Y.U.

L. REV. 353, 356 (1966) (noting the efforts of one family court that has undertaken innovative
procedures for handling divorce). The availability of adequate mediation and evaluation services
might help overcome the general judicial antipathy to custody cases, see supra note 4, as would a
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One criticism of the single-judge system is that the judge may have a
pronounced bias about what the result should be in custody cases. Judicial bias, however, can be reduced by special training, acquainting judges
with the available research on the needs of the children of divorce. Yet
the greatest check on judicial bias in the cooperative custody system is
mediation itself. Mediation downplays the importance of the judge in a
custody dispute. The parents themselves, with the aid of a court-appointed mediator, work out an agreement. The judge functions more as a
manager of dispute settlement and an arbitrator only as a last resort.
.

Separationof Custody and Child Supportfrom Other Parental
Disputes

The cooperative custody system breaks the link between child-related disputes and maintenance and property division issues by encouraging the judge to sever the issues for trial and to decide the child-related
issues first. Separation of issues symbolizes society's concern with the
welfare of the child, not the parent's financial welfare. It reduces the
capacity for parents to trade off custody and money issues in predivorce
settlement bargaining and encourages agreement on smaller parts of the
total dispute in the hope that agreement will then be easier to reach on
34 1
the other issues in dispute.
The principal criticism about separating custody and child support
issues from the other issues in dispute between the parents is that primary caretakers of children-almost invariably the mother, who has less
access to economic wealth in the immediate aftermath of divorce-will
be disadvantaged in divorce settlement bargaining as a result. 342 Separation of issues prevents the mother from making concessions on custody
matters on which she is likely to prevail in court in return for a larger
share of the family financial pie.
One response to this concern is that the dispute resolution system
should serve the best interests of the child, not the mother or father.
Reform of the maintenance and property distribution laws protects the
interests of primary caretakers better than use of the child as a bargaining chip.3 43 Until such reform is accomplished, however, the child's fate
depends on the parent's actual financial situations as well as their perceptions of the fairness of the agreements and the process that led up to
greater recognition by the legal community and the public of the importance of judges who oversee
family disputes.
341. See supra notes 146-48 and accompanying text.
342. Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357, 360, 362, (W. Va. 1981); see Chambers, supra note 156,
at 563-64.
343. For some suggested reforms, see Weitzman, supra note 76, at 1264-68.
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them. The cooperative custody system must, therefore, look after the
34
economic balance of the two households.
Giving the primary caretaker an extra bargaining chip is not the
only way to ensure the primary caretaker's economic health. 345 Separation of child issues from parent issues may promote the economic interests of primary caretakers. As part of a total pro-cooperative custody
dispute-resolution system, it may lead to reliable child support payments
and physical custody arrangements that enable divorced women to realize more of their economic potential in the job market.346 By emphasizing the primacy of the child's emotional and financial interests and by
creating an overall perception of fairness to both mothers and fathers, the
cooperative custody system fosters an emotional climate in the reorganized family which encourages compliance with child-support
obligations.
Moreover, the cooperative custody system offers relief for those divorced women who work from some of the strains created by sole custody responsibilities because the system encourages more active
involvement of fathers in physical custody plans in their child's
postdivorce life.
It is thus not at all clear that separating issues necessarily harms
women. The adversarial model advocates bargaining from a position of
strength, usually in an atmosphere of hostility, and relies on the courts to
enforce the agreement. The cooperative custody system promotes the
development of a continuing relationship between parents and provides a
process for resolving future disputes that makes it more likely that the
agreement will survive without court intervention.
E.

Mediation: "'Rights"of Parentsand Inequality of Bargaining
PowerBetween Men and Women

Another criticism of the cooperative custody system attacks the notion that a final judicial decision-and thus adjudication of the parent's
347
custody rights-should be delayed until the mediation process fails.
344. One reason the cooperative custody system should ensure the mother's economic health is
that wide disparities of wealth between a husband's first and second families can make the child's
adjustment to divorce more difficult. See supra notes 74-84 and accompanying text.
345. Nor is it necessarily the best way.
346. See supra notes 181-83 and accompanying text. Child support payments agreed to before
trial by men who have continuing access to their children after divorce and written settlement agreements are far more likely to be made than payments ordered by courts from fathers disengaged from
their children. See supra note 277 and accompanying text.
347. See Comeaux, supra note 264, at 86-87.
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This objection arises from the belief that parents have a right to have
their dispute settled swiftly by the court.
This objection fails for many reasons. First, nothing in the sole custody/adversary system guarantees a speedy decision by a judge; delay
tends to be endemic to litigation in which initiatives by lawyers control
the timetable. The cooperative custody system, on the other hand, ensures that the custody dispute receives significant attention from the
court far earlier than under the alternate model. Mediation simply delays some final judicial determinations for a short period of time to give
dispute resolution time to operate.
Second, the argument that a judge should decide a custody dispute
rather than diverting it to mediation assumes that the issues raised require a determination of legal rights, something courts are uniquely qualified to do. Using mediation as the primary forum means that society
regards the solution to the dispute as an adjustment of the parents' relationship to each other, not as an adjudication of "rights" between parents. Mediation is most appropriate for disputes in which the
relationship between the people affected is continuing, emotionally complex, and not easily governable by detailed, formal rules prescribing conduct such as the ones embodied in the typical judicial decree.34 8
Finally, a rights-oriented perspective promotes the notion that disagreement between the parents signals an end to the potential for cooperation between them and that the function of the legal system is to decide
between the competing claimants. It also promotes the view of the child
as property to be allocated rather than as a human being to be preserved,
because it devalues the child's most significant interest in the postdivorce
family: maintaining relationships with both parents. A rights orientation benefits adults, not children.
A second major concern about mediation of custody disputes is that
the "weaker" party 349 may not compete as well in the bargaining. 350 Mediation works best when the parties have roughly equal bargaining
348. See Fuller, supra note 284, at 325-26; see also M. Rosenberg, The Adversary System and
Dispute Processing in Our Society 21-22 (1983) (paper presented at the National Conference on the
Lawyer's Changing Role in Resolving Disputes, Harvard Law School, October 1982) (publication
forthcoming) (copy on file with the author) (arguing that the adversarial system is ill-suited to handle disputes of an interpersonal nature). See generally Fuller, Two Principlesof Human Association,
in VOLUNTARY AssOCIATIONS (NoMos XI) 3-23 (1969) (arguing that principles of human associations and commitments should not be "bent to the demands of formal legal rules and due process").
349. Usually the mother, who has been the primary caretaker of children.
350. A variation of this concern is the fear that primary caretakers will be disadvantaged in
divorce settlement negotiations by separation of child-related from parental disputes. See supra
notes 341-46 and accompanying text.
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power.3 5 1 In a dispute involving parents, however, the bargaining positions of the parents may be far from equal. 352 For example, although the
husband and wife may have negotiated day-to-day decisions during the
marriage, the acrimony that accompanies divorce may prevent one
spouse from strongly asserting herself in front of the other spouse.
In the great number of custody disputes between two basically "fit"
parents, however, an assumption of equality in bargaining capacity between man and woman is generally appropriate. Formal discrimination
against women in family law has largely been eliminated; 353 progress is
being made in eliminating discrimination against men and working
mothers in custody determinations. 354 Forty-four percent of all employed Americans are women, and employment of women in occupations
requiring higher levels of education and cognitive skills has increased significantly. 355 Divorced women tend to have higher salaries than married
women.3 5 6 More women are assuming prominent places in political and
economic life and in the professional schools in our society. Economic
discrimination against women still exists, but our society has made a
357
great deal of progress toward eradicating barriers based on sex.
Although we have not achieved equality between men and women, we
351. The prototypical situation in which mediation is generally thought appropriate is a labormanagement dispute. In such matters the mediator and society can assume that the parties are of
relatively equal bargaining capacity and are both experienced negotiators unlikely to be intimidated
by the other.
352. The concept of equality of bargaining power is extremely difficult to define. Assume one
parent worked while the other stayed home and took care of the child. The parent who worked may
be more experienced in business or financial affairs while the parent who stayed home may be more
articulate about the child's needs. In some sense both have different advantages in the negotiation
process. Some cases, however, are relatively clear. An assumption that parents start with equal
bargaining power is inappropriate when one parent has repeatedly physically abused the other over a
long period of time. Even if the husband were a fit parent, a seriously abused wife in these cases
should be able to ask the state for protection before being brought into a negotiation that makes a
false assumption that she is her husband's negotiating 'equal. Even in custody disputes involving
domestic violence, however, mediation may be a useful dispute settlement process after the legal
system provides protection to the victim by emergency measures. See Bethel & Singer, Mediation: A
New Remedy for Domestic Violence, in ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF FAMILY DIsPuTE RESOLUTION
363-99 (1982).
353. See Freed & Foster, Family Law in the Fifty States: An Overview, 16 FAM. L.Q. 289, 321
(1983) (noting trend toward recognizing contribution of spouse as homemaker); Younger, supra note
37 (tracing the movement towards equality of the sexes in both community property and commonlaw jurisdictions). But see Johnson, The Family in Transition: A JudicialOverview of Changing Sex
Roles, 2 FAM. ADVOC. 6 (1979) (arguing in favor of uniform family laws to counter problems faced
by women as evidenced by inconsistent adjudication in different jurisdictions). See generally Freed
& Foster, Family Law in the Fifty States: An Overview, 18 FAM. L.Q. 369 (1984) (discussing state
and federal developments in family law).
354. See supra notes 44-51.
355. Hacker, Men vs. Women in the Work Force, N.Y. Times, Dec. 9, 1984 § 6 (Magazine), at
124-25.
356. Id. at 127.
357. Id. at 129.
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have progressed enough to assume that most women are capable of negotiating with men in a mediation proceeding about their child. This is
particularly true when women can have the procedural protections of
advice of counsel before they sign a final agreement 358 and when the me359
diator is ethically bound not to facilitate unconscionable agreements.
Most significantly, however, equality of bargaining power between
men and women is not the focus of a cooperative system. The system,
instead, is designed to promote the child's interest. The fundamental aim
of creating a cooperative custody system is to protect the interest of the
weakest member of the reorganized family in a relationship with both
parents after divorce, not to protect an arguably less equal parent.
F.

Custody Evaluation as a Backup System

On the surface, it is arguable that the role of a custody evaluator is
not needed in a custody dispute resolution system that seeks to promote
parental cooperation following separation. The job of a custody evaluator is to help the court choose between contending parents by providing
neutral fact-gathering and recommendations; the goal of a cooperative
custody system is to maximize cooperation between parents. As previously suggested, however, the actual operation of custody evaluations in
the dispute resolution system makes the surface conflict between evalua3 60
tion and promoting cooperation more apparent than real.
The process of custody evaluation can be a powerful force encouraging parents to settle their dispute by functioning as a kind of informal
arbitrator of the custody dispute. 361 The choice should not then be between evaluation and mediation. A cooperative custody system should
have both. The two processes complement each other in serving the goal
of promoting parental settlement, especially if carefully structured to
work sequentially.
Some believe that the same person should be mediator and evaluator. 362 This combination, however, runs the risk of confusing parents
358. See Schepard, Philbrick & Rabino, supra note 275, at 638.
359. Id. at 650-51.
360. See supra subpart IV(C).
361. Some evaluators try to mediate the dispute during the evaluation process, both before and
after making a recommendation. Some parents settle before the evaluator's report is transmitted to
the court, either because the evaluator has successfully mediated the dispute or for fear of an adverse
recommendation. Other parents settle, often on advice of counsel, after the evaluator's recommendations have been made because they recognize they face an uphill fight in the wake of the
recommendations.
362. See, eg., McLaughlin v. Superior Court, 140 Cal. App. 3d 473, 483, 189 Cal. Rptr. 479,
486-87 (1983) (upholding due process challenge to local court rule prohibiting cross-examination of
evaluator at hearing, but encouraging combined mediator and evaluator roles under California
mandatory custody mediation statute). In addition to saving money by using one professional rather
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and the personnel involved as to their actual function. The result may be
that neither task is performed well. More significantly, however, combining the roles of mediator and evaluator loses sight of the importance
of reinforcing parental autonomy and competence in the reorganized
family.3 63 Confidential mediation is a far less intrusive dispute-resolution
process than evaluation. The state should give parents and children a
serious opportunity to agree on a custody plan with help but voluntarily
before it applies significant coercion to promote agreement. Relying on
confidential mediation initially reinforces the basic presumption of the
cooperative custody system-that the parents are responsible individuals
concerned about the welfare of their child, and simply need help in facilitating communication and in learning about their child's needs after
divorce.
VII.

Parental Autonomy and the Cooperative Custody System: The
Problem of Parental Relocation

The cooperative custody system is based on the social value of the
child's continuing relationship with both parents after divorce. Its premise is that a child is more likely to benefit if the state encourages divorced
parents to work together in a parental capacity than if the state delegates
control of the child to one of them.
This fundamental belief, however, must contend with the realities of
life in a mobile society that values personal and parental autonomy. The
conflict becomes acute when one divorced parent wants to move from the
geographic area where the child and the other parent live. This Part uses
such relocation controversies to sketch briefly how the cooperative custody system copes with potential conflicts between the needs of a child
and a parent's personal autonomy. This Part assumes that a child has
two fit parents who share legal and physical custody to a significant degree so that both have a meaningful relationship with the child. As will
than two in a single dispute, such a combination could strengthen both. Making the mediator and
the evaluator the same person may make parents and their lawyers take mediation more seriously, as
they know that the mediator will take the willingness of parents to compromise into account in her
evaluative report to the court. In effect, combining the roles of mediator and evaluator in the same
person suggests that placing a veil of confidentiality around mediation deters parental settlement. If
parental non-cooperation in mediation cannot be reported to the court a parent's incentive to try to
reach agreement in the mediation process is reduced. All the truly cynical parent who thinks she is
going to win at a hearing or evaluation need do is to stay silent during the mediation. The mediator
will then report to the court that the parents cannot reach agreement, without reporting the intransigent parent's lack of cooperation. But see MicH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 552.513(l), (3), 552.515
(West Supp. 1986) (providing for domestic relations mediation but making communication between
the mediator and parties to the mediation privileged communication inadmissible in court proceedings and prohibiting the mediator from performing recommendation or enforcement functions).
363. See supra text accompanying notes 332-35.
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be seen, a cooperative custody system does not necessarily make relocation controversies less angry or agonizing. It does, however, keep the
child's relationship with both parents the central focus of analysis and
the value to be preserved. 3 " The result does restrict the freedom of each

parent to do as he or she wishes with the child. These restrictions,
though, are the costs of social policies behind the cooperative custody
system.
Suppose one parent wishes to move from the geographic area where
both parents successfully share legal and physical custody. 3 65 How to

weigh the parent's right to move against the child's interest in preserving
her relationship with both parents presents a complex issue. The contemplated relocation seriously threatens the stability of a situation in
which she is doing well. The child's relationship with either parent is
threatened no matter what the outcome of the dispute. If the parent and
child move, the quality of the child's relationship with the parent who
remains may suffer because the greater distance between them will make

meaningful interaction on a regular basis far more difficult. Even if the
child's relationship with both parents can be maintained at some reasonably comparable level to what it was before the relocation, the child will
have to adjust to a new school, peer group, and community environment.
If the child's relocation is not allowed, but the parent relocates anyway,
leaving the child behind, the child's relationship with that parent may
suffer the same fate. If the child's relocation is not allowed and the par364. The analysis of parental relocation controversies that follows should also be useful to courts
considering such disputes in a jurisdiction that does not adopt a joint custody preference. Even in a
"best interests" or sole custody jurisdiction, courts can and should analyze the child's need to continue a meaningful relationship with a noncustodial parent.
365. For the following discussion in the text, assume that both parents meet minimum fitness
standards and actively involve themselves in the child's postseparation life through a joint legal
custody arrangement and a physical custody arrangement in which both participate substantially but
unequally. Each supports the child's relationship with the other, though relationships between the
parents remain somewhat hostile. Assume further that the child likes her school environment and
seems to be adjusting to the reorganization of the postdivorce family. Finally, assume that all
postdivorce support payments and wealth transfers between the parents occur as scheduled.
The child's custody and support plan functions for two years following divorce. Then, the
parent who exercises more of the physical custody responsibilities plans to relocate with the child to
a distant place for a combination of economic and emotional reasons: a new job; the possibility of
remarriage to someone who lives in the new location; and a desire to start a new life in a new
location. The parents' separation agreement contains a clause requiring the consent of the other
parent or a court of competent jurisdiction before either parent can relocate, but the provision sets
no substantive test for determining whether the move will be allowed. The child wants to maintain
her relationship with both parents and does not want to leave her friends and school. This hypothetical is a combination of the facts of In re Frederici, 338 N.W.2d 156 (Iowa 1983), Cooper v. Cooper,
99 N.J. 42, 491 A.2d 606 (1984), and Weiss v. Weiss, 52 N.Y.2d 170, 418 N.E.2d 377, 436 N.Y.S.2d
862 (1981).
In this hypothetical, the child's postdivorce relationship with both her parents has developed in
precisely the way that the child's and society's interests suggest it should.
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ent chooses to stay to preserve a relationship with the child, the parent
may resent the other parent and the child for blocking what the parent
perceives as a beneficial change in life.
In a cooperative custody system, the first attempt to resolve this
problem should be through mediation. If the parents had not divorced
they would have negotiated with each other about proposed relocations.
Mediation requires them to undertake that same negotiation with the
help of a neutral party. The neutral party is necessary because the forces
that encourage married parents to compromise with each other have
been weakened by divorce, and the neutral party reminds them of their
continuing joint interest in the welfare of their child.
The mediator can help the parents explore the variety of ways to
reduce the level of family disorganization the relocation might cause.
Perhaps the parent who desires to relocate can seek within the local geographic area job opportunities comparable to the one that would result
from the contemplated move. Both parents may be able to relocate to an
area where their relationships with the child can continue; the prospective spouse of the parent who wants to relocate may be. able to move to
where the parents currently live. The parents might maintain joint legal
custody arrangements by periodic telephone conferences or meetings in
mutually convenient sites and the sharing of information about the child.
The parents might also adjust physical custody schedules so that the
child and the parent who does not want to move will be compensated for
the loss of time together, especially if the parent who desires the move
can finance trips for the child or the nonrelocating parent.
Mediation should encourage the parents to adopt a creative joint
problem-solving mode of analysis 366 to the relocation problem that might

eliminate the need for a court to intervene. The quality of the relationship that each parent had with the child after divorce but before the relocation controversy arose might cause each parent to recognize the
importance of the child's continuing relationship with the other and,
therefore, compromise to maintain it.
Cooperative custody system principles and procedures also encourage parents to try to reduce the relocation's negative effects on the
child's relationship with the other parent. Courts currently seem to ask
implicitly whether the relocating parent is motivated by spite in seeking
permission to move. 367 Determining "true" or "predominant" motiva-

tion for a proposed move assumes that the court can distinguish spiteful
366. See generally R. FISHER & W. URY, supra note 146, at 58-83 (inventing creative options for
use in negotiation can be a significant aid to reaching an agreement).
367. See In re Frederici, 338 N.W.2d 156, 160 (Iowa 1983); Cooper v. Cooper, 99 N.J. 42, 56-57,
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reasons from rational reasons such as a new job and the desire to remarry. In many cases, motives may be mixed, consciously or unconsciously, or rational reasons for a move may be fabricated to mask
spiteful ones. An inquiry into "predominant" motivation requires a
court to reconstruct the parents' relationship since the divorce to see if
the contemplated move fits into a pattern of spite and retaliation. Such
an inquiry dredges up all the disadvantages of using adversary system
368
procedures to adjust family relationships.
The expert evaluations and court hearings in relocation controversies that follow the failure of mediation in the cooperative custody system, however, should move consideration of the parents' motivation
from the abstract and the past to the concrete and the future by focusing
on the adjustments the parent proposes in the current custody plan to
compensate the child and the nonrelocating parent for the diminution in
quality of their relationship that the relocation requires. A relocating
parent's lack of willingness to make serious attempts to avoid the necessity of relocation 369 or to make proposals and sacrifices in future custody
and support arrangements to encourage the other parent's continuing relationship with the child after relocation indicates that the relocating
parent does not value that relationship seriously. Negative inferences
can then be drawn from the parent's decision to relocate.
The cooperative custody system also broadens the focus of the
state's inquiry into the motivation of both parents by emphasizing the
importance of the child's relationship with the parent who wants to relocate. Pretrial evaluations create incentives to compromise for the parent
who wants the child to remain where she is. The opposing parent should
think about how to accommodate the other parent's reasons for the proposed move and assume that the move is being sought in good faith.
Even if her initial opposition seems absolute and unalterable, she should
be asked to assume the move will be permitted and to make proposals to
adjust the child's custody and support plan to minimize the move's adverse consequences. The family unit will thus be prepared for every contingency through advance planning. The failure of the parent opposing
relocation to take the other parent's needs seriously and to make contingency plans to accommodate the move should also result in adverse inferences about her if a court must make a determination for the parents.
491 A.2d 606, 613 (1984); Weiss v. Weiss, 52 N.Y.2d 170, 176, 418 N.E.2d 377, 380, 436 N.Y.S.2d
862, 865 (1981).
368. See supra text accompanying notes 194-98.
369. See Bryan v. Bryan, 99 A.D.2d 743, 471 N.Y.S.2d 650 (1984) (relocation request denied in
part because parent who sought job opportunity in new geographic area did not make attempt to
find similar job without relocation).
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Mediation and evaluation take place in the shadow of the rule of law
used in trials to decide relocation controversies. No dispute-resolution
procedure can eliminate the need for a standard to decide cases that do
not respond to settlement-promoting procedures and incentives. Ultimately, the state must decide whether to encourage or discourage the
parent from relocating based on a perception of whether the move is in
the best interests of the child. 370 Relocation controversies provide the
most serious test of how much a court is willing to restrict the autonomy
of a parent3 7 ' for the purpose of protecting a child's continuing relation372
ship with the other parent.
Some courts apply a test that emphasizes the primacy of the child's
continuing relationship with both parents. New York courts have, for
example, created a general rule that a custodial parent cannot leave the
jurisdiction because of the importance of the child's continuing relationship with the noncustodial parent, even though they have not created a
general rule that divorced parents should share equally in postdivorce
decision making about the child even if one of them objects. 373 Gener370. In some sense the state may have an interest in allowing the relocation to take place if the
relocating parent will become economically more productive as a result, thereby increasing the total
output of the economy. If so, a policy against allowing relocation at will to preserve the quality of
the child's relationship with both parents should be seen as an economic investment in the welfare of
future generations.
371. See supra note 365 and accompanying text.
372. Although the Supreme Court has not decided the issue, reasonable parental relocation restrictions following divorce imposed by a court do not seem to be constitutionally objectionable.
Such restrictions should be distinguished from restrictions imposed by statutes alleged to abridge a
citizen's constitutional right to travel. The great majority of right-to-travel cases deal with the equal
protection problem created when a state discriminates against new residents in the distribution of
important interests, such as the right to vote and the right to receive welfare benefits. In contrast, a
divorced parent's right to travel is necessarily qualified by the interests of the other parent and most
especially of the child. Cf. Jones v. Helms, 452 U.S. 412, 417-23 (1980) (upholding constitutionality
of state statute escalating the crime of child abandonment from a misdemeanor to a felony when the
parent left the state). It is also qualified by the state's important interest in regulating marriage and
divorce, especially when the interests of a child are involved. See Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 40607 (1975) (upholding a state's durational residency requirement for eligibility for divorce against a
right-to-travel challenge because of state's interest in regulating the "consequences of... moment"
for parents and children that result from a divorce decree); cf. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433,
(1984) ("The goal of granting custody based on the best interests of the child is indisputably a
substantial governmental interest for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause."). Many states impose some restriction on a divorced parent's right to relocate with the child. See Hillstrom, Out-ofState Removal ofChildren Analyzed, 8 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 4015 (Mar. 30, 1982) (emphasizing joint
custody and the continued authority of both parents to be in the best interests of the child with only
special circumstances being allowed to interfere with both parents' rights to raise the child). As the
Kansas Court of Appeals recently stated in rejecting a challenge to a relocation restriction imposed
on a sole custodial parent: "[A] divorced parent to whom custody of minor children has been entrusted may be required to forego or forfeit some rights [including the right to travel].., consistent
with the best interests and welfare of the children and the rights of the other parent." Carlson v.
Carlson, 661 P.2d 833, 836 (Kan. Ct. App. 1983). Recognizing that relocation restrictions are constitutional, however, does not determine whether and when they are in the child's best interests.
373. See supra note 113 for a discussion of New York's conservative approach to joint custody.
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ally, though, New York courts allow parents to relocate in good faith
only when the move seems to be essential to career opportunities and
374
economic advancement not available in the old location.
Other courts and commentators emphasize the primacy of the
child's relationship with the "primary" custodial parent. The Iowa
In contrast is the leading parental relocation case of Weiss v. Weiss, 52 N.Y.2d 170, 418 N.E.2d 377,
436 N.Y.S.2d 862 (1981), in which the New York Court of Appeals affirmed the granting of an
injunction preventing a custodial mother from relocating to Las Vegas with her son. According to
the trial court, relocation would interfere with the visitation rights given the father in the separation
agreement, rights that the father had faithfully exercised over a period of five years. Although the
separation decree contained provisions apparently allowing relocation at will, the Court dismissed
the provisions as "boilerplate," id. at 174, 418 N.E.2d at 379, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 864, and did not
permit the mother to relocate with the child.
The Court concluded that the mother's proposed compensatory visitation would create practical implementation difficulties (extra expense and the problem of finding long periods of available
time) and could not give the father and son anything like the 150 to 200 days a year they had been
visiting each other. The mother also did not have a "unique" or even "firm" job offer in Las Vegas,
and the move was not necessitated by exceptional health or educational needs, or the obligations of
remarriage.
374. See, e.g., Schwartz v. Schwartz, 91 A.D.2d 628, 456 N.Y.S.2d 811 (1982) (holding that the
best interests of the child are served by requiring him to remain with mother in new location);
Martinez v. Konczewski, 85 A.D.2d 717, 445 N.Y.S.2d 844 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981) (same). See
generally Florescue, Custodial-ParentMoves, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 19, 1983, at 3, col. I (reviewing New
York court decisions on custodial-parent moves and concluding that economic necessity is the controlling factor in judicial proceedings). The standard applied seems to be identical no matter what a
separation agreement or court order says about relocation before the controversy arises. The analysis focuses on the effect of the proposed relocation on the quality of the child's relationship with the
nonrelocating parent. New York courts generally require the relocating parent to minimize the
harm to the other parent's relationship with the child through compensatory measures such as bearing reasonable expenses in order to support the exercise of visitation made more costly by relocation.
Martinez v. Konczewski, 85 A.D.2d 717, 445 N.Y.S.2d 844 (1981).
The majority and concurring opinions in the New Jersey Supreme Court's recent decision in
Cooper v. Cooper, 99 N.J. 42, 491 A.2d 606 (1984) illustrate well the different judicial approaches to
the relocation problem in the context of a traditional sole custody/visitation arrangement. A recent
Note in the StanfordLaw Review suggests that judicial intervention in relocation controversies "constitutes an unwarranted interference with both family autonomy and the custodial parent's freedom." Note, The Judicial Role in Post-Divorce Child Relocation Controversies, 35 STAN. L. REV.
949, 949-50 (1983). The Note takes the "primary parent" position approach to relocation controversies, largely based on the Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit argument that the child's psychological/sole
custodial parent should have the right to determine the extent of the child's relationship with the
nonpsychological/noncustodial parent. Id. The Note argues that "judicial discretion should be replaced by a rule allowing the custodial parent to move whenever that parent so desires absent a
privately negotiated residence restriction." Id. at 950. Like Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit, it fails to
address the empirical evidence that shows that the child's postseparation relationship with both
parents is the most significant variable in determining whether the child will successfully surmount
the divorce crisis. See supra notes 61-73 and accompanying text. It also fails to consider the constitutional objections to a rule of law that leaves the noncustodial parent's interest in a relationship
with the child subject to potentially arbitrary termination or diminution by the custodial parent. See
supra note 151 and accompanying text. Nor, like Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit, does the Note emphasize that the power of the sole custodial parent will significantly increase, creating a huge benefit
for the parent who has the resources to litigate this question. Cf Mnookin & Komhauser, supra
note 114, at 980-84 (suggesting that Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit's proposal to give the "psychological parent" control over the visitation rights of the noncustodial parent will benefit the parent who
not only has the resources to litigate custody disputes but who is also able to find sufficient grounds
upon which to unilaterally reopen litigation).
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Supreme Court, for example, has taken an approach directly opposite to
the approach of the New York courts and has deferred to the custodial
parent's wish to relocate even when the parents have a working joint
custody arrangement.

375

A third alternative to New York's presumption against relocation
and Iowa's presumption in its favor is to treat the issue on a case-by-case
basis without a presumption. Under this view, the standard for reloca376
tion is a multifactor "best interests of the child" analysis.
These three standards for allowing parental relocation parallel the
three basic standards for joint custody: favoring it in most cases, against
it in most cases, and neutral on the subject with determinations made on
a case-by-case basis. 37 7 A presumption against relocation strongly protects the child's continuing relationship with both parents and thus is
most compatible with a cooperative custody system. It is also most restrictive of parental autonomy. Choosing between the competing substantive rules only emphasizes how important mediation and other
agreement-inducing features of a cooperative custody system are. Parents, planning together and with respect for each other's importance in
375. In In re Frederici, 338 N.W.2d 156 (Iowa 1983), the Iowa Supreme Court permitted a good
faith move out-of-state by a mother who was the primary physical custodian of the children, even
though the father had joint legal custody with the mother and had faithfully exercised extensive
visitation/physical-custody rights. Fredericiis factually distinguishable from Weiss, the leading New
York case, see supra note 373, as the reason for the mother's proposed relocation in the Iowa case
was "a unique and promising career opportunity of the kind that typically motivates people in this
highly mobile society to relocate." 338 N.W.2d at 160. On the other hand, Fredericiis in one
respect a stronger case than Weiss for prohibiting the relocation. The father in Fredericishared legal
custody of the children with the mother.
More important than the factual similarities and differences between the cases are the differences in attitudes of the two courts toward parental relocation controversies. The Iowa Supreme
Court specifically rejected the standards of Weiss and the subsequent New York cases. The court
did not view the mother's request to relocate as the precipitating event requiring modification of the
custody arrangement. Instead, the court focused on the father's opposition to the mother's request
as the cause of the controversy and treated the father's opposition to the relocation as a request by
the father to modify the custody plan:
A parent seeking to take custody from the other must prove an ability to minister more
effectively to the children's well-being. The heavy burden upon a party seeking to modify
custody stems from the principle that once custody of the children has been fixed, it should
be disturbed only for the most cogent reasons.
Id. at 158.
The Iowa approach reflects the continuing influence of the sole custody system, even when the
parents have a working joint custody arrangement. Although the father shared legal custody and
had an extensive relationship with the children since the divorce, the parent who desired to relocate
was allowed to do so because she had a greater degree of responsibility for physical custody of the
child. The fact that the parent who desired to relocate had greater physical custody responsibilities
placed the burden of persuasion on the parent opposing the move.
376. See Weiss v. Weiss, 56 N.Y.2d 938, 944-50, 439 N.E.2d 324, 327-31, 453 N.Y.S.2d 609,
611-15 (1982) (Meyer, J., dissenting).
377. See supra II(B)-(C).
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the child's life, are better able to formulate a plan to deal with parental
relocations than a court could applying any conceivable substantive test.
Conclusion
However the legal system is organized and no matter what its goals
are, parental divorce will create a crisis for the affected child. The organization of the legal system, however, can make the crisis of greater or
lesser proportions. The analytical tools and procedural mechanisms to
organize a cooperative custody system to perform the task of crisis containment are reasonably well identified. What is lacking are resources
and commitment on the part of those who operate the system.
Creating a cooperative custody system is only a partial step towards
the goal of providing as many children as possible with two involved
parents throughout their youth. Divorce is a less than ideal time to promote cooperative parenting; the family structure is dissolving, there is
often great anger, and parental roles in many families need to be redefined drastically. Promoting the child's meaningful relationship with
both parents after divorce would be easier if both parents had such a
relationship before it. Cooperative custody concepts would not then
seem so foreign and threatening and each parent would be more likely to
recognize the importance of the child's bond with the other. As part of
their basic education for citizenship, men need to learn about the importance of their being involved with their children before and during marriage. 378 Women must not assume children are their private preserve
and, instead, should invite and encourage men to participate in the joys
and problems of childrearing. Employers must come to terms with the
enormous needs of working parents of both sexes for adequate child care,
without which it would not be possible for many of them to balance roles
in the workplace and in the family. As a nation we must recognize that
an increased investment of resources in children is an investment in our
379
own future.
The need for basic changes in society, in the relationship between
men and women and in the relationship of both with their children is not,
however, a reason to delay implementation of a cooperative custody system. Changes in the larger social structure and changes in the legal
structure reinforce and mirror each other. Both are necessary to move
toward achieving a society where all members of the family can achieve
378. Many educational programs are beginning to emerge for this purpose. See Ciampa, The
Emerging Father,58 BOSTONIA 29 (1984) (description of the "Fatherhood Project").
379. For a thoughtful reflection on the future direction of national public policy toward children, see D. MOYNIHAN, FAMILY AND NATION (1986) (Godkin Lectures at Harvard University).
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their full potential and men and women can share the joys and sorrows,
credit and blame that comes with creating the next generation.
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